Longevity is valuable. Most of us would agree that it’s bad to die when you could go on living, and death’s badness has to do with the value your life would have if it continued. Most of us would also agree that it’s bad if life expectancy in a country is low, it’s bad if there is high infant mortality and it’s bad if there is a wide mortality gap between different groups in a population. But how can we make (...) such judgments more precise? How should we evaluate the harm of mortality in a population? Although philosophers have written a lot about the harm of death for individuals, very little work has been done on the harm of mortality for populations. In this article, I take the first steps towards developing a theory of the harm of population mortality. Even these first steps, I argue, lead to surprising results. (shrink)

My remarks on Metz's project will focus on another angle than the one Metz uses. I am more interested in thinking about whether and how far ethical standards from different cultures really differ, how to understand those differences, and how to relate them to what is objectively good, independently of people's opinions on the matter. Of course one widely circulating opinion on the topic is that cross-cultural differences somehow demonstrate that there is no such thing as objective good at all (...) – that each culture has its own conception of what is good, right, permitted, forbidden, and so on, and the differences are so wide that anyone at all familiar with this, can no longer take seriously the idea that there could be any “objective” values underlying such varied systems. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 2007: pp. 336-346. (shrink)

To date, bioethics and health policy scholarship has given little consideration to questions of aging and intergenerational justice in the developing world. Demographic changes are precipitating rapid population aging in developing nations, however, and ethical issues regarding older people’s claim to scarce healthcare resources must be addressed. This paper posits that the traditional arguments about generational justice and age‐based rationing of healthcare resources, which were developed primarily in more industrialized nations, fail to adequately address the unique challenges facing older persons (...) in developing nations. Existing philosophical approaches to age‐based resource allocation underemphasize the importance of older persons for developing countries and fail to adequately consider the rights and interests of older persons in these settings. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the most appropriate framework for thinking about generational justice in developing nations is a rights‐based approach that allows for the interests of all age groups, including the oldest, to be considered in the determination of health resource allocation. (shrink)

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any (...) of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way. (shrink)

In a world of limited resources, competition between the young and old prompt difficult questions of justice. In countries with public pension and health care systems, or with aging populations, there is often a concern that members of different generations are not always treated fairly. Dennis McKerlie's monograph examines justice between age-groups with the ultimate goal of a new theory of justice that effectively grapples with those questions. In the realm of public policy and medical ethics this is an important (...) and timely topic, but surprisingly one that has received relatively little attention from moral philosophers. McKerlie develops a comprehensive view of fairness between age groups that applies the egalitarian values of equality, or priority for the badly off, to temporal parts of lives -- not just to complete lives. (shrink)

To date, bioethics and health policy scholarship has given little consideration to questions of aging and intergenerational justice in the developing world. Demographic changes are precipitating rapid population aging in developing nations, however, and ethical issues regarding older people’s claim to scarce healthcare resources must be addressed. This paper posits that the traditional arguments about generational justice and age-based rationing of healthcare resources, which were developed primarily in more industrialized nations, fail to adequately address the unique challenges facing older persons (...) in developing nations. Existing philosophical approaches to age-based resource allocation underemphasize the importance of older persons for developing countries and fail to adequately consider the rights and interests of older persons in these settings. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the most appropriate framework for thinking about generational justice in developing nations is a rights-based approach that allows for the interests of all age groups, including the oldest, to be considered in the determination of health resource allocation. (shrink)