This is the first publication of these ideas in book form. 'It is a rare treat--important, original philosophy that is also a pleasure to read.

The Concept of Law is one of the most influential texts in English-language jurisprudence. 50 years after its first publication its relevance has not diminished and in this third edition, Leslie Green adds an introduction that places the book in a contemporary context, highlighting key questions about Hart's arguments and outlining the main debates it has prompted in the field. The complete text of the second edition is replicated here, including Hart's Postscript, with fully updated notes to include modern references (...) and further reading. (shrink)

This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.

The author discusses the role of language within law, and the role of philosophy of language in understanding the nature of law. He argues that the major re-thinking of the common and `common sense' views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theorists are unnecessary.

Islamic building codes require mosques to face Mecca. The further Islam spreads, the more apt are believers to fall into a quandary. X faces Y only when the front of X is closer to Y than any other side of X. So the front of the mosque should be oriented along a shortest path to Mecca. Which way is that? Does the path to Mecca tunnel through the earth? Or does the path follow the surface of the earth?

Roy Sorensen has argued that vagueness in the law cannot be justified by appeal to the value of power-delegation, and thereby threatens to take away one of the main reasons for thinking that vagueness can be valuable to law. Delegation of power to officials is justified, he thinks, only if these officials are in a better position to discover whether a particular x is F, a condition not satisfied in cases of vagueness. I argue that Sorensen’s argument is unsound: delegation (...) of power can be valuable even if the delegates are not in a better position to answer that question. (shrink)

How can it be valuable to use vagueness in a normative text? The effect is to make a vague norm, and vagueness seems repugnant to the very idea of making a norm. It leaves conduct (to some extent) unregulated, when the very idea of making a norm is to regulate conduct. A vague norm leaves the persons for whom the norm is valid with no guide to their conduct in some cases - and the point of a norm is to (...) guide conduct. A vague norm in a system of norms does not control the officers or officials responsible for applying the norms or resolving disputes - and part of the value of a system of norms is to control the conduct of the persons to whom the system gives normative power. In this essay I will seek to resolve these puzzles, and to show that vagueness can be valuable to lawmakers (and valuable to them, because their use of it is valuable to the people to whom the law is addressed). Far from being repugnant to the idea of making a norm, vagueness is a central technique of normative texts: it is needed in order to pursue the purposes of formulating such texts. Not all norms are vague. But vagueness is of central importance to the very idea of guiding conduct by norms. (shrink)