Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory of personal (...) identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular set of actions, experiences, and characteristics is that of a given person rather than someone else. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper critically examines the liberal model of decision making for the terminally ill and contrasts it with the familial model that can be found in some Asian cultures. The contrast between the two models shows that the liberal model is excessively patient‐centred, and misconceives and marginalises the role of the family in the decision making process. The paper argues that the familial model is correct in conceiving the last journey of one's life as a sharing process rather than (...) a process of exercising one's prior or counterfactual choice, and concludes by suggesting a policy framework for the practice of familialism that can answer the liberal challenge that familialism cannot safeguard the patient from abuse and neglect. (shrink)

Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory of personal (...) identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular set of actions, experiences, and characteristics is that of a given person rather than someone else. (shrink)

The notions of “expert” and “expertise” imply that some people have more credibility than others on certain matters. While expert authority is often taken for granted, there are questions as to whether expert power in some cases can be a form of epistemic oppression. Informed by bedside disagreements between family and clinicians as well as feminist discussions of epistemic oppression, this paper argues for a commitment to epistemic humility and the adoption of a two-way collaborative approach between clinicians and families (...) that can help to enhance professionals’ own understanding of their theoretical framework and also promote responsive patient care. (shrink)

Consensus is growing among ethicists and lawyers that medical decision making for incompetent patients who were previously competent should be made in accordance with that person's prior wishes and desires. Moreover, this legal and ethical preference for the substituted judgment standard has found its way into the daily practice of medicine. However, what appears on the surface to be an agreement between jurists, bioethicists, and clinicians obscures the very real differences between disciplines regarding the actual implementation of the sub stituted (...) judgment standard. Ethicists and judges have carefully outlined how substituted judgments ought to be made and evaluated. Although differences arise, especially at the state court level, regarding the scope of the substituted judgment standard and its relation to other standards of surrogate decision making, agreement is fairly widespread on the priority of substituted judgment and on the necessity of sufficient evidence being available in order to support a particular substituted judgment. (shrink)