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  1. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945/1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others.
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  • How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain.Antonio R. Damasio - 2003 - William Heinemann.
    Damasio, an eminent neuroscientist explores the science of human emotion and what the great Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza can teach of how and why we feel. Damasio shows how joy and sorrow, those most defining of human feelings, are in fact the cornerstones of our survival and culture.
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  • The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Antonio Damasio - 1999 - Harcourt Brace and Co.
    The publication of this book is an event in the making. All over the world scientists, psychologists, and philosophers are waiting to read Antonio Damasio's new theory of the nature of consciousness and the construction of the self. A renowned and revered scientist and clinician, Damasio has spent decades following amnesiacs down hospital corridors, waiting for comatose patients to awaken, and devising ingenious research using PET scans to piece together the great puzzle of consciousness. In his bestselling Descartes' Error, Damasio (...)
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  • Husserl's phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
    It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon (...)
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  • How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (319):196-200.
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  • The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery.Marc Jeannerod - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):187-202.
    This paper concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using a specific type of representational activity, motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imaging and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a (...)
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  • The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 48–93.
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  • The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Kathleen Virginia Wider - 1997 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    In this work, Kathleen V. Wider discusses Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of consciousness in Being and Nothingness in light of recent work by analytic philosophers ...
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  • Body schema and intentionality.Shaun Gallagher - 1995 - In José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 225--244.
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  • Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain.Ralph D. Ellis - 1995 - Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
    ... Geoffrey Underwood (University of Nottingham) Francisco Varela (CREA, Ecole Polytechnique. Paris) Volume 2 Ralph D. Ellis Questioning Consciousness ...
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  • Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  • The inner sense of action: Agency and motor representations.Vittorio Gallese - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40.
    Discusses the possibility of reconciling different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. The author analyzes the relationship between agency and representation and how representation is intrinsically related to action control. The author also presents a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to externally-or (...)
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  • The periconscious substrates of consciousness: Affective states and the evolutionary origins of the SELF.Jaak Panksepp - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    An adequate understanding of ‘the self’ and/or ‘primary-process consciousness’ should allow us to explain how affective experiences are created within the brain. Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms of consciousness. At present, abundant evidence indicates that affective states arise from the intrinsic neurodynamics of primitive self-centred emotional and motivational systems situated in subcortical (...)
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  • Present-time consciousness.Francisco J. Varela - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.
    My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented by Depraz in this Special Issue.
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  • Foundations of Understanding.Natika Newton - 1996 - John Benjamins.
    How can symbols have meaning for a subject? Foundations of Understanding argues that this is the key question to ask about intentionality, or meaningful thought. It thus offers an alternative to currently popular linguistic models of intentionality, whose inadequacies are examined: the goal should be to explain, not how symbols, mental or otherwise, can refer to or mean states of affairs in the external world, but how they can mean something to us, the users. The essence of intentionality is shown (...)
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  • The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Kathleen V. Wider - 1997 - Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):161-168.
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  • Curious Emotions: Roots of Consciousness and Personality in Motivated Action.Ralph D. Ellis - 2005 - Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    Emotion drives all cognitive processes, largely determining their qualitative feel, their structure, and in part even their content.
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  • At the source of time: Valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect: The question, the background: How affect originarily shapes time.Francisco J. Varela - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
    This paper represents a step in the analysis of the key, but much-neglected role of affect and emotions as the originary source of the living present, as a foundational dimension of the moment-to-moment emergence of consciousness. In a more general sense, we may express the question in the following terms: there seems to be a growing consensus from various sources -- philosophical, empirical and clinical -- that emotions cannot be seen as a mere 'coloration' of the cognitive agent, understood as (...)
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  • Putting the puzzle together: Toward a general theory of the neural correlates of consciousness.J. B. Newman - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):47-66.
    Part I of this two-part paper provided a broad overview of clinical and experimental findings bearing on the neural correlates of conscious processes. It was argued that several neurocognitive models related to: orienting to the outer world, dream sleep, and the integration of sensory-motor representations, converge upon a core ‘conscious system’, dubbed the extended reticular-thalamic activating system . The functions of the ERTAS, which shares extensive projections with the cerebral cortex, are mostly ‘implicit’, in contrast to the explicit representation of (...)
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  • A neural attentional model for access to consciousness: A global workspace perspective.J. B. Newman & Bernard J. Baars - 1993 - Concepts in Neuroscience 4 (2):255-90.
    A broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed (...)
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  • Three paradoxes of phenomenal consciousness: Bridging the explanatory gap.Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):419-42.
    Any physical explanation of consciousness seems to leave unresolved the ‘explanatory gap': Isn't it conceivable that all the elements in that explanation could occur, with the same information processing outcomes as in a conscious process, but in the absence of consciousness? E.g. any digital computational process could occur in the absence of consciousness. To resolve this dilemma, we propose a biological-process-oriented physiological- phenomenological characterization of consciousness that addresses three ‘paradoxical’ qualities seemingly incompatible with the empirical realm: The dual location of (...)
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  • From action to interaction.Shaun Gallagher & Marc Jeannerod - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):3-26.
    Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, not only as we are actively (...)
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  • Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness.Natika Newton - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):47-59.
    This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point is to show that the uniqueness of (...)
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  • Implications of inattentional blindness for "enactive" theories of consciousness.Ralph D. Ellis - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  • Covert agency with proprioceptive feedback.Anton Lethin - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):96-114.
    : Marcel says that the experience of ownership of actions is given in the specifications for action. He is referring not to a bodily movement but that which precedes it. Is the body involved or are all the changes in the brain? This paper examines the evidence for changes in the spinal cord and muscles that occur with motor imagery, simulation and preparation. There are changes in the alpha motoneurons and in the gamma motoneurons to the muscle spindles. These may (...)
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  • The interdependence of consciousness and emotion.Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton - 2000 - Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):1-10.
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  • Do we understand consciousness?John Searle & Walter Freeman - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    John Searle and Walter Freeman compared notes at a Wonderfest panel at the University of California, Berkeley, 16 August, 1998.
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  • Efferent brain processes and the enactive approach to consciousness.Ralph D. Ellis - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):40-50.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey argues persuasively that consciousness results from active and efferent rather than passive and afferent functions. These arguments contribute to the mounting recent evidence that consciousness is inseparable from the motivated action planning of creatures that in some sense are organismic and agent-like rather than passively mechanical and reactive in the way that digital computers are. Newton calls this new approach the ‘action theory of understanding'; Varela et al. dubbed it the ‘enactive’ view of consciousness. It was (...)
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  • Intentionality and the inside/outside distinction in sensitive systems.H. de Preester - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):65-79.
    Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived.
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  • The art of representation: Support for an enactive approach.Natika Newton - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):411-411.
    Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
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  • Exposing the covert agent.Anton Lethin - 2005 - In Ralph and Natika Ellis and Newton (ed.), Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, conscious choice, and selective perception. John Benjamins. pp. 157--180.
    The sense of self as a covert agent is a key component to the sense of self. This paper focuses on covert action as a preparation to interact. This activates the entire motor system, including the gamma motoneurons innervating the muscle spindles. The proprioceptive stimulation is fed back to the network of origin, contributing to a sense of self as generating the covert activity. A study of motivated behavior in the rat is presented to clarify how the motivation potentiates actions (...)
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