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  1. Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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  • How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...)
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  • A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.John R. Searle - 1975 - In K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 344-369.
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  • (1 other version)Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
    This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...)
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  • Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
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  • Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741.
    In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea of what I call (...)
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  • The Truth about Moods.Kirk Ludwig - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:19-66.
    Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as 'Cut your hair', or interrogatives such as 'What time is it?', are truth (...)
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  • Objects of intention.Bruce Vermazen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):223 - 265.
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  • A conditional intent to perform.Gregory Klass - 2009 - Legal Theory 15 (2):107.
    The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor's conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor's intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman's planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical (...)
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  • Conditional intent and mens Rea.Gideon Yaffe - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (4):273-310.
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  • Simple intention.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (3):245 - 259.
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  • Conditional intention.J. P. W. Cartwright - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (3):233 - 255.
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  • Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman. [REVIEW]Michael H. Robins - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
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  • Fuller on legal fictions.Kenneth Campbell - 1983 - Law and Philosophy 2 (3):339 - 370.
    What are legal fictions? Professor Lon Fuller discussed the matter at some length. One interpretation of his answer is this: they are lies that are not intended to deceive. This solution fails, in the end, to be convincing. But some remarks of Fuller provide the clue to another way of looking at the problem: fictions are means of changing the application of the law by relying on a tension between two classifications of fact.
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  • Conditional intentions, intentional action and aristotelian practical syllogisms.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (2):239 - 260.
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  • Conditional Intentions.Richard Scheer - 1989 - Philosophical Investigations 12 (1):52-62.
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  • The Belief Requirement on Intending.Bruce Vermazen - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):239 - 242.
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  • Conditional intent in the strange case of murder by logic.Dale Jacquette - 2003 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 12:301-316.
    The concept of conditional intent is pervasive in practical reasoning and action. Although conditional intent has not received the detailed attention it deserves, it is worth remarking that much if not most of the intentions we formulate and on the basis of which we act or try to act are conditional in logical form.
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  • Is an agreement an exchange of intentions?Joe Mintoff - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):44–67.
    Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions — in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what (...)
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