Winner of the Wolf Prize for his contribution to our understanding of the universe, Penrose takes on the question of whether artificial intelligence will ever ...

Cosmologists using the Anthropic Principle claim that if our universe had been much different then nobody would exist to observe it. This may become explanatory when one accepts the actual existence of multiple "universes": gigantic, largely or entirely separate systems having very varied properties. Ian Hacking has urged, though, that an Inverse Gambler's Fallacy is committed during many attempts to formulate anthropic explanations. Besides disagreeing with him, the paper makes several further points in support of such explanations, in particular against (...) the background of the Inflationary Universe. (shrink)

And the first step of the Peripatetick argument is that, where Aristotle proveth the integrity and perfection of the World, telling us, that it is not a simple line, nor a bare superficies, but a body adorned with Longitude, Latitude and Profundity; and because there are no more dimensions but these three; the World having them, hath all, and having all, is to be concluded perfect. And again, that by simple length, that magnitude is constituted, which is called a line, (...) to which adding breadth, there is formed a Superficies, and yet further adding the altitude or profundity, there results the Body, and after these three the dimensions there is no passing farther, so that in these three the integrity, and to so speak, totality is terminated, which I might but with justice have required Aristotle to have proved to me by necessary consequences, the rather in regard he was able to do it very plainly and speedily. *Received 9. iii. 54. (shrink)

In the form in which it was originally expounded, the anthropic principle was presented as a warning to astrophysical and cosmological theorists of the risk of error in the interpretation of astronomical and cosmological information unless due account is taken of the biological restraints under which the information was acquired. However, the converse message is also valid: biological theorists also run the risk of error in the interpretation of the evolutionary record unless they take due heed of the astrophysical restraints (...) under which evolution took place. After an introductory discussion of the ordinary ('weak') anthropic principle and of its more contestable ('strong') analogue, a new application of the former to the problem of the evolution of terrestrial life is presented. It is shown that the evidence suggests that the evolutionary chain included at least one but probably not more than two links that were highly improbable (a priori) in the available time interval. (shrink)

Summary The recent turn to the ‘context of discovery’ and other ‘postmodernist’ developments in the philosophy of science have undermined the idea of a universal rationality of science. This parallels the fate of the classical dream of a logic of discovery. Still, justificational questions have remained as a distinct perspective, though comprising both consequential and generative justification — an insight delayed by certain confusions about the (original) context distinction. An examination of one particular heuristic strategy shows its local rationality; even (...) as an efficient procedure of hypothesis generation, it carries probative weight. It will be explored in which respects such a strategy can be normative or contain normative elements. (shrink)

Harris elucidates the important philosophical implications of the Anthropic Principle. Tracing the continuous development of the principle from physics through biology and psychology, he examines the case for the thesis that intelligent life is necessarily involved from the very beginning of physical reality and that the entire process of natural evolution comes to consciousness of itself in the human mind.

Describes the current views on the nature of space, time, matter, and fundamental forces.

The fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe seem "finely tuned" for human habitation. The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life. A closer look at the principle’s explanandum, however, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted. Leslie’s, Barrow’s and Tipler’s attempts to (...) avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems. (shrink)

An outline of the three basic versions of the Anthropic Principle-the Weak, the Strong, and the Final Anthropic Principles-is given from a philosophical point of view.

Tipler has previously argued that the nature of the universe is a matter of contingency rather than necessity. Now he argues that the existence of the universe can also be demonstrated to be a matter of necessity. I argue that both arguments are fatally flawed, and that neither supports the conclusion it is intended to establish.