In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ideas in the Brain: The Localization of Memory Traces in the Eighteenth CenturyTimo KaitaroPlato suggests in the Theaetetus that we imagine a piece of wax in our soul, a gift from the goddess of Memory. We are able to remember things when our perceptions or thoughts imprint a trace upon this piece of wax, in the same manner as a seal is stamped on wax. Plato uses this metaphor (...) to explain the errors which arise when we mistake something for something else: we connect the perception of an object with the trace belonging to another. The metaphor can also be used in explaining differences in people’s mnestic capacities: rapid learning and forgetting correspond to soft wax, impure wax results in muddled traces, etc.1 If we locate the traces in the brain instead of in the soul, Plato’s metaphor gains consistency and turns into a testable hypothesis. This move was already made by Quintilian.2So, the metaphor of memory as traces in the brain is evidently not a modern invention. This is easy to understand. To frame the hypothesis one needs only to reflect on how we use objects outside our brains for mnemonic purposes. We conserve ideas by tracing or printing letters and words on paper. We are also able to conserve images in drawings, paintings and prints. What could be more natural than to think of memory as the formation of traces in the brain? The development of even better information storage techniques in the form of pictures, symbols, and signs provides the metaphor extra plausibility. Plato’s seal allows us to imagine the imprint of a person’s likeness, but modern techniques of information storage and retrieval make it even easier to imagine memory in general as the formation of material traces.Explaining memory in terms of material traces could, of course, be taken [End Page 301] to mean that the formation of material traces in the brain is merely a necessary condition of memory. But one could also take a more reductionistic stance which identifies memory with the formation of material traces. Furthermore, one could identify specific mental items (sensations, ideas, memories) with specific physiological events or anatomical entities in the brain. This seems especially plausible if we imagine that the traces in the brain are as discrete and separate as ideas or memories are in our minds. Since the traces we form or print on paper consist of discrete letters and words, the thought that the traces in the brain are equally discrete and separate comes easily. Plato, in fact, made separateness a condition for the memory to work properly: it is not easy to read signs printed on one another.3 Of course, no traces are actually visible in the brain. But they are easy to imagine, as it is to imagine explanations of psychological phenomena, such as association, based on these traces.At the end of the seventeenth century, explanations of mental phenomena referring to material traces in the brain were used by writers, from Platonists to materialists, who supported widely different theories about the nature of the human mind.4 In fact, as I will show later in this paper, the question of the possible identity of mental entities, like ideas or sensations, with material entities or traces in the brain is relatively independent of the question of the existence of an immaterial soul. Or rather, if there is a systematic connection between the answers proposed to these two questions in the eighteenth century, it is not the connection one would expect. Nowadays we often tend to think of a prototypical materialist as someone who makes radical reductionistic claims about the identity of mental phenomena with brain states. We also tend to think of the eighteenth-century French materialists as “mechanistic.”5 In view of this reputation, it may come as a surprise to find that some eighteenth-century materialists, notably Denis Diderot, were in fact consistent anti-reductionists and opposed to mechanical or mechanistic explanations of the mental.6 In fact, the epithet “mechanistic” is misleading even when applied to the philosopher who is traditionally presented as the paradigmatic example of a “mechanistic materialist,” Julien Offray... (shrink)

So-called identity theories that postulate the identity of mental phenomena with brain states are usually associated with materialistic ontology. However, the historical picture of the actual attempts at spelling out the mind–brain identities is more complex. In the eighteenth century such identities were most enthusiastically proposed by dualists, whereas non-reductionistic materialists such as Diderot tried to get along without them. In the nineteenth century physiologists such as Broca, Charcot and Wernicke, who postulated discrete and localizable neural correlates for ideas and (...) mental images, ended up, despite their professed materialism, defending theories that resembled Cartesian schemes and the theories of their eighteenth-century dualistic predecessors. Some problems resulting from the use of these theoretical models postulating local and discrete traces, images or representations in the brain in the context of materialist ontology are obviously related to their dualistic origins and to the fact that they are necessarily bound up with dualistic presuppositions. In the context of the criticism of the nineteenth-century memory trace paradigm it is, however, important to bear in mind that functional localization as such is not dependent on the notion of localizable representations. Nor are materialist theories of the mind necessarily dependent on postulating specific type–type identities between the mental and the physiological. (shrink)

