The text includes fragments of his work that have never before been translated.

The revival of Leibniz studies in the past twenty-five years has cast important new light on both the context and content of Leibniz's philosophical thought. Where earlier English-language scholarship understood Leibniz's philosophy as issuing from his preoccupations with logic and language, recent work has recommended an account on which theological, ethical, and metaphysical themes figure centrally in Leibniz's thought throughout his career. The significance of these themes to the development of Leibniz's philosophy is the subject of increasing attention by philosophers (...) and historians. This collection of new essays by a distinguished group of scholars offers an up-to-date overview of the current state of Leibniz research. In focusing on nature and freedom, the volume revisits two key topics in Leibniz's thought, on which he engaged both contemporary and historical arguments. Important contributions to Leibniz scholarship in their own right, these articles collectively provide readers a framework in which to better situate Leibniz's distinctive philosophy of nature and the congenial home for a morally significant freedom that he took it to provide. (shrink)

While he was in the employ of the Elector of Mainz, between 1668 and 1671, Leibniz produced a series of important studies in natural law. One of these, dated between 1670 and 1671, is especially noteworthy since it contains Leibniz's earliest sustained attempt to develop an account of justice. Central to this account is the notion of what Leibniz would later come to call `disinterested love', a notion that remained essentially unchanged in Leibniz's work from this period to the end (...) of his life. Through his notion of disinterested love, Leibniz sought to resolve the supposed conflict between self- and other-regarding motives. For a variety of reasons, many commentators have failed to understand the basis of Leibniz's proposed resolution. My purpose in the present paper is to clarify the terms in which Leibniz effected this resolution, as well as to point out important developments in his later thought concerning the relation between pleasure, good, and happiness. (shrink)

Gegenstand dieser Studien ist eine moglichst umfassende Darstellung und Deutung des Naturrechtsgedankens bei Leibniz. Es wird versucht, unter Verzicht auf ein bestimmtes philosophisches Vorverstandnis Leibniz' Naturrechtsgedanken aus dem vorhandenen Quellenmaterial vom Text her zu erschliessen, zu ordnen und im historischen Zusammenhang zu verstehen.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

To mark the 300th anniversary of the composition of Leibniz’ most important mature writing on justice, the Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice, I published an interpretation of this work in The Leibniz Review. But Dr. Andreas Blank, dissatisfied with my Platonizing “reading” of the Méditation, published his own commentary in the same Review —treating not just my 2003 article but also my Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise and several smaller writings from the (...) period 1972-2002. Since Andreas Blank is a good Leibniz-scholar who deserves a reply, I want to attempt an answer; and to avoid any possible misrepresentation, I want to quote the beginning of his article, word-for-word. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Préface Sigles utilisés Tableau synchronique Politique et religion des employeurs de Leibniz A - La philosophie politique L'architectonique archaïque : le rapport puissance > sagesse L'inversion du rapport structural : sagesse > puissance L'empire (...) de la sagesse sur les perfections finies et infinies B - La politique philosophique La socialité Souveraineté et majesté Les trois formes du gouvernement de la République Entre paix et guerre Les facteurs matériels de la paix Les facteurs culturelsde la paix Futurition Utopie et optimum Bibliographie Pages de fin. (shrink)

This remarkable book is the most comprehensive study ever written of the history of moral philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its aim is to set Kant's still influential ethics in its historical context by showing in detail what the central questions in moral philosophy were for him and how he arrived at his own distinctive ethical views. The book is organised into four main sections, each exploring moral philosophy by discussing the work of many influential philosophers of the (...) seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In an epilogue the author discusses Kant's view of his own historicity, and of the aims of moral philosophy. In its range, in its analyses of many philosophers not discussed elsewhere, and in revealing the subtle interweaving of religious and political thought with moral philosophy, this is an unprecedented account of the evolution of Kant's ethics. (shrink)

Es ist weitgehend anerkannt, dass sich Leibniz' praktische Philosophie fest auf teleologische Prinzipien (Vollkommenheit, Glückseligkeit), affektive Faktoren (Freude, Liebe) wie auch intellektuelle Tugenden (Wissen, Weisheit) gründet. Tatsächlich definiert Leibniz Weisheit als „die Wissenschaft von der Glückseligkeit" und Gerechtigkeit letztlich als „die Liebe des Wissenden" (caritas sapientis). Jedoch argumentiere ich in dieser Arbeit, dass Leibniz' praktische Philosophie auf die deontologischen Kategorien von Recht (ius) und Verpflichtung (obligatio) gegründet ist. Diese Kategorien, eingeführt in einer der frühesten Arbeiten von Leibniz, den Nova Methodus (...) Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667), bezeichnen die moralischen Qualitäten einer rationalen Substanz, d. h. die moralische Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer Person, gerecht zu handeln. Von dieser a-priori-Begründung leitet Leibniz materielle und gesetzliche Rechte und Verpflichtungen, seine bekannten drei Regeln des Rechten wie auch das Wesen der „Allgemeinen Nützlichkeit" ab. Im Wesentlichen bezeichnen die deontologischen Kategorien die Selbst-Begrenzung der Freiheit einer Person, d. h. ihre innere Fähigkeit, ihre Ziele vereinbar mit und nutzbringend für alle anderen rationalen Wesen zu machen. Ich werde zeigen, dass Leibniz' viel spätere teleologische Prinzipien ohne diese, wenig beachtete deontische Begründung nicht richtig verstanden werden. (shrink)

Barbeyrac's republication of and commentary on Leibniz' attack on Pufendorf's natural-law doctrine is often seen as symptomatic of the failure of all three early moderns to solve a particular moral-philosophical problem: that of the relationship between civil authority and morality. Making use of the first English translation of Barbeyrac's work, this article departs from the usual view by arguing that here we are confronted by three conflicting constructions of civil obligation, arising not from the common intellectual terrain of moral philosophy, (...) but from divergent religious and political cultures. If this approach makes the three constructions less susceptible to theoretical reconciliation, then it opens them to a more revealing historical investigation, in terms of the particular religious and political circumstances in which they arose, and which they were designed to address. The result is that these early modern struggles over the nature of civil obligation confront us again as unfinished historical business. (shrink)