This study integrates the research on corporate political strategy and corporate governance. Using the agency theory perspective, this study examines how corporate governance mechanisms such as institutional ownership, insider ownership, and long-term executive compensation affect a firm’s political strategy approach. This study proposes that an agency problem may occur between owners and managers in regard to firms’ approach to corporate political strategy. Since a relational approach to corporate political strategy, such as establishing a government relations office in Washington, DC, requires (...) significant resource commitments without guaranteeing a favorable policy change, shareholders might be reluctant to approve such an approach. In a sample of 3,417 U.S. manufacturing firms, over 5 years of data, the results show that institutional ownership and insider ownership are negatively associated with firms’ propensity to engage in a relational approach to political strategy. (shrink)

While there are growing bodies of research examining both the differences between strongly and poorly socially performing firms, and the impact of firm leaders on other strategic outcomes, little has been done in examining the effect of firm leaders on corporate social performance (CSP). This study directly addresses this issue by using upper echelon theory, and the KLD Research Analytics CSP ratings, to show that observable CEO characteristics predict differences in CSP between firms, even when firm and industry characteristics are (...) controlled for. Using a sample of 650 public US firms I find that strong or exemplary CSP, as measured by the strengths categories of KLD's ratings, is positively related to the CEO having a bachelor's degree in humanities, having a breadth of career experience and being female. I find that KLD strength ratings are negatively related to the CEO having a bachelor's degree in economics and to their level of short-term compensation. Preliminary tests of causality support the assertion that these effects reflect CEO discretion rather than being an artifact of reverse causality. Significant relationships between the CEO characteristics and poor social performance as measured by the concerns categories of KLD's ratings are not found. This suggests that CEOs have more discretion in influencing strong and exemplary social performance than in impacting poor CSP. Implications, particularly for economics education, are discussed. While there are many fruitful directions for future research, the benefits and challenges to conducting similar studies in other countries is focused upon to correspond to the global nature of this special issue. (shrink)

This article explains the rationale for study of the governance challenges of corporate political activity. The topic is important, especially in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, but understudied to date. The authors review the literature bearing on this topic. The authors separate consideration of the topic into macro-level and micro-level issues. The macro level concerns the societal perspective. At this level, key research questions concern whether corporate political activity be allowed, and how it should be (...) regulated. The micro level covers managerial and shareholder control over corporate political activity. At this level, key research questions include concern whether the firm should practice political activity and how to regulate practice through professional self-regulation, ethical guidelines, and corporate governance systems control. The remainder of this article contains focused summaries of the articles selected for this Special Issue. Each article is introduced and evaluated against the key research questions at the macro or micro levels of analysis. (shrink)