This paper examines the role of managerial self-interest in the merger market. It looks at factors influencing managers'' merger decisions by analyzing managerial expense preference factors on cross-sectional data employing non-parametric statistical methods. The same factors are examined for acquiring, acquired, and merging firms, and control groups used in each case. The results support the authors'' contention that managerial discretion is a significant motivating factor for mergers. The changes in expense preference factors indicate management decisions which provide conditions allowing management (...) to indulge in management preferred expenditures, while reducing risk to their career. The authors then provide a moral/philosophic framework of ethical analysis for examining manager''s merger decisions, using teleological and deontological theories. They conclude that merger decisions motivated or influenced by self-interest are unethical and, in the process, provide managers facing a merger decision with a framework for making an ethical decision. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is often unable to distinguish those individuals and groups that are stakeholders from those that are not. This problem of stakeholder identity has recently been addressed by linking stakeholder theory to a Rawlsian principle of fairness. To illustrate, the question of stakeholder status for the non-human environment is discussed. This essay criticizes a past attempt to ascribe stakeholder status to the non-human environment, which utilized a broad definition of the term "stakeholder." This paper then demonstrates how, despite the (...) denial of stakeholder status, the environment is nonetheless accounted for on a fairness-based approach through legitimate organizational stakeholders. In addition, since stakeholder theory has never claimed to be a comprehensive ethical scheme, it is argued that sound reasons might exist for managers to consider their organization's impact on the environment that are not stakeholder-related. (shrink)

Shareholder value orientation has been introduced as a means to improve the performance of the corporation. The paper investigates the theoretical justification for the claim that increasing shareholder value is the purpose of corporate governance. It demonstrates that shareholder value is the control principle, not the purpose of the firm. The idea that shareholder value is the only goal of the corporation is a mistaken transfer from the financial to the industrial firm. The paper also questions that the merger of (...) manager interests and owner interests introduced by the remuneration of managers by stock options improves the management performance. The self-apportioning of stock options by the management is in danger of becoming a form of insider trading. (shrink)

'Knowledge Capitalism' reveals how the emerging knowledge-based economy is redefining firms, empowering individuals and reshaping learning and work. It provides a practical tool-set for business managers to interpret and manage change.