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  1. Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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  • Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy.Niko Kolodny - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):287-336.
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  • Democratic Equality and Political Authority.Daniel Viehoff - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):337-375.
    This essay seeks to provide a justification for the ‘egalitarian authority claim’, according to which citizens of democratic states have a moral duty to obey (at least some) democratically made laws because they are the outcome of an egalitarian procedure. It begins by considering two prominent arguments that link democratic authority to a concern for equality. Both are ultimately unsuccessful; but their failures are instructive, and help identify the conditions that a plausible defense of the egalitarian authority claim must meet. (...)
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  • Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?Niko Kolodny - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (3):195-229.
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  • The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964).Philip E. Converse - 2006 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 18 (1-3):1-74.
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  • Must Egalitarians Condemn Representative Democracy?Adam Lovett - 2021 - Social Theory and Practice 1 (1):171-198.
    Many contemporary democratic theorists are democratic egalitarians. They think that the distinctive value of democracy lies in equality. Yet this position faces a serious problem. All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Such democracies are highly unequal: representatives have much more power than do ordinary citizens. So, it seems that democratic egalitarians must condemn representative democracies. In this paper, I present a solution to this problem. My solution invokes popular control. If representatives are under popular control, then their extra power is (...)
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  • On civic friendship.Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):97-128.
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  • Democratic Autonomy and the Shortcomings of Citizens.Adam Lovett - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (4):363–386.
    A widely held picture in political science emphasizes the cognitive shortcomings of us citizens. We’re ignorant. We don’t know much about politics. We’re irrational. We bend the evidence to show our side in the best possible light. And we’re malleable. We let political elites determine our political opinions. This paper is about why these shortcomings matter to democratic values. Some think that democracy’s value consists entirely in its connection to equality. But the import of these shortcomings, I argue, cannot be (...)
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  • The paradox of voting and the ethics of political representation.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (3):272-306.
    This paper connects the question of the rationality of voting to the question of what it is morally permissible for elected representatives to do. In particular, the paper argues that it is rational to vote to increase the strength of the manifest normative mandate of one's favored candidate. I argue that, due to norms of political legitimacy, how representatives ought to act while in office is tied to how much support they have from their constituents, where a representative’s “support” is (...)
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  • No Man is an Island: Self-Interest, the Public Interest, and Sociotropic Voting.D. Roderick Kiewiet & Michael S. Lewis-Beck - 2011 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 23 (3):303-319.
    ABSTRACT Four decades ago, Gerald Kramer showed that economic conditions affect electoral outcomes. Some researchers took this to mean that voters were self-interested, voting their “pocketbooks,” while others, such as Leif Lewin, took it to mean that voters were sociotropic, motivated by the public interest—and therefore altruistic. It is important, however, to avoid conflating sociotropic voters with altruistic ones. Voters might be voting in favor of politicians or parties that they think will further the public interest as an indirect route (...)
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  • People Do Not Have a Duty to Avoid Voting Badly: Reply to Brennan.Marcus Arvan - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1):1-6.
    Jason Brennan argues that people are morally obligated not to vote badly, where voting badly is voting “without sufficient reason” for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. His argument is: (1) One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs. (2) Voting badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs. (3) Therefore, one should not vote badly. This paper shows that (...)
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