A central aim of Elster's Making Sense of Marx is to recover Marx for methodological individualism, to show that Marx, unlike many of his followers, sought to provide his explanations of macro?phenomena with micro?foundations. Though I largely share Elster's methodological commitments and his view that Marx also (intermittently) adhered to them, I question whether this makes Marx a methodological individualist. In my view, Marx practised in his best work both individualist and structuralist explanation simultaneously. In three briefer remarks I also (...) comment on Marx's and Elster's treatment of the differences between workers? and peasants? propensities for collective action; the primacy in Marx's theories of dynamics internal to a society and his failure to recognize the importance for domestic developments of interactions with other societies and states; and finally Marx's ?progressive? values, which Elster seems to share. (shrink)

Physicalism is a programme for building a unified system of knowledge based upon the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this programme. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. He reviews and evaluates major objections to the (...) programme and considers its significance for philosophy, science, society, and individual persons. An important theme of the book is that recent attempts to formulate a 'non-reductive' version of physicalism are inadequate and that the role of supervenience relations in expressions of physicalist thought is significantly limited. This is the first sustained and systematic discussion of the major philosophical aspects of the physicalist programme. Professor Poland also examines the relations between physicalism and other philosophical positions such as realism, empiricism, and relativism, and suggests that physicalism is compatible with a tolerant pluralism in the philosophical, cultural, and personal domains. (shrink)

Past criticisms to the contrary, methodological individualism in the social sciences is neither trivial nor obviously false. In the style of Weber's sociology, it restricts the ultimate explanatory repertoire of social science to agents' reasons for action. Although this restriction is not obviously false, it ought not to be accepted, at present, as a regulative principle. It excludes, as too far-fetched to merit investigation, certain hypotheses concerning the influence of objective interests on large-scale social phenomena. And these hypotheses, in fact, (...) merit empirical consideration. The attractiveness of methodological individualism as a regulative principle depends on two independent confusions, the conflation of an agent's reasons for action with the beliefs, needs, desires, or goals which are the reasons why he acted as he did, and the identification of explaining a phenomenon and describing its causes. (shrink)