In this article I examine several criticisms of the concept of vulnerability. Rather than rejecting the concept, however, I argue that a sufficiently rich understanding of vulnerability is essential to bioethics. The challenges of international research in developing countries require an understanding of how new vulnerabilities arise from conditions of economic, social and political exclusion. A serious shortcoming of current conceptions of vulnerability in research ethics is the tendency to treat vulnerability as a label fixed on a particular subpopulation. My (...) paper examines the role of this “label” metaphor in current statements of research ethics. In contrast to this prevailing “label” metaphor, my own positive account of vulnerability develops a dynamic way of understanding the structure of the concept of vulnerability based on the idea of “layers of vulnerability.” I examine several cases involving women, as they are sometimes labeled as a vulnerable population and sometimes not. My analysis demonstrates the essential role of this revised concept of vulnerability in bioethics and research ethics. (shrink)

The so-called European principles of bioethicsare a welcome enrichment of principlistbioethics. Nevertheless, vulnerability, dignityand integrity can perhaps be moreaccurately understood as anthropologicaldescriptions of the human condition. Theymay inspire a normative language, but they donot contain it primarily lest a naturalisticfallacy be committed. These anthropologicalfeatures strongly suggest the need todevelop deontic arguments in support of theprotection such essential attributes ofhumanity require. Protection is to beuniversalized, since all human beings sharevulnerability, integrity and dignity, thusfundamenting a mandate requiring justice andrespect for fundamental human (...) rights.Being a feature of all humanity, vulnerabilityis improperly extended to designatedestitute individuals and populations. Rather,they are in a state of fallen vulnerability,for they already are harmed in some way, andhave become deprived of their range ofcapabilities. These individuals are destituteand are no longer in command of theirfundamental human rights. They have lost thestatus of unharmed vulnerability;identifying them as susceptible – vulnerated andno longer only vulnerable – stresses thepoint that bioethics demands specific socialaction to palliate or remove their distress.When harm does occur – in the form of disease,for example –, individuals are no longervulnerable – for they have ceased to be intact–, they become susceptible to additionaldeprivations and sickness; integrity isdemeaned and dignity is offended, leading tostates of dysfunction that require specificremedial social practices, aimed at treatingand removing injuries.The main point this paper addresses is thatvulnerability – as well as dignity and integrity – are descriptive characteristics ofhuman beings qua humans, which are not normative in themselves, but fundamental enoughto inspire bioethical requirements of protection and respect for human rights in thewake of social justice. A clear distinction must be made in regard to human beings who areinjured by poverty, sickness, discriminating deprivations or suffer otherdestitutions, having ceased to be only vulnerable for they are no longer intact. Theseindividuals and populations require more than protection, their needs must be met byspecific care and remedial measures to be identified and instigated by bioethics quaapplied ethics. (shrink)

To date, bioethics and health policy scholarship has given little consideration to questions of aging and intergenerational justice in the developing world. Demographic changes are precipitating rapid population aging in developing nations, however, and ethical issues regarding older people’s claim to scarce healthcare resources must be addressed. This paper posits that the traditional arguments about generational justice and age-based rationing of healthcare resources, which were developed primarily in more industrialized nations, fail to adequately address the unique challenges facing older persons (...) in developing nations. Existing philosophical approaches to age-based resource allocation underemphasize the importance of older persons for developing countries and fail to adequately consider the rights and interests of older persons in these settings. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the most appropriate framework for thinking about generational justice in developing nations is a rights-based approach that allows for the interests of all age groups, including the oldest, to be considered in the determination of health resource allocation. (shrink)

Concern for human vulnerability seems to be at the heart of bioethical inquiry, but the concept of vulnerability is under-theorized in the bioethical literature. The aim of this article is to show why bioethics needs an adequately theorized and nuanced conception of vulnerability. We first review approaches to vulnerability in research ethics and public health ethics, and show that the bioethical literature associates vulnerability with risk of harm and exploitation, and limited capacity for autonomy. We identify some of the challenges (...) emerging from this literature: in particular, how to reconcile universal human vulnerability with a context-sensitive analysis of specific kinds and sources of vulnerability; and how to reconcile obligations to protect vulnerable persons with obligations to respect autonomy. We then briefly survey some of the theoretical resources available within the philosophical literature to address these challenges, and to assist in understanding the conceptual connections between vulnerability and related concepts such as harm, exploitation, needs, and autonomy. We also sketch out a taxonomy of sources and kinds of vulnerability. Finally, we consider the implications for policy evaluation of making vulnerability an explicit and central focus of bioethics. Our investigation is in the form of a broad survey motivating a research agenda rather than a detailed analysis. (shrink)

How can social institutions complicate and worsen vulnerabilities of particular individuals or groups? We begin by explicating how certain diagnoses within mental health and medicine operate as interactive kinds of labels and how such labels can create institutional barriers that hinder one's capacity to achieve wellbeing. Interactive-kind modeling is a conceptual tool that elucidates the ways in which labeling can signal to others how the labeled person ought to be treated, how such labeling comes about and is perceived, and how (...) it compounds vulnerabilities. We argue that this shift in standpoint helps us recognize and mitigate compounded vulnerabilities. (shrink)

