Habermas's analysis of rational action is the fulcrum for his broader theoretical project. If that analysis is faulty his larger project is jeopardized. I explore the role Habermas assigns to strategic action in order to scrutinize his central concept of communicative action. Using basic game theoretic concepts as a counterpoint I argue that he both misconstrues stategic action and fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. I conclude by sketching several ways that Habermas might seek to rectify deficiencies (...) in his analysis of rational action. (shrink)

To be ashamed of one's immorality—that is a step on the staircase at whose end one is also ashamed of one's morality. Friedrich Nietzsche.

Among “continental” philosophers there is general agreement that reason has to be understood as culturally mediated and embodied in social practice, and thus that the critique of reason should be carried out through some form of sociocultural analysis. At the same time, there is very sharp disagreement among them as to just what form the critique should take. In its most general terms, that disagreement has come to be known as the “modernity/postmodernity debate” in philosophy. Stylizing a bit, we might (...) characterize one side as attacking Enlightenment—especially Kantian—conceptions of reason and the rational subject at their very roots, and the other side as wanting to preserve such conceptions by transforming them. It is the merit of Richard Bernstein’s recent book to have reconstructed these abstruse metaphilosophical debates in generally comprehensible prose and to have indicated in the process the relevance of the pragmatist tradition to the issues they raise. (shrink)

“ S pace, K no w l edge and P o w e r ” , en tr ev i s t a r ea l i z a d a en 1982 y pub li cada en P aul R ab i no w , The Foucau l t R eade r , N ueva Y o r k, 1984. A quí se pub li ca de acue r do a l a ve r s i ón f r (...) ancesa, t r aduc i da por P ab l o Bli t s t e i n y Tadeo L im a. (shrink)

What if thought freed itself from common sense and decided to think only at the extreme point of its singularity? What if it mischievously practiced the bias of paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the doxa? What if it thought difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference?1.

What if thought freed itself from common sense and decided to think only at the extreme point of its singularity? What if it mischievously practiced the bias of paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the doxa? What if it thought difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference?1.