After Leibniz's death in 1716, Clarke published an edition of their philosophical correspondence--a wide-ranging discussion of the nature of God, human souls, free will and indifference of choice, space and time, the vacuum, miracles, and matter and force. Clarke included his own letters, his translations of Leibniz's letters, and some translated passages from Leibniz's French and Latin works that helped to illuminate their exchanges.

Entirely faithful to Boethius' Latin; Relihan's translation makes the philosophy of the Consolation intelligible to readers; it gives equal weight to the poetry--in fact, Relihan's metrical translation of Boethius' _metro_ are themselves contributions of the first moment to Boethian studies. Boethius finally has a translator equal to his prodigious talents and his manifold vision. --Joseph Pucci, Brown University.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz and the Two ClocksDavid ScottAnyone familiar with Leibniz’s philosophy in general and with his critique of occasionalism in particular is likely familiar with his example of two clocks. Generally speaking, the example illustrates a range of hypotheses that, according to Leibniz, might possibly explain the connections between substances in the world. The most important of these hypotheses are Leibniz’s own doctrine of the preestablished harmony and the occasionalist—for (...) present purposes, Malebranche’s—doctrine of causation. In Leibniz’s mind at least, the two clocks example (so-called because substances are represented by two clocks) illustrates the superiority of the hypothesis of the preestablished harmony over occasionalism. Whether the example in fact succeeds in this regard is the primary question of this paper.Given the times, Leibniz’s choice of example is understandable. A clock is ideally suited to represent a mechanism, of course; and in view of the general “mechanization of the world view” of that time, the example seems to have been in the air.1 Spring-driven clocks had appeared at the outset of the sixteenth century, and the kind of clock Leibniz seems to have in mind in his example, namely, one driven by a pendulum, was the invention, in about 1656, of Christian Huygens, who was a significant influence on Leibniz. Huygens’s invention in fact provided the impetus for a broadening of the importance and extent of horology.2Although Leibniz’s choice of example was understandable, it was not a happy one, and the general importunity of his use of this example was [End Page 445] recognized by both his contemporary critics and his subsequent commentators.3 In fact his choice of the example becomes almost ironic when it is recalled that Geulincx, who is most commonly associated with the example, was an occasionalist. The operations of two clocks, between which there is a constant and fixed relation, say, of keeping the same time, cannot normally be said to be “related.” The example is more intuitively taken to indicate the random, accidental, unnecessary, and unconnected nature of the otherwise constant and regular relation between the clocks; and so one would think the example more suited to an occasionalist’s position than to that of Leibniz.In what follows I aim to judge the effectiveness—in Leibniz’s own terms—of the two clocks example. In gauging the effectiveness of Leibniz’s use of the example, I expect that a few things can be learned about Leibniz’s system in general and about his critique of occasionalism in particular. My procedure will be to examine separately what I take to be four significant occasions in which Leibniz compares things or substances in the world and clocks. The passages in question date from a period spanning ten years, and in each instance the example is put to service in Leibniz’s attempt to better occasionalism.Beyond this, although the comparison is employed or appraised in slightly different ways each time, the uses to which it is put are basically two. In the first two instances examined below, it is employed primarily to distinguish the preestablished harmony from occasionalism. I will be arguing that, to the extent that it fails to illustrate his point, Leibniz fails adequately to distinguish these two doctrines. This was Arnauld’s criticism.4 In the third and fourth instances, however, the example is employed solely to illustrate certain features of the preestablished harmony. On my analysis, it does not appear to fulfill this role either. [End Page 446]First Use of the ExampleOne of the more well known statements of the two clocks example is from an explanation Leibniz gives to Basnage de Beauval in 1696 of his “New System” (1695):Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways. The first is that of a natural influence.... The second way of making two clocks, even poor ones, agree is always to assign a skilled craftsman to them who adjusts them and constantly sets them in agreement. The third way is to construct these two timepieces at the beginning with such skill and accuracy that one can... (shrink)

This article introduces three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680); her sister, Princess Sophie who became the Electress of Hanover (1630-1714); and Sophie's daughter, Sophie Charlotte, who became the first Queen of Prussia (1668-1705). After summarizing their common family background, the article presents, for each in turn, her biography and a discussion of her relation to philosophy. In each case their philosophical involvement stems from their friendships with the leading philosophers of their day; Princess Elizabeth was a friend of Descartes (...) while the Electress Sophie and Sophie Charlotte were friends of Leibniz. The article concludes that anyone who has made the acquaintance of the three princesses and has studied their interaction with their philosopher-friends will always see them as part of the history of modern philosophy. (shrink)

What is Leibniz’s argument for simple substances? I propose that it is an extension of his prior argument for incorporeal forms as principles of unity for individual corporeal substances. The extension involves seeing the hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances as implying a resolution of matter into forms, and this seems to demand that forms, which are themselves simple, be the only elements of things. The argument for simples thus presupposes the existence of corporeal substances as a key premise. Yet a (...) theory of simple substances as the elements of things threatens to preclude the existence of corporeal substances for Leibniz, and the extension of the argument for forms into an argument for simples is not cogent. If nothing else rides on the simplicity of individual substances, then perhaps instead of being its most fundamental tenet, the doctrine of simples—the monadology—is something that over-extends and destabilizes Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

L’article apporte le bilan de ce que l’on sait aujourd’hui, en fonction des sources publiées, des relations philosophiques entre John Toland et Leibniz. Il esquisse une revue thématique des arguments, en se plaçant au point de vue de Leibniz.

The privacy, real or illusory, afforded by the personal letter allows each participant the philosophical freedom to explore a range of possible opinions, to experiment with different ideas, to hesitate, and to change his or her mind in ways that published articles and books discourage. The private letter also allows the use of language and style of writing to be altered to suit the particular recipient. This is especially evident in Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses. Sometimes, however, the intended recipient (...) is not the addressee, as when Leibniz engaged with Locke through Thomas Burnett of Kemney. This situation was not an isolated occurrence in Leibniz's dealings with Locke. In this chapter, we shall see how Leibniz attempted to engage with Locke through a second correspondence and how he adapted the style and presentation of his views, not for the main correspondent, Lady Masham, but for the other intended recipient. We shall also see that the views Leibniz presents confirm his loyalty during this period to an ontology of embodied, perceiving substances. -/- The correspondence with Damaris Masham began shortly after Lady Masham sent Leibniz a copy of her father's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (TIS) at the end of 1703. Learning that the book was on its way, Leibniz's first letter was intended to thank her in advance. (shrink)

Copyright © 2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is (...) worth. (shrink)