- A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Responsible psychopaths.Patricia S. Greenspan - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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Psychopharmacological enhancement.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (1):45-54.details
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Moral responsibility and the psychopath.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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A Threat to Autonomy? The Intrusion of Predictive Brain Implants.Frederic Gilbert - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (4):4-11.details
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Taking the Self out of Self-Rule.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.details
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Freedom and Indoctrination.Michael Garnett - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):93-108.details
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Agency and Inner Freedom.Michael Garnett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):3-23.details
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Popper and Free Will.Danny Frederick - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.details
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Natural Freedom.Daniel C. Dennett - unknowndetails
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How Should Free Will Skeptics Pursue Legal Change?Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (1):47-54.details
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Dennett on freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):414-426.details
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Does a robot have an Umwelt? Reflections on the qualitative biosemiotics of Jakob von Uexküll.Claus Emmeche - 2001 - Semiotica 2001 (134):653-693.details
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The demand for contrastive explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.details
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Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):127-144.details
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The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism.Richard Double - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Demetriou - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action.Gabriel De Marco - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1953-1972.details
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Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing.Gabriel De Marco - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):487-507.details
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Brain Interventions, Moral Responsibility, and Control over One’s Mental Life.Gabriel De Marco - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (3):221-229.details
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Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent.Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Roseanna Sommers - 2022 - Cognition 224 (C):105065.details
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The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details
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Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.details
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Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):473-484.details
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Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Autonomy in R. S. Peters' Educational Theory.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (supplement s1):189-207.details
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Education for Critical Thinking: Can it be non‐indoctrinative?Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723–743.details
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Two Arguments for Impossiblism and Why It isn’t Impossible to Refute them.Joseph Corabi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):569-584.details
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The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):291-307.details
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Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.details
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Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism.John Christman - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):369-382.details
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What’s Wrong with Designing People to Serve?Bartek Chomanski - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):993-1015.details
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Unsavory Seduction.Eric M. Cave - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):235-245.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.details
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Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.details
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