This collection of Habermas's recent essays on philosophical topics continues the analysis begun in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. In a short introductory essay, he outlines the sources of twentieth-century philosophizing, its major themes, and the range of current debates. The remainder of the essays can be seen as his contribution to these debates.Habermas's essay on George Herbert Mead is a focal point of the book. In it he sketches a postmetaphysical, intersubjective approach to questions of individuation and subjectivity. In (...) other essays, he develops his distinctive, communications-theoretic approach to questions of meaning and validity. The book as a whole expands on his earlier efforts to define a middle ground between nostalgic revivals of metaphysical conceptions of reason and radical deconstructions of reason. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt.The Essays: The Horizon of Modernity is Shifting. Metaphysics after Kant. Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking. Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning. Peirce and Communication. The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices. Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity. Philosophy and Science as Literature? (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to cast some light on the debate between Habermas and Rorty on the question of the possibility of rationality as a philosophical theory. My assessment of this debate proceeds from the perspective of their respective critiques of modern philosophy, defined as an epistemological discipline within the Cartesian- Kantian tradition of foundationalism. While both thinkers seem to be fairly clear on why they can no longer accept philosophical theories of rationality which have their roots in the (...) metaphysical tradition of modern philosophy, Rorty is convinced that Habermas, despite his linguistic turn, does not quite succeed in breaking with the transcendental problematic of the Kantian tradition. In what follows, I propose to investigate the accuracy of the charge of transcendentalism levelled by Rorty against Habermas. (shrink)

My argument will proceed as follows. I will first sketch out the broad internalist case for pitching its normative account of sport in the abstract manner that following Dworkin’s lead in the philosophy of law its adherents insist upon. I will next show that the normative deficiencies in social conventions broad internalists uncover are indeed telling but misplaced since they hold only for what David Lewis famously called ‘coordinating’ conventions. I will then distinguish coordinating conventions from deep ones and make (...) my case not only for the normative salience of deep conventions but for their normative superiority over the abstract normative principles broad internalists champion. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Jürgen Habermas’ notion of morality (moral norms) has more in common with Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical life’ as a ‘ sittlich ’ relation – understood as a socially integrative force – rather than Kant’s supreme principle of personal morality. I show that Habermas and Hegel, each in his own way, make a distinction between morality and ethics. However, I make the case that Habermas’ conception of ‘morality’ incorporates aspects of Hegel’s notion of ‘ethical life’, (...) while Habermas’ conception of ‘ethical’ – referring to individual and group conceptions of the good life – is a remedy to the shortcomings in Hegel’s overly unified ethical life. I offer an alternative reading of Habermas’ principle of morality, which I suggest should be read as his attempt to provide a binding process to set up the norms that ought to condition a modern political community understood as a civil association. (shrink)

An easy-to-use A-Z guide to a body of work that spans philosophy, sociology, politics, law and cultural theory, this is an essential reference guide to one of the most important social theorists of the last century.

Exploring the broad historical context of modern America, this book argues that the state of sports is a powerful indictment of a wealth-driven society and hyper-individualistic way of life.

I argue that several recent criticisms Lopez Frias has made against my conventionalist version of broad internalism fail to hit their mark. I further argue that the author's use of Habermas's account of discourse ethics to make his criticisms also misfires because Habermas expressly warned against using his account to resolve normative conflicts that arise from the often conflicting ways different communities order their ethical lives, to include their athletic lives. My main aim in responding to Lopez Frias was to (...) bring critical attention to the normative difficulties that result when we cannot agree on how sport should be done because we cannot agree on what is/are the purpose of sport. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I will identify two key normative principles at the core of Robert L. Simon’s mutualist theory of sport, namely, the respect-for-the-opponent principle and the idea that sport is a practice aimed at pursuing excellence. The former is a Kantian principle grounded in human beings’ rationality, and the latter is an Aristotelian principle related to the development of excellences as a means to human flourishing. After having presented and analyzed both principles, I will critically evaluate Simon’s attempt to (...) combine them within his mutualist approach. To conclude, I will highlight the challenges that mutualism should face to complete such a combination more successfully.Abbreviation: Categorical imperative. (shrink)

