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Okasha on inductive scepticism

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232 (2002)

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(1 other version)What did Hume really show about induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.details Many philosophers agree that Hume was not simply objecting to inductive inferences on the grounds of their logical invalidity and that his description of our inductive behaviour was inadequate, but none the less regard his argument against induction as irrefutable. I argue that this constellation of opinions contains a serious tension. In the light of the tension, I re-examine Hume’s actual sceptical argument and show that the argument as it stands is valid but unsound. I argue that it can only (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 36 citations
The white shoe is a red Herring.I. J. Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):322.details Download Export citation Bookmark 62 citations
The paradoxes of confirmation - a survey.R. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.details THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 28 citations

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