Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Decision theory and folk psychology.Philip Pettit - 1991 - In Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.), Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory. Blackwell. pp. 147-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):249-281.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Decision Theory and Rationality.José Luis Bermúdez - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • External norms and rationality of choice.Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):139-152.
    Ever since Sen criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the traditional rationalizability approach. To do so, we characterize norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitable modifications of revealed preference axioms that are well established in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • A model of non-informational preference change.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
    According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The impossibility of a Paretian republican? Some comments on Pettit and Sen.Christian List - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):65-87.
    Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Framing as path dependence.Natalie Gold & Christian List - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):253-277.
    A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
    There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Internal consistency of choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   103 citations  
  • Reason-based choice.E. Shafir - 1993 - Cognition 49 (1-2):11-36.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • (A, F ) choice with frames.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We develop a framework for modeling choice in the presence of framing effects. An extended choice function assigns a chosen element to every pair (A, f ) where A is a set of alternatives and f is a frame. A frame includes observable information that is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless affects choice. We relate the new framework to the classical model of choice correspondence. Conditions are identified under which there exists either a transitive or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Preference based on reasons.Daniel Osherson & Scott Weinstein - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):122-147.
    We describe a logic of preference in which modal connectives reflect reasons to desire that a sentence be true. Various conditions on models are introduced and analyzed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Logic of Preference.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1963 - Philosophy 40 (151):78-79.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Where do preferences come from?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
    Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as new (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • (1 other version)The ergodic hierarchy.Edward N. Zalta - 2014 - In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
    The so-called ergodic hierarchy (EH) is a central part of ergodic theory. It is a hierarchy of properties that dynamical systems can possess. Its five levels are egrodicity, weak mixing, strong mixing, Kolomogorov, and Bernoulli. Although EH is a mathematical theory, its concepts have been widely used in the foundations of statistical physics, accounts of randomness, and discussions about the nature of chaos. We introduce EH and discuss its applications in these fields.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent.Ariel Rubinstein - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Choice, internal consistency and rationality.Aditi Bhattacharyya, Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):123-149.
    The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Logic of Preference.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1963 - Studia Logica 30:159-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Von Wright’s “The Logic of Preference” revisited.Fenrong Liu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):69-88.
    Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement between preference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations