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  1. Porous Memory and the Cognitive Life of Things.John Sutton - 2002 - In D. Tofts, A. Jonson & A. Cavallaro (eds.), Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 130--141.
    Published in Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Alessio Cavallaro (eds), _Prefiguring Cyberculture: an intellectual history_ (MIT Press and Power Publications, December 2002). Please do send comments: email me. Back to my main publications page . Back to my home page.
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  • The Extended Mind and Cognitive Integration.Richard Menary - 2010 - In The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
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  • The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  • The Extended Mind.Richard Menary (ed.) - 2010 - MIT Press.
    Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.
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  • The Bounds of Cognition.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  • Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2013 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of ...
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  • Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.Andy Clark - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark argues that what makes humans so different from other species is our capacity to fully incorporate tools and supporting cultural ...
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  • Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science.Andy Clark - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science invites readers to join in up-to-the-minute conceptual discussions of the fundamental issues, problems, and opportunities in cognitive science. Written by one of the most renowned scholars in the field, this vivid and engaging introductory text relates the story of the search for a cognitive scientific understanding of mind. This search is presented as a no-holds-barred journey from early work in artificial intelligence, through connectionist (artificial neural network) counter-visions, and on to neuroscience, (...)
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  • Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.
    The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical (...)
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  • Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness.Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
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  • Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head.Andy Clark - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):963-993.
    Is consciousness all in the head, or might the minimal physical substrate for some forms of conscious experience include the goings on in the (rest of the) body and the world? Such a view might be dubbed (by analogy with Clark and Chalmers’s ( 1998 ) claims concerning ‘the extended mind’) ‘the extended conscious mind’. In this article, I review a variety of arguments for the extended conscious mind, and find them flawed. Arguments for extended cognition, I conclude, do not (...)
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  • Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 67--80.
    This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is (...)
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  • Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction : brainbound versus extended -- From embodiment to cognitive extension -- The active body -- The negotiable body -- Material symbols -- World, Incorporated -- Boundary disputes -- Mind re-bound -- The cure for cognitive hiccups (HEMC, HEC, HEMC ...) -- Rediscovering the brain -- The limits of embodiment -- Painting, planning, and perceiving -- Disentangling embodiment -- Conclusions : mind-sized bites.
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  • The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  • The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.Mark Rowlands - 2010 - Bradford.
    There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively "in the head." Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. In this book, leading philosopher Mark Rowlands investigates the conceptual foundations of this new science of the mind. The new way of thinking about the mind emphasizes the ways in which mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. The new (...)
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  • Consciousness Broadly Construed.Mark Rowlands - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    This chapter begins with a presentation of Frege’s reflections on the concept of sense and how it has been misread as leading to a philosophy based on psychologism. This is helpful because the focus of this chapter is based on the psychological—specifically, conscious experiences defined by there being something it is like to have them. An extended account of states that are both conscious and intentional is also discussed, claiming that the intentional directedness of experiences consists in disclosing activity, and (...)
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  • Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains.Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2).
    We offer an argument for the extended mind based on considerations from brain development. We argue that our brains develop to function in partnership with cognitive resources located in our external environments. Through our cultural upbringing we are trained to use artefacts in problem solving that become factored into the cognitive routines our brains support. Our brains literally grow to work in close partnership with resources we regularly and reliably interact with. We take this argument to be in line with (...)
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  • Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  • Dynamics, Control, and Cognition.Chris Eliasmith - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Can Mental Images Be Ambiguous?D. Chambers & Daniel Reisberg - 1985 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 11:317-28.
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