Sport occupies a significant role in modern society and has a wide following. In his Leftist Theories of Sport, Morgan examines what he considers to be a degradation of modern sport and the lack of proper critical theory to address this challenge. In the latter part of LTS, Morgan presents a reconstructed critical theory with ‘a liberal twist’ in terms of an analysis of what he sees as the internal ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport, and a call for critical deliberation in (...) sporting practice communities. I depart from Morgan’s ideas of the ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport which, I believe, has significant potential and operative force. I interpret the logic of sport as forms of self-imposed constraints at three levels: in the logic of the rules, in norms for fair play, and in a particular interpretation of sporting excellence as a form of human excellence. Using the practical case of performance-enhancing drugs, I demonstrate how this interpretation can exert operative power. I conclude by pointing to th... (shrink)

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm (...) of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines. To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ?broad internalism? engaged in by Russell (1999, 2004), Dixon (2003), Simon (2000, 2004) and Morgan (2004). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ?mind from nowhere?. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities. (shrink)

Habermas's analysis of rational action is the fulcrum for his broader theoretical project. If that analysis is faulty his larger project is jeopardized. I explore the role Habermas assigns to strategic action in order to scrutinize his central concept of communicative action. Using basic game theoretic concepts as a counterpoint I argue that he both misconstrues stategic action and fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. I conclude by sketching several ways that Habermas might seek to rectify deficiencies (...) in his analysis of rational action. (shrink)

Several authors, such as William J. Morgan, John S. Russell and R. Scott Kretchmar, have claimed that the limits between the diverse normative theories of sport need to be revisited. Most of these works are philosophically grounded in Anglo-American philosophical approaches. For instance, William J. Morgan’s proposal is mainly based on Richard Rorty’s philosophy. But he also discusses with some European philosophers like Jürgen Habermas. However, Habermas’ central ideas are rejected by Morgan. The purpose of this paper is to analyse (...) Morgan’s rejection of Habermas’ thought and show that a more appropriate normative of sport that explains better our current sporting world can be achieved by drawing on the German philosopher’s ideas. The plan of this paper is the following. It shall analyse the limits of the distinction between broad internalism and externalism by taking Morgan’s work as its starting point. To do so, firstly, the conventionalist way in which Morgan criticises the limits of interpretivism sha.. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the moral status of sport through a conceptual structure borrowed from Jürgen Habermas's philosophy and social theory. Habermas distinguishes between communicative and strategic action as two ways in which social action may be coordinated. While the former relies on the building of mutual understanding between social agents, the latter entails one agent manipulating others, as if they were mere objects to be treated instrumentally. In an initial model of sporting practice, it is (...) suggested that sport primarily involves strategic action and in particular encourages the undermining of one's opponent's autonomy. This model is subject to criticism, by scrutinising Habermas's interpretation of the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game, and thus the relationship between communicative language-use and strategic games playing. It will be suggested that games playing has more in common with language-use than Habermas acknowledges, thereby opening up a space for genuinely communicative and expressive action within sport. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the moral significance of sport lies in the fact that its communicative and expressive potential can only be exercised against the moral threat of the dominance of strategic action. (shrink)

James Bohman has succeeded in reinvigorating the old debate over explanation and understanding by situating it within contemporary discussions about sociological indeterminacy and complexity. I argue that Bohman's preference for a paradigm based on Habermas's theory of communicative action is justifiable given the explanatory deficiencies of ethnomethodological, rational choice, rule-based, and functionalist methodologies. Yet I do not share his belief that the paradigm is preferable to less formalized models of interpretation.

This essay examines whether Habermas' approach to bioethics implies that the ethical challenges of eugenics cannot be answered within the scope of a deontological account, but only with reference to a concept of the good life or a normative anthropology. First, Habermas' 'argument against alien determination' is elaborated, based on an action-theoretical concept of 'human nature' which is analyzed in the part three. Habermas' main objection against genetic engineering, namely that it entails a reification of human nature by undermining the (...) consciousness of autonomy of the genetically manipulated person, is also discussed. Subsequently, his concept of human nature as a condition of possibility of our ethical self-understanding, which is expressed in the phrase 'ethics of the species', is introduced. It is argued that this term clearly indicates Habermas' departure from the path of deontological ethics. Moreover, this essay asserts that two readings of the argument against alien determination are possible and that the expression 'consciousness of autonomy' therefore remains ambiguous. The fourth part of the paper deals with the question whether or not the argument against alien determination is conditional on the assumption of genetic determinism. In part five, the author claims that in contrast to earlier conceptions, Habermas now implicitly raises the question 'Why be moral?' and at the same time refuses to address it. The essay concludes with two different anthropological accounts that can be found in Habermas' work and that might be helpful to correct the anthropological deficiency of his bioethical account. (shrink)