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  1. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
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  • (5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
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  • (5 other versions)The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.
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  • Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
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  • Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
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  • (1 other version)Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.
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  • (2 other versions)Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Mind 94 (374):310-319.
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  • Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
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  • (1 other version)Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
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  • Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699-706.
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  • Morals and Modals.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - In Essays in quasi-realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.
    Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility. This paper devel...
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  • Quasi-Dependence.Selim Berker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218.
    Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...)
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  • Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  • The moral belief problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
    The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are (...)
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  • A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  • Truth and a Priori Possibility: Egan’s Charge Against Quasi Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and (...)
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  • There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.
    This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism, the paper highlights both (...)
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  • Free Thinking for Expressivists.Neil Sinclair - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.
    This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
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  • A Better World.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.
    A number of moral philosophers have endorsed instances of the following curious argument: it would be better if a certain moral theory were true; therefore, we have reason to believe that the theory is true. In other words, the mere truth of the theory—quite apart from the results of our believing it or acting in accord with it—would make for a better world than the truth of its rivals, and this fact provides evidence of the theory’s truth. This form of (...)
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  • What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?Sebastian Köhler - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):161-165.
    Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the (...)
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  • Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.
    Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his (...)
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  • II—Michael Ridge: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.
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  • I Might be Fundamentally Mistaken.Michael Ridge - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3):1-22.
    Quasi-realism aspires to preserve the intelligibility of the realist-sounding moral judgments of ordinary people. These judgments include ones of the form, “I believe that p, but I might be mistaken,” where “p” is some moral content. The orthodox quasi-realist strategy is to understand these in terms of the agent’s worrying that some improving change would lead one to aban-don the relevant moral belief. However, it is unclear whether this strate-gy generalizes to cases in which the agent takes their error to (...)
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  • Wouldn’t It Be Nice If P, Therefore, P.David Enoch - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):222-224.
    Suppose that a world in which we have an utterly non-consequentialist moral status is a better world than one in which we don’t have such a status. Does this give any reason to believe that we have such moral status? Suppose that a world without moral luck is worse than a world with moral luck. Does this give any reason to believe that there is moral luck? The problem is that positive answers to these questions1 seem to commit us to (...)
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  • I—James Lenman: What is Moral Inquiry?James Lenman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):63-81.
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  • Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.
    If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate between Egan :205–219, 2007), Blackburn :201–213, 2009), (...)
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  • Can expressivism have it all?Terence Cuneo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):219-241.
    Quasi-realist expressivists set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the “realist-sounding” elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view—what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic (...)
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  • Expressivism and Mind-Dependence.Sebastian Köhler - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):750-764.
    Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this is and cannot be the case, but also – and perhaps more importantly – offers a diagnosis why philosophers are nevertheless so often led to think otherwise.
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  • Expressivism and Mind-Dependence: Distinct Existences.Sebastian Köhler - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4).
    Despite the efforts of meta-ethical expressivists to rebut such worries, one objection raised over and over again against expressivism is that, if the theory is true, matters of morality must be mind-dependent in some objectionable way. This paper develops an argument which not only shows that this is and cannot be the case, but also – and perhaps more importantly – offers a diagnosis why philosophers are nevertheless so often led to think otherwise.
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  • (1 other version)Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.Neil Sinclair - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective against a range of plausible positions regarding moral truth. I first distinguish debunking arguments which target the truth of moral judgements from those which target their justification. I take the latter to rest on the premise that such judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After (...)
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  • Resolute Expressivism.Nicholas Smyth - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):1-12.
    Over the years, metaethicists have witnessed the rise of a cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections. In doing so, I hope to call into question some prevailing assumptions about the linguistic phenomena that a metaethical theory should be expected to capture.
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  • Précis of ruling passions. [REVIEW]Simon Blackburn - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122–135.
    Ruling Passions is about human nature. It is an invitation to see human nature a certain way. It defends this way of looking at ourselves against competitors, including rational choice theory, modern Kantianism, various applications of evolutionary psychology, views that enchant our natures, and those that disenchant them in the direction of relativism or nihilism. It is a story centred upon a view of human ethical nature, which it places amongst other facets of human nature, as just one of the (...)
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