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  1. (3 other versions)The biophilosophical basis of whole-brain death.James L. Bernat - 2002 - Soc Philos Policy 19 (2):324-42.
    Notwithstanding these wise pronouncements, my project here is to characterize the biological phenomenon of death of the higher animal species, such as vertebrates. My claim is that the formulation of “whole- brain death ” provides the most congruent map for our correct understanding of the concept of death. This essay builds upon the foundation my colleagues and I have laid since 1981 to characterize the concept of death and refine when this event occurs. Although our society's well-accepted program of multiple (...)
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  • Why DCD Donors Are Dead.John P. Lizza - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (1):42-60.
    Critics of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) argue that, even if donors are past the point of autoresuscitation, they have not satisfied the “irreversibility” requirement in the circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death, since their circulation and respiration could be artificially restored. Thus, removing their vital organs violates the “dead-donor” rule. I defend DCD donation against this criticism. I argue that practical medical-ethical considerations, including respect for do-not-resuscitate orders, support interpreting “irreversibility” to mean permanent cessation of circulation and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Stem cell research: A target article collection part III - determining moral status.Ronald M. Green - 2002 - American Journal of Bioethics 2 (1):20 – 30.
    In this chapter, I review some of the background thinking concerning matters of moral status that I had developed in previous years and that I would now bring to the work of the Human Embryo Research Panel. Two ideas were at the forefront of my thinking. First, that biology usually offers not decisive "events" but only continuous processes of development. Second, in making status determinations we do not so much "identify" a point on a developmental continuum where moral respect should (...)
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  • Clarifying the paradigm for the ethics of donation and transplantation: Was 'dead' really so clear before organ donation?Sam D. Shemie - 2007 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2:18-.
    Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility of (...)
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  • The Dead Donor Rule: Can It Withstand Critical Scrutiny?F. G. Miller, R. D. Truog & D. W. Brock - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):299-312.
    Transplantation of vital organs has been premised ethically and legally on "the dead donor rule" (DDR)—the requirement that donors are determined to be dead before these organs are procured. Nevertheless, scholars have argued cogently that donors of vital organs, including those diagnosed as "brain dead" and those declared dead according to cardiopulmonary criteria, are not in fact dead at the time that vital organs are being procured. In this article, we challenge the normative rationale for the DDR by rejecting the (...)
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  • Killing by Organ Procurement: Brain-Based Death and Legal Fictions.Robert M. Veatch - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):289-311.
    The dead donor rule (DDR) governs procuring life-prolonging organs. They should be taken only from deceased donors. Miller and Truog have proposed abandoning the rule when patients have decided to forgo life-sustaining treatment and have consented to procurement. Organs could then be procured from living patients, thus killing them by organ procurement. This proposal warrants careful examination. They convincingly argue that current brain or circulatory death pronouncement misidentifies the biologically dead. After arguing convincingly that physicians already cause death by withdrawing (...)
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  • (3 other versions)The biophilosophical basis of whole-brain death.James L. Bernat - 2002 - Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):324-342.
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  • DCDD Donors Are Not Dead.Ari Joffe - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S4):29-32.
    According to international scientific medical consensus, death is a biological, unidirectional, ontological state of an organism, the event that separates the process of dying from the process of disintegration. Death is not merely a social contrivance or a normative concept; it is a scientific reality. Using this paradigm, the international consensus is that, regardless of context, death is operationally defined as “the permanent loss of the capacity for consciousness and all brainstem function. This may result from permanent cessation of circulation (...)
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  • A Defense of the Dead Donor Rule.David Magnus - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S4):36-38.
    Discussion of the “dead donor rule” is challenging because it implicates views about a wide range of issues, including whether and when patients are appropriately declared dead, the validity of the doctrine of double effect, and the moral difference between or equivalence of active euthanasia and withdrawal of life‐sustaining treatment. The DDR will be defined here as the prohibition against removal of organs necessary for the life of the patient—that is, the prohibition of intentionally ending the life of a patient (...)
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