In this paper, I explore two closely related ethical principles, ‘Ought implies Can’ and the Kantian ‘Du kannst, denn du sollst’ . The former principle is mainly used to diffuse moral dilemmas and other problem cases. Possibility is a necessary condition of obligation. Recent criticism notwithstanding, the principle is shown to be defensible and useful in the case of genuine, action-guiding oughts. The latter principle makes use of the former, but it in addition presupposes the validity of a moral command (...) and on that basis concludes that the agent must be able to act accordingly. ‘Du kannst, denn du sollst’ has its roots in Kantian ethics: the firm consciousness of moral necessity serves as the ratio cognoscendi of human freedom. The principle is mainly directed against metaphysical scepticism turning on the validity of natural determinism. It is doubtful whether many non-Kantians would be willing to support it in its original metaphysical incarnation. (shrink)

This paper develops an interpretation of what is essential to kant's doctrine of the highest good, Which defends it while also explaining why it is often rejected. While it is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, The paper gives an account in which neither feature appears. The highest good is best understood as a state of affairs to be achieved through human agency, Containing the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of (...) their permissible ends-I.E., One in which all act from the moral law and in doing so achieve their intended ends. The paper shows that the texts contain two distinct conceptions not distinguished by kant-Both a theological and a secular (political) notion. The standard objections apply to the theological, But the secular conception is consistent with kant's conception of moral conduct. Moreover, That the highest good is introduced as an end to be constructed out of the moral law indicates that the secular version is the essential notion. (shrink)

This is the first book in English devoted entirely to Kant's Opus postumum and its place in the Kantian oeuvre.

Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...) reason can provide justified assent about things-in-themselves, in favor of one that is much more liberal. Interpretive benefits are not the only results of the discussion, however. I also hope it will become clear along the way that there is such a thing as Kantian Belief, and that we often have quite a lot of it. -/- . (shrink)

Of all the major philosophical works, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most rewarding, yet one of the most difficult. Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary elucidates not only textural questions and minor issues, but also the central problems which arise, he contends, from the conflicting tendencies of Kant's own thinking. Kemp Smith's Commentary continues to be in demand with Kant scholars, and it is being reissued here with a new introduction by Sebastian Gardner to set it in its (...) contemporary context. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of Kant's treatment of happiness in ethics.

When this work was first published in 1960, it immediately filled a void in Kantian scholarship.