ignette and autobiographical recall studies have often been used to test models of the appraisals associated with specific emotions. Recently, critiques of both methodologies have called into question the applicability of appraisal theory to naturally-occurring emotional responses. This study examined supporter's responses to Ross Perot's withdrawal from the 1992 presidential race to assess the extent to which appraisal models accurately capture responses to a naturally-occurring event. Supporters in Riverside County, California (N = 227) completed questionnaires concerning their interpretations of the (...) event, their initial emotional reactions, changes in their reactions in the weeks immediately following Perot's withdrawal, and their plans. Appraisal models correctly predicted the dimensions of agency and coping potential that served to differentiate sadness from anger, and the appraisals and plans associated with hope. Appraisal models did not predict the strong focus of sad supporters on their past goals and beliefs, and the plans associated with sadness and anger. Changes in emotional intensity occurred as a function of changes in goals and plans rather than merely as a function of time. These findings demonstrate the applicability of appraisal theory to naturally-occurring emotional responses, but also show that models may understate the complexity of the planning processes associated with emotions. (shrink)

Most theories of affective influences on judgement and choice take a valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not specified if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is defined by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original cognitive-appraisal dimensions (...) of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisals—anger and fear—relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisal-tendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes. (shrink)

Understanding the interplay between memory and emotion is crucial for the work of researchers in many arenas--clinicians, psychologists interested in eyewitness ...

This chapter documents the progress that has been made in our understanding of how people remember emotional events, but also highlight substantial gaps in our knowledge. It demonstrates that, in a wide range of circumstances, emotion promotes memory for all event's “central” materials, but also emotion seems to have the opposite effect, undermining memory, in terms of details at an event's “periphery”. However, this latter effect may be produced not by emotion itself but by the presence of powerful “attention magnets” (...) found within some emotional events. The chapter then explores possible limits of this data pattern, with an eye on how different types and different strengths of emotion may influence memory differently. In general, emotion seems to have a positive effect on memory, increasing memory vividness, accuracy, completeness, and longevity. On the other hand, extremely intense emotions may work against memory, perhaps by interrupting the biological processes needed for memory consolidation. The available evidence directly challenges some long-held and often-quoted claims, including the Yerkes-Dodson law and the Easterbrook hypothesis of arousal and memory. (shrink)