In the first part of this paper the marked differences between the stances of some philosophers of education who view the field as a self-contained discipline and MacIntyre's contrasting view are outlined and discussed, with the author seeing the greater merit in MacIntyre's position. This leads on to a review in the second part of the paper of the differences between MacIntyre and Dunne on teaching as a practice and on the range of issues that underlie these differences. Again, the (...) paper argues in favour of MacIntyre's claim that teaching is subservient to the good it serves, in this case the good of the learner and of the community. Criticisms are then made, however, of how MacIntyre conceives of the good of the community, and of its promotion by learning. In particular, his advocacy of partisan universities and his arguments for rationalising the rivalries between them are faulted. In its concluding part, the paper finds more merit in the pedagogical features of MacIntyre's late work Dependent Rational Animals, particularly the rationale advanced for educating independent practical reasoners. (shrink)

I argue here that Alasdair MacIntyre is mistaken when he claims that teaching is not a practice. In particular, I try to throw some doubt on his claim that ‘teaching is never more than a means’ and to challenge his list of things that all students should learn. In the second section, I show how analyses of professionalism endorse MacIntyre's emphasis on complexity and internal criteria for practices. Finally, building on the doubts observed in the first section and the criteria (...) identified in the second, I describe teaching as a relational practice. (shrink)

This discussion begins from the dilemma, posed in some earlier writing by Alasdair MacIntyre, that education is essential but also, in current economic and cultural conditions, impossible. The potential for resolving this dilemma through appeal to ‘practice’, ‘narrative unity’, and ‘tradition’(three core concepts in After Virtue and later writings) is then examined. The discussion also explores the relationship of education to the modern state and the power of a liberal education to create an ‘educated public’ very different in character from (...) the electorates of contemporary democratic regimes. It concludes with some remarks on the role of education in combating prejudice against certain kinds of human difference. (shrink)

Some initial reflections on the theoretical status of philosophy of education suggest that it seems appropriate to regard education and teaching as practices in some sense. Following a distinction between teaching as an institutional and professional role and teaching as a more basic form of moral association, however, some key aspects of this distinction are explored via a contrast between MacIntyrean notions of moral and social practice and more mainstream Aristotelian virtue-ethics concepts of moral character and agency. The paper proceeds (...) to argue that, notwithstanding any and all pressure to regard teaching in institutional and professional contexts as a form of technical or managerial expertise directed to specific social ends, neither teaching nor the moral ends which it more widely serves seem reducible to practices in any such socially defined sense. (shrink)

He further argues that it is necessary to rethink traditional conceptions of argument, and to find a position that avoids the limitations of both the highly abstract approach of formal logic and the highly contextualized approaches of rhetoric and communication theory.".

In this paper, I reconstruct Alasdair MacIntyre’s aretaic, practical philosophy, drawing out its implications for professional ethics in general and the practice of teaching in particular. After reviewing the moral theory as a whole, I examine MacIntyre’s notion of internal goods. Defined within the context of practices, such goods give us reason to reject the very idea of applied ethics. Being goods for the practitioner, they suggest that the eudaimonia of the practitioner is central to professional ethics. In this way, (...) MacIntyre’s moral theory helps us recover the untimely question, how does teaching contribute to the flourishing of the teacher? (shrink)

This chapter enquires into the nature of university teaching. I consider whether Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of a practice, together with some of his related ideas, is useful to us here. My argument is that MacIntyre’s talk of incommensurable rationalities tells in the end against the fragmentation of higher education and rather points to one distinctive and important role for the university: that the university should be conceived in some respects as a therapeutic community, whose function it is to encourage and (...) enable its members to think together. (shrink)

I argue here that Alasdair MacIntyre is mistaken when he claims that teaching is not a practice. In particular, I try to throw some doubt on his claim that ‘teaching is never more than a means’ and to challenge his list of things that all students should learn. In the second section, I show how analyses of professionalism endorse MacIntyre’s emphasis on complexity and internal criteria for practices. Finally, building on the doubts observed in the first section and the criteria (...) identified in the second, I describe teaching as a relational practice. (shrink)