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Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional

Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith

Analysis 57 (2):123-131 (1997)

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Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details Autonomous Agents addresses the related topics of self-control and individual autonomy. "Self-control" is defined as the opposite of akrasia-weakness of will. The study of self-control seeks to understand the concept of its own terms, followed by an examination of its bearing on one's actions, beliefs, emotions, and personal values. It goes on to consider how a proper understanding of self-control and its manifestations can shed light on personal autonomy and autonomous behaviour. Perspicuous, objective, and incisive throughout, Alfred Mele makes a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 335 citations
(1 other version)Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible. Download Export citation Bookmark 182 citations
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Albert R. MELE - 1992details Download Export citation Bookmark 300 citations
Frog and Toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 48 citations
Underestimating Self-control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad.Alfred Mele - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):119-123.details Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations
Practical unreason.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):53-79.details Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 31 citations

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