- Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.details
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(5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.details
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(5 other versions)The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.details
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Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.details
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.details
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(1 other version)Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.details
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(2 other versions)Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Mind 94 (374):310-319.details
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Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.details
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(1 other version)Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.details
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Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699-706.details
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Morals and Modals.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - In Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.details
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Quasi-Dependence.Selim Berker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218.details
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Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.details
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The moral belief problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Truth and a Priori Possibility: Egan’s Charge Against Quasi Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.details
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There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.details
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Free Thinking for Expressivists.Neil Sinclair - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.details
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A Better World.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.details
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What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?Sebastian Köhler - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):161-165.details
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Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.details
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II—Michael Ridge: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.details
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I Might be Fundamentally Mistaken.Michael Ridge - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3):1-22.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice If P, Therefore, P.David Enoch - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):222-224.details
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I—James Lenman: What is Moral Inquiry?James Lenman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):63-81.details
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Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.details
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Can expressivism have it all?Terence Cuneo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):219-241.details
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Expressivism and Mind-Dependence.Sebastian Köhler - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):750-764.details
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Expressivism and Mind-Dependence: Distinct Existences.Sebastian Köhler - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4).details
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(1 other version)Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.Neil Sinclair - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Resolute Expressivism.Nicholas Smyth - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):1-12.details
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Précis of ruling passions. [REVIEW]Simon Blackburn - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122–135.details
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