This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we (...) should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book uses these results to mount an attack on consequentialism in ethics, arguing that there are more sorts of reasons around than consequentialists can even dream of. (shrink)

This is a short review of Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford University Press, 2002).

Abstract Applied ethics is commonly carried out on the assumption that moral decisions can be handled by experts. This involves a failure to recognize that being morally serious means recognizing that one cannot hand over responsibility for certain decisions to anyone else. The idea of moral expertise is shown to be based on a misconstrual of the nature of moral discourse, one that can be overcome by following Wittgenstein's exhortation to philosophers to pay heed to the actual uses of language. (...) The sense of a moral judgment cannot be considered in isolation from what the speaker is doing in the context of utterance. The author concludes by suggesting that this discussion can provide the basis for a new reading of Anscombe's essay ?Modern Moral Philosophy? (shrink)

A timely and penetrating investigation, this book seeks to transform moral philosophy. In the face of continuing disagreement about which general moral principles are correct, there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea that correct moral judgements can be only about particular cases. This view--moral particularism --forecasts a revolution in ordinary moral practice that has until now consisted largely of appeals to general moral principles. Moral particularism also opposes the primary aim of most contemporary normative moral theory that (...) attempts to show that either one general principle, or a set of general principles, is superior to all its rivals. (shrink)

David Bloor's challenging new evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following brings together the rare combination of philosophical and sociological viewpoints. Wittgenstein enigmatically claimed that the way we follow rules is an "institution" without ever explaining what he meant by this term. Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate has since been subject to sharply opposed interpretations by "collectivist" and "individualist" readings by philosophers; in the light of this controversy, Bloor argues convincingly for a collectivist, sociological understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. (...) Accessible and simply written, this book provides the first consistent sociological reading of Wittgenstein's work for many years. (shrink)

I propose a theory of conceptual development in which concept possession consists in seeing the world aright. The capacity to see things aright is primitive; it is not explained in terms of grasp of a theory or in terms of assimilation of socially determined norms of word use. The educational task in promoting conceptual development is to train the forms of awareness by which the learner comes to see the world correctly. I sketch the consequences of this approach for understanding (...) expertise by drawing upon ideas that inform an ongoing research project investigating the attention-dependent knowledge bases of experienced classroom teachers. One of the distinctive features of the theory is the central role it gives the concept of judgement in the account of concept possession so that conceptual development is theorised as an apprenticeship in judgement. (shrink)

In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. A compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality. Offers an important and original reading of Wittgenstein’s key texts. Based upon a unifying theme in Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies.

I propose a theory of conceptual development in which concept possession consists in seeing the world aright. The capacity to see things aright is primitive; it is not explained in terms of grasp of a theory or in terms of assimilation of socially determined norms of word use. The educational task in promoting conceptual development is to train the forms of awareness by which the learner comes to see the world correctly. I sketch the consequences of this approach for understanding (...) expertise by drawing upon ideas that inform an ongoing research project investigating the attention-dependent knowledge bases of experienced classroom teachers. One of the distinctive features of the theory is the central role it gives the concept of judgement in the account of concept possession so that conceptual development is theorised as an apprenticeship in judgement. (shrink)