In exploring the concept of vulnerability, we do not begin with a blank slate. In research involving human subjects, ethics guidelines typically provide a rough definition of the concept. For example, the commentary on Guideline 13 in the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, issued by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), says that "vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient (...) power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own interests" (CIOMS 2002). Because the CIOMS guidelines .. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability has long played a central role in discussions of research ethics. In addition to its rhetorical use, vulnerability has become a term of art in U.S. and international research regulations and guidelines, many of which contain specific provisions applicable to research with vulnerable subjects. Yet, despite the frequency with which the term vulnerability is used, little consensus exists on what it actually means in the context of human subject protection or, more importantly, on how a finding (...) of vulnerability should affect the process of research ethics review.The Common Rule, the centerpiece of the U.S. human subject protection regulations, uses the word vulnerable three times. First, it provides that institutional review boards that regularly review research involving a vulnerable category of subjects should consider including one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these subjects. (shrink)

Despite broad agreement that the vulnerable have a claim to special protection, defining vulnerable persons or populations has proved more difficult than we would like. This is a theoretical as well as a practical problem, as it hinders both convincing justifications for this claim and the practical application of required protections. In this paper, I review consent-based, harm-based, and comprehensive definitions of vulnerability in healthcare and research with human subjects. Although current definitions are subject to critique, their underlying assumptions may (...) be complementary. I propose that we should define vulnerability in research and healthcare as an identifiably increased likelihood of incurring additional or greater wrong. In order to identify the vulnerable, as well as the type of protection that they need, this definition requires that we start from the sorts of wrongs likely to occur and from identifiable increments in the likelihood, or to the likely degree, that these wrongs will occur. It is limited but appropriately so, as it only applies to special protection, not to any protection to which we have a valid claim. Using this definition would clarify that the normative force of claims for special protection does not rest with vulnerability itself, but with pre-existing claims when these are more likely to be denied. Such a clarification could help those who carry responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations, such as Institutional Review Boards, to define the sort of protection required in a more targeted and effective manner. (shrink)

Vulnerability is one of the least examined concepts in research ethics. Vulnerability was linked in the Belmont Report to questions of justice in the selection of subjects. Regulations and policy documents regarding the ethical conduct of research have focused on vulnerability in terms of limitations of the capacity to provide informed consent. Other interpretations of vulnerability have emphasized unequal power relationships between politically and economically disadvantaged groups and investigators or sponsors. So many groups are now considered to be vulnerable in (...) the context of research, particularly international research, that the concept has lost force. In addition, classifying groups as vulnerable not only stereotypes them, but also may not reliably protect many individuals from harm. Certain individuals require ongoing protections of the kind already established in law and regulation, but attention must also be focused on characteristics of the research protocol and environment that present ethical challenges. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Protecting The Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities. By Robert E. Goodin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Several foundational documents of bioethics mention the special obligation researchers have to vulnerable research participants. However, the treatment of vulnerability offered by these documents often relies on enumeration of vulnerable groups rather than an analysis of the features that make such groups vulnerable. Recent attempts in the scholarly literature to lend philosophical weight to the concept of vulnerability are offered by Luna and Hurst. Luna suggests that vulnerability is irreducibly contextual and that Institutional Review Boards (Research Ethics Committees) can only (...) identify vulnerable participants by carefully examining the details of the proposed research. Hurst, in contrast, defines the vulnerable as those especially at risk of incurring the wrongs to which all research ethics participants are exposed. We offer a more substantive conception of vulnerability than Luna but one that gives rise to a different rubric of responsibilities from Hurst's. While we understand vulnerability to be an ontological condition of human existence, in the context of research ethics, we take the vulnerable to be research subjects who are especially prone to harm or exploitation. Our analysis rests on developing a typology of sources of vulnerability and showing how distinct sources generate distinct obligations on the part of the researcher. Our account emphasizes that the researcher's first obligation is not to make the research participant even more vulnerable than they already are. To illustrate our framework, we consider two cases: that of a vulnerable population involved in international research and that of a domestic population of people with diminished capacity. (shrink)

To date, bioethics and health policy scholarship has given little consideration to questions of aging and intergenerational justice in the developing world. Demographic changes are precipitating rapid population aging in developing nations, however, and ethical issues regarding older people’s claim to scarce healthcare resources must be addressed. This paper posits that the traditional arguments about generational justice and age‐based rationing of healthcare resources, which were developed primarily in more industrialized nations, fail to adequately address the unique challenges facing older persons (...) in developing nations. Existing philosophical approaches to age‐based resource allocation underemphasize the importance of older persons for developing countries and fail to adequately consider the rights and interests of older persons in these settings. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the most appropriate framework for thinking about generational justice in developing nations is a rights‐based approach that allows for the interests of all age groups, including the oldest, to be considered in the determination of health resource allocation. (shrink)

This short article is a commentary to ‘Vulnerability in Research Ethics: A way forward’ from Margaret Meek Lange, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds. In their article they describe and accept my criticisms of the subpopulation approach to vulnerability and my analysis of vulnerability based on layers, but they suggest going beyond it using a taxonomy to classify layers of vulnerabilty. I argue that a) we do not need a taxonomy to classify vulnerabilities, b) the authors do not provide an adequate (...) or successful taxonomy, and c) they are unable to link their taxonomy to specific obligations. Thus I propose avoiding an approach that requires taxonomies, and suggest instead using some characteristics of layers of vulnerability. (shrink)