ABSTRACT This paper attempts to show that the acorn–oak tree argument against the slippery slope on the personhood of the fetus is valid and William Cooney's attack on this argument fails. I also argue that the slippery slope argument leads to on undesirable conclusion and should not be used as a valid tool in the debate on the personhood of the fetus.

Is the Nazi euthanasia program a useful analogy for contemporary discussions of euthanasia? This paper explores the logic of slippery slope arguments with the Nazi analogy as a test case.

In this provocative book, a professor of philosophy examines the arguments for and against euthanasia, analyzes specific case studies, including those of Baby Jane Doe and Barney Clark, and offers an alternate theory on the morality of euthanasia. Various traditional distinctions--between "human" and "non-human," intentional and nonintentional, killing and "letting die"--are taken into account to determine whether euthanasia is permissible or not. Rachels presents a systematic argument against the traditional view, defending an alternative position based on the belief that there (...) is a profound difference between having a life and merely being alive. (shrink)

Objectives: The objective of this study is to estimate the proportion of different types of end‐of‐life decisions (ELDs) of physicians in the city of Hasselt (Flanders, Belgium). The question is addressed to what degree these ELD meet legal constraints and the ethical requirements for prudent practice. Methodology: All physicians of the city of Hasselt who signed at least one death certificate in 1996 (N=166) received an anonymous self‐administered mail questionnaire per death case (max. 5/doctor) Results: the response rate was 55% (...) (N=269). In 37.3% of all cases at least one ELD was made (16.5% non‐treatment decisions; 16% potential life‐shortening by intensifying the treatment of pain and symptoms; 4.8% administration, supply or prescription of lethal drugs). In 59.5% of the cases were an ELD was made that decision was legally questionable. Patient characteristics were clearly related to the type of ELD. There was no influence of physician characteristics, except for commitment to life‐stance. In 71.3% of the cases the ELD was in no way discussed with the patient. 8.1% of the ELD‐cases were in response to a direct request from the patient Conclusions: The incidences of ELDs in Hasselt are consistent with earlier findings. The study shows that religious commitment influences the behaviour of physicians at the end of their patients' life. The patient's and her family's entitlements to participation in the decision making process were rather poorly respected. (shrink)

Objectives: The objective of this study is to estimate the proportion of different types of end‐of‐life decisions (ELDs) of physicians in the city of Hasselt (Flanders, Belgium). The question is addressed to what degree these ELD meet legal constraints and the ethical requirements for prudent practice.Methodology: All physicians of the city of Hasselt who signed at least one death certificate in 1996 (N=166) received an anonymous self‐administered mail questionnaire per death case (max. 5/doctor)Results: the response rate was 55% (N=269). In (...) 37.3% of all cases at least one ELD was made (16.5% non‐treatment decisions; 16% potential life‐shortening by intensifying the treatment of pain and symptoms; 4.8% administration, supply or prescription of lethal drugs). In 59.5% of the cases were an ELD was made that decision was legally questionable. Patient characteristics were clearly related to the type of ELD. There was no influence of physician characteristics, except for commitment to life‐stance. In 71.3% of the cases the ELD was in no way discussed with the patient. 8.1% of the ELD‐cases were in response to a direct request from the patientConclusions: The incidences of ELDs in Hasselt are consistent with earlier findings. The study shows that religious commitment influences the behaviour of physicians at the end of their patients' life. The patient's and her family's entitlements to participation in the decision making process were rather poorly respected. (shrink)

I have a hairstylist whose lover was very sick. I’d been seeing this stylist for ten years and we’re good friends. [His lover was] becoming an invalid, not able to get out of bed. He said “I hate to ask you this but would you mind writing a prescription to help us out?” [So] I wrote a prescription to a patient who I had never seen, and I sent it to him in the mail and I heard the next time (...) I went in to get my hair cut that it was the most beautiful experience that my stylist had ever had. It was Valentine’s Day and they had a lovely meal with champagne. And they held each other and then, you know, his partner took his pills and was released. (shrink)

I have a hairstylist whose lover was very sick. I’d been seeing this stylist for ten years and we’re good friends. [His lover was] becoming an invalid, not able to get out of bed. He said “I hate to ask you this but would you mind writing a prescription to help us out?” [So] I wrote a prescription to a patient who I had never seen, and I sent it to him in the mail and I heard the next time (...) I went in to get my hair cut that it was the most beautiful experience that my stylist had ever had. It was Valentine’s Day and they had a lovely meal with champagne. And they held each other and then, you know, his partner took his pills and was released. (shrink)

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) are, so I argue, arguments from consequences which have the following peculiar characteristic: They take advantage of our being less than perfect in making—and acting according to—distinctions. But then, once SSAs are seen for what they are, they can be turned against themselves. Being less than perfect at making the second‐order distinction between distinctions we're good at abiding by and those we're bad at abiding by, we're bound to fail to make the distinction between good and (...) bad SSAs. One can therefore construct an SSA, the conclusion of which is, that we ought not to use SSAs. After characterizing SSAs and constructing the SSA against the use of SSAs, I then explore its implications. (shrink)

The difficulties of establishing a definition of torture are discussed, and a definition is suggested. It is then argued that, irrespective of general ethical questions, doctors in particular should never be involved because of their social role.