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  1. Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
    The literature on the theory of social choice has grown considerably beyond the few items in existence at the time the first edition of this book appeared in 1951. Some of the new literature has dealt with the technical, mathematical aspects, more with the interpretive. My own thinking has also evolved somewhat, although I remain far from satisfied with present formulations. The exhaustion of the first edition provides a convenient time for a selective and personal stocktaking in the form of (...)
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  • The Theory of Committees and Elections.Duncan Black - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):248-249.
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  • Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
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  • Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences.William V. Gehrlein - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
    Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by PMR, and (...)
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  • How relevant are?Irrelevant? Alternatives?Jean-Marie Blin - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1):95-105.
    Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition is examined. It is shown why the standard rationale for (or against) the condition tends to be inconclusive as it fails to consider the basic ‘game’ issue in social choice. Specifically it is explained how some recent results (Gibbard-Satterthwaite) on the general non-existence of strategy-proof voting procedures provide the strongest rationale for the independence condition. Also, it is shown that this rationale was exactly the one used by Condorcet in his work on decision rules (...)
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