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  1. Weaponized Noncombatants, Child Soldiers, and Targeting Innocents.Oren J. Litwin - 2020 - Journal of Military Ethics 19 (1):56-68.
    This article presents a novel theory of noncombatant immunity that can serve as a practical guide for soldiers in the field. It improves on existing theories by justifying why and when an innocent...
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  • Who is Morally Liable to Be Killed in War. [REVIEW]J. McMahan - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):544-559.
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  • Pogge, Poverty, and War.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (4):446-469.
    According to Thomas Pogge, rich people do not simply violate a positive duty of assistance to help the global poor; rather, they violate a negative duty not to harm them. They do so by imposing an unjust global economic structure on poor people. Assuming that these claims are correct, it follows that, ceteris paribus, wars waged by the poor against the rich to resist this imposition are morally equivalent to wars waged in self-defense against military aggression. Hence, if self-defense against (...)
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  • Just War Theory: Revisionists Vs Traditionalists.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Annual Review of Political Science 20:37-54.
    Contemporary just war theory is divided into two broad camps: revisionists and traditionalists. Traditionalists seek to provide moral foundations for something close to current international law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict. Although they propose improvements, they do so cautiously. Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. In this article, I present the contemporary history of analytical just war theory, from the origins of contemporary traditionalist just war theory in Michael (...)
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  • Proxy Battles in the Ethics of War.Seth Lazar & Laura Valentini - 2017 - In David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 3. London, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 166-193.
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  • The Historical Approach and the ‘War of Ethics Within the Ethics of War’.Christian Nikolaus Braun - 2018 - Journal of International Political Theory 14 (3):349-366.
    Contemporary just war thinking has mostly been split into two competing camps, namely, Michael Walzer’s approach and its revisionist critics. While Walzerians employ a casuistical method, most revisionists resort to analytical philosophy’s reflective equilibrium. Importantly, besides employing different methods, the two sides also disagree on substantive issues. This article focuses on one such issue, the moral equality of combatants, arguing that while a methodological reconciliation between the two camps is impossible, contemporary debate would benefit from a ‘third-way’ approach. Presenting James (...)
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  • The Perspective of the Rebel: A Gap in the Global Normative Architecture.Christopher J. Finlay - 2017 - Ethics and International Affairs 31 (2):213-234.
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  • Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants.Uwe Steinhoff - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):339-366.
    According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no "moral equality of combatants." That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war - but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the (...)
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  • Standards of Risk in War and Civil Life.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Florian Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict. Palgrave.
    Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...)
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  • The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.
    People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have (...)
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  • Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War.Seth Lazar - 2013 - Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):3-48.
    this paper advances a novel account of part of what justifies killing in war, grounded in the duties we owe to our loved ones to protect them from the severe harms with which war threatens them. It discusses the foundations of associative duties, then identifies the sorts of relationships, and the specific duties that they ground, which can be relevant to the ethics of war. It explains how those associa- tive duties can justify killing in theory—in particular how they can (...)
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  • Necessity in Self-Defense and War.Seth Lazar - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (1):3-44.
    It is generally agreed that using lethal or otherwise serious force in self-defense is justified only when three conditions are satisfied: first, there are some grounds for the defender to give priority to his own interests over those of the attacker (whether because the attacker has lost the protection of his right to life, for example, or because of the defender’s prerogative to prefer himself to others); second, the harm used is proportionate to the threat thereby averted; third, the harm (...)
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  • Walking the Tightrope of Just War. [REVIEW]B. J. Strawser - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):533-544.
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  • Biotechnology, Justice and Health.Ruth Faden & Madison Powers - 2013 - Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (1):49-61.
    New biotechnologies have the potential to both dramatically improve human well-being and dramatically widen inequalities in well-being. This paper addresses a question that lies squarely on the fault line of these two claims: When as a matter of justice are societies obligated to include a new biotechnology in a national healthcare system? This question is approached from the standpoint of a twin aim theory of justice, in which social structures, including nation-states, have double-barreled theoretical objectives with regard to human well-being. (...)
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  • Authorization and The Morality of War.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
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  • Evaluating the Revisionist Critique of Just War Theory.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Daedalus 146 (1):113-124.
    Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, (...)
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  • Risky Killing: How Risks Worsen Violations of Objective Rights.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1):1-26.
    I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. I argue that the salient (...)
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  • Revolution Against Non-Violent Oppression.Zsolt Kapelner - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (4):445-461.
    Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a government is or (...)
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  • Complicity and the Responsibility Dilemma.Morten Højer Jensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):109-127.
    Jeff McMahan famously defends a moral inequality of combatants, where liability to be attacked and potentially killed in war, should be grounded in the individual combatant’s moral responsibility for posing an unjust threat. In a response, Seth Lazar shows that McMahan’s criterion for liability leads to an unacceptable dilemma between “contingent pacifism” and “total war”, i.e. between war being practically infeasible, or implausibly many civilians being legitimate targets. The problem is that McMahan grounds liability mainly in the individual’s causal responsibility (...)