This book analyses the concept of scientific explanation developed by French disciples of Descartes in the period 1660-1700. Clarke examines the views of authors such as Malebranche and Rohault, as well as those of less well-known authors such as Cordemoy, Gadroys, Poisson and R'egis. These Cartesian natural philosophers developed an understanding of scientific explanation as necessarily hypothetical, and, while they contributed little to new scientific discoveries, they made a lasting contribution to our concept of explanation--generations of scientists in subsequent centuries (...) followed their lead. (shrink)

"Lettres à Sophie Volland" par Denis Diderot. Denis Diderot était un écrivain, philosophe et encyclopédiste français (1713-1784).

Diderot -la cheville ouvrière de l'Encyclopédie- a été en relation avec tous les écrivains, tous les artistes, tous les savants de son époque. Son universelle curiosité et son immense culture lui ont permis de dialoguer avec les représentants des disciplines les plus diverses. Aussi, sa Correspondance est-elle un témoignage unique sur la vie intellectuelle et artistique du XVIIIè siècle. Moins volumineuse que celle de Voltaire, moins sentimentale que celle de Rousseau, elle fait entrer le lecteur de plein-pied dans la république (...) des lettres. Si l'Europe des Lumières a été une Europe française, c'est aussi grâce au rayonnement des Encyclopédistes et de Diderot en particulier, qui fut également le conseiller de Catherine II de Russie. Mais ce ne sont pas seulement tous les grands esprits de l'époque que l'on rencontre au fil de ces pages, ce sont aussi les amis de Diderot, ses familiers, sa fille et Sophie Vollant. L'homme de lettres était aussi un homme de cœur. L'intérêt de ce volume réside dans les textes et dans les notes établies par un des meilleurs spécialistes de l'époque. De précieux index des lieux, des personnes et des œuvres font de cet ouvrage un instrument de travail hors pair. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est la thèse de doctorat en médecine présentée en 1943 par Georges Canguilhem, augmentée, lors de sa réédition vingt ans plus tard, de réflexions philosophiques sur la signification du terme « normal » en médecine. La thèse débute par une étude historique sur l’identité des phénomènes normaux et pathologiques, dogme de la pensée médicale au XIXe siècle. La seconde partie est une étude systématique, sous la forme d’une analyse critique, des concepts de normal et de pathologique. Georges Canguilhem (...) (1904-1995), philosophe puis médecin, contribua à rénover l’épistémologie française. (shrink)

Sans cesse lu et étudié, Descartes exerça une influence considérable en Europe dès le XVIIe siècle. Le projet de l’édition des œuvres complètes de Descartes a été lancé en 1894 par le Ministère de l’Instruction publique, et entrepris par un comité comprenant entre autre Emile Boutroux, Xavier Léon, Louis Liard, Charles Adam et Paul Tannery. Ces deux derniers, véritables maîtres d’œuvre de ce travail, aidés par l’éditeur, ne négligèrent rien pour pouvoir présenter à l’Exposition universelle de 1900, une édition qui (...) fût digne du philosophe et de son pays.Elle est désormais universellement considérée comme l’édition de référence de l’œuvre cartésienne et est constamment citée dans les travaux d’érudition. Elle est la seule édition véritablement complète à ce jour, et comprend notamment l’ensemble de la correspondance et de l’œuvre scientifique, toutes deux essentielles à une bonne compréhension de l’entreprise cartésienne.René Descartes est né le 31 mars 1596 à La Haye, en Touraine. Il est l’inventeur de la géométrie analytique et de la dioptrique, le promoteur de la mécanique et le fondateur de la philosophie moderne. (shrink)