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The responsibility dilemma for killing in war: A review essay

Seth Lazar

Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (2):180-213 (2010)

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(2 other versions)The Ethics of Killing in War.Jeff McMahan - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):23-41.details This paper argues that certain central tenets of the traditional theory of the just war cannot be correct. It then advances an alternative account grounded in the same considerations of justice that govern self-defense at the individual level. The implications of this account are unorthodox. It implies that, with few exceptions, combatants who fight for an unjust cause act impermissibly when they attack enemy combatants, and that combatants who fight in a just war may, in certain circumstances, legitimately target noncombatants (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 63 citations
Killing in war.Jeff McMahan - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details Jeff McMahan urges us to reject the view, dominant throughout history, that mere participation in an unjust war is not wrong. Download Export citation Bookmark 167 citations
The basis of moral liability to defensive killing.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):386–405.details There may be circumstances in which it is morally justifiable intentionally to kill a person who is morally innocent, threatens no one, rationally wishes not to die, and does not consent to be killed. Although the killing would wrong the victim, it might be justified by the necessity of averting some disaster that would otherwise occur. In other instances of permissible killing, however, the justification appeals to more than consequences. It may appeal to the claim that the person to be (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 119 citations
(2 other versions)The ethics of killing in war.Jeff McMahan - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):693-733.details This paper argues that certain central tenets of the traditional theory of the just war cannot be correct. It then advances an alternative account grounded in the same considerations of justice that govern self-defense at the individual level. The implications of this account are unorthodox. It implies that, with few exceptions, combatants who fight for an unjust cause act impermissibly when they attack enemy combatants, and that combatants who fight in a just war may, in certain circumstances, legitimately target noncombatants (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 96 citations
On the moral equality of combatants.Jeff McMahan - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (4):377–393.details THERE’S a well-known scene in Shakespeare’s Henry V in which the King, disguised as an ordinary soldier, is conversing with some of his soldiers on the eve of the battle of Agincourt. Hoping to ﬁnd or inspire support among them, he remarks: “Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King’s company, his cause being just and his quarrel honorable.” One soldier replies: “That’s more than we know,” whereupon a second says: “Ay, or more than we should (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 35 citations
Order and Affray: Defensive Privileges in Warfare.Toby Handfield & Patrick Emerton - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):382 - 414.details Just war theory is a difficult, even paradoxical, philosophical topic. It is not just that warfare involves large-scale, organised, deliberate killing, and hence might seem the very paradigm of immorality. The just war tradition sharply divorces the question of whether or not it is permissible to resort to war – the question of jus ad bellum – from the question of how and against whom one may inflict harm once at war – the question of jus in bello. As Michael (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations

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