John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I will argue (...) that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris. He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence. (shrink)

This paper discusses the role of consent in decision making generally and its role in end of life decisions in particular. It outlines a conception of autonomy which explains and justifies the role of consent in decision making and criticises some misapplications of the idea of consent, particular the role of fictitious or “proxy” consents.Where the inevitable outcome of a decision must be that a human individual will die and where that individual is a person who can consent, then that (...) decision is ethical if and only if the individual consents. In very rare and extreme cases such a decision will be ethical in the absence of consent where it would be massively cruel not to end life in order to prevent suffering which is in no other way preventable.Where, however, the human individual is not a person, as is the case with abortion, the death of infants like Mary , or in the very rare and extreme cases of those who have ceased to be persons like Tony Bland, such decisions are governed by the ethics of ending the lives of non-persons. (shrink)

In many jurisdictions, adolescents acquire the right to consent to treatment; but in some cases their refusals – e.g. of life-saving treatment – may not be respected. This asymmetry of adolescent consent and refusal seems puzzling, even incoherent. The aim here is to offer an original explanation, and a justification, of this asymmetry. Rather than trying to explain the asymmetry in terms of a variable standard of competence – where the adolescent is competent to consent to, but not refuse, certain (...) interventions – the account offered here focuses more closely on the normative power to render actions permissible. Where normative powers are shared they can readily give rise to an asymmetry between consent and refusal. We then turn to why it is justifiable that normative powers be shared in adolescence. Transitional paternalism holds that the acquisition of normative powers by competent adolescents should not be an instant one, achieved in a single step, but that there should be a transitional period where paternalistic protection is rolled back, but not entirely withdrawn until a later date. Transitional paternalism could be implemented without generating the asymmetry between consent and refusal but, it is argued, the asymmetric version of transitional paternalism is to be preferred insofar as it offers a greater respect for the adolescent's decisions than the symmetrical alternative. (shrink)

This discussion paper continues the debate over risk‐related standards of mental competence which appears in Bioethics 5. Dan Brock there defends an approach to mental competence in patients which defines it as being relative to differing standards, more or less rigorous depending on the degree of risk involved in proposed treatments. But Mark Wicclair raises a problem for this approach: if significantly different levels of risk attach, respectively, to accepting and refusing the same treatment, then it is possible, on this (...) account, for a patient to be considered competent to accept, but not refuse, the treatment, or vice versa. I argue that this puzzle does not constitute a genuine problem for a risk‐related standard. To this end I focus on the situation where, of two mutually exclusive options, one is riskier, but offering more pronounced benefit, while the other is safer, but offering less benefit. I argue for this proposition: it can take far less insight to know that the safe option is good than to know that the risky option is better. Now say one is actually informed enough to know that the safe option is good, but not enough to know whether the risky option is better; in such a case one is competent to say yes to that first option (the safe one), but not to say yes to the other. (I argue in passing that Pascal's Wager can be interpreted as having precisely this deliberative structure.) I thus conclude that cases do indeed exist where one can be competent to say yes but not no, or vice versa; and that it is thus not an anomaly in the risk‐related standard that it entails the existence of such cases. (shrink)

This discussion paper addresses Ian Wilks’ defence of the risk‐related standard of competence that appears in Bioethics 11. Wilks there argues that the puzzle posed by Mark Wicclair in Bioethics 5 against Dan Brock's argument in favour of a risk‐related standard of competence — namely that Brock’s argument allows for situations of asymmetrical competence — is not a genuine problem for a risk‐related standard of competence. To show this, Wilks presents what he believes to be two examples of real situations (...) in which asymmetrical competence arises. I argue that insofar as Wilks equivocates two senses of competence in his examples — namely, competence to perform a task and competence in performing a task — Wilks is unable to illustrate the existence of real situations of asymmetrical competence. By examining the way in which Wilks equivocates two senses of competence in his examples, and by applying the results of this examination to the problem of patient competency within the medical field, I argue that not only does Wilks fail to show that situations of asymmetrical competence exist, but he is also unable to provide a foundation for understating how the risk‐related standard of competence can strike a balance between an individual’s autonomy and benevolent intervention. I thus conclude that insofar as Wilks fails to answer the objections raised by Wicclair and others against the risk‐related standard of competence, the risk‐related standard of competence continues to be undermined by the problem of asymmetrical competence. (shrink)