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  • Moral Character for Political Leaders: A Normative Account.Lucas Swaine - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (4):317-333.
    This article analyzes the moral and political implications of strong moral character for political action. The treatment provides reason to hold that strong moral character should play a role in a robust normative account of political leadership. The case is supported by empirical findings on character dispositions and the political viability of the account’s normative prescriptions.
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  • Complicitous Liability in War.Saba Bazargan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):177-195.
    Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, however, (...)
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  • When Is It Right to Fight? Just War Theory and the Individual-Centric Approach.James Pattison - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):35-54.
    Recent work in the ethics of war has done much to challenge the collectivism of the convention-based, Walzerian just war theory. In doing so, it raises the question of when it is permissible for soldiers to resort to force. This article considers this issue and, in doing so, argues that the rejection of collectivism in just war should go further still. More specifically, it defends the ‘Individual-Centric Approach’ to the deep morality of war, which asserts that the justifiability of an (...)
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  • Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants.Scott D. Sagan & Benjamin A. Valentino - 2019 - Ethics and International Affairs 33 (4):411-444.
    Traditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility (...)
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  • War as a Workplace: Ethical Implications of the Occupational Shift.Ned Dobos - 2019 - Journal of Military Ethics 18 (3):248-260.
    ABSTRACTSoldiering has traditionally been thought of as something radically different from a job or career, but things are changing. Sociologists have observed an “occupational shift” in military s...
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  • The Ethics of Arming Rebels.James Pattison - 2015 - Ethics and International Affairs 29 (4):455-471.
    Despite the popularity of arming rebels as a foreign policy option, there is very little, if any, detailed engagement with the ethical issues surrounding the practice. There is a growing literature on the ethical issues surrounding civil wars and, more specifically, the conditions for engaging in just rebellion; but the focus of this literature is largely on the question of the justifiability of the rebels themselves in engaging in civil war and their conduct when doing so, rather than the permissibility (...)
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  • Non-Combatant Immunity and War-Profiteering.Saba Bazargan - 2017 - In Helen Frowe & Lazar Seth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and War. Oxford University Press.
    The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...)
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  • Risky Killing.Seth Lazar - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. (...)
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  • Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.Bradley Jay Strawser - 2010 - Journal of Military Ethics 9 (4):342-368.
    A variety of ethical objections have been raised against the military employment of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones). Some of these objections are technological concerns over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their inhabited counterparts. This paper sets such concerns aside and instead focuses on supposed objections to the use of UAVs in principle. I examine several such objections currently on offer and show them all to be wanting. Indeed, I argue that we have a duty to protect an (...)
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  • Duty and Liability.Victor Tadros - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (2):259-277.
    In his recent book, Killing in War, Jeff McMahan sets out a number of conditions for a person to be liable to attack, provided the attack is used to avert an objectively unjust threat: (1) The threat, if realized, will wrongfully harm another; (2) the person is responsible for creating the threat; (3) killing the person is necessary to avert the threat, and (4) killing the person is a proportionate response to the threat. The present article focuses on McMahan's second (...)
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  • Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption.Janina Dill & Henry Shue - 2012 - Ethics and International Affairs 26 (3):311-333.
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  • Killing Innocent People.Tyler Doggett - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):645-666.
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  • Recent Work on the Ethics of Self-Defense.Tyler Doggett - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):220-233.
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  • Authority, Oaths, Contracts, and Uncertainty in War.Seth Lazar - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):52-58.
    Soldiers sign contracts to obey lawful orders; they also swear oaths to this end. The enlistment contract for the Armed Forces of the United States combines both elements: -/- '9a. My enlistment is more than an employment agreement. As a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, I will be: (1) Required to obey all lawful orders and perform all assigned duties … (4) Required upon order to serve in combat or other hazardous situations.' -/- We standardly think (...)
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  • Liability, Community, and Just Conduct in War.Jonathan Parry - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3313-3333.
    Those of us who are not pacifists face an obvious challenge. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on intentional killing, yet war involves homicide on a grand scale. If wars are to be morally justified, it needs be shown how this conflict can be reconciled. A major fault line running throughout the contemporary just war literature divides two approaches to attempting this reconciliation. On a ‘reductivist’ view, defended most prominently by Jeff McMahan, the conflict is largely illusory, since such killing (...)
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  • I—Rights Against Harm.Jonathan Quong - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):249-266.
    Some philosophers defend the fact-relative view of moral rights against harm:Whether B infringes A's right not to be harmed by ϕ-ing depends on what will in fact occur if B ϕs. B's knowledge of, or evidence about, the exact consequences of her ϕ-ing are irrelevant to the question of whether her ϕ-ing constitutes an infringement of A's right not to be harmed by B.In this paper I argue that the fact-relative view of moral rights is mistaken, and I argue for (...)
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