Ce volume recueille des elements propres a eclairer l'oeuvre de Duns Scot et entend montrer que sa lecture n'est pas pas inutile pour comprendre Thomas d'Aquin. Gilson rappelle que le sens des principes dont use l'auteur ne se comprend bien que par l'usage qu'il en fait. Car le Docteur Subtil ne nous a pas laisse un systeme: la parole de Dieu, dont il cherche l'intellection, n'est pas un donne a reconstruire par mode de deduction. La philosophie, la sienne en propre, (...) doit etre traversee de themes fondamentaux ausquels il revient sans cesse pour eclairer les profondeirs de la foi. On trouvera dans cet ouvrage magistral des analyses fondees sur les Commentaires de Pierre Lombard par Duns Scot, ainsi que des etudes sur l'objet de la metaphysique, l'existence de l'etre infini, la nature divine, l'origine du contringent, la connaissance intellectuelle et la volonte. (shrink)

The word "modem" in the title of this book refers primarily to post-medieval discussions, but it also hints at those medieval mo dal theories which were considered modem in contradistinction to ancient conceptions and which in different ways influenced philosophical discussions during the early modem period. The me dieval developments are investigated in the opening paper, 'The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors', by Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila. Boethius's works from the early sixth century belonged (...) to the sources from which early medieval thinkers obtained their knowledge of ancient thought. They offered extensive discus sions of traditional modal conceptions the basic forms of which were: (1) the paradigm of possibility as a potency striving to realize itself; (2) the "statistical" interpretation of modal no tions where necessity means actuality in all relevant cases or omnitemporal actuality, possibility means actuality in some rel evant cases or sometimes, and impossibility means omnitemporal non-actuality; and (3) the "logical" definition of possibility as something which, being assumed, results in nothing contradic tory. Boethius accepted the Aristotelian view according to which total possibilities in the first sense must prove their met tle through actualization and possibilities in the third sense are assumed to be realized in our actual history. On these presump tions, all of the above-mentioned ancient paradigms imply the Principle of Plenitude according to which no genuine possibility remains unrealized. (shrink)

Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it (...) is argued, involves a rejection of this idea of absolute conceivability and can be seen as a constructivist view of intelligibility and rationality. (shrink)