Background The aim of this study was to investigate whether physicians who felt strongly for or against a treatment, in this case a moderately life prolonging non-curative cancer treatment, differed in their estimation of medical indication for this treatment as compared to physicians who had no such sentiment. A further aim was to investigate how the notion of medical indication was conceptualised. Methods A random sample of GPs, oncologists and pulmonologists comprised the study group. Respondents were randomised to receive either (...) version of a case presentation; in one version, the patient had smoked and in the other version she had never smoked. The physicians were labelled value-neutral and value-influenced on the basis of their attitude towards the treatment. Results In the ‘value-influenced’ group, there was a significant difference in the estimation of medical indication for treatment depending upon whether the patient had smoked or never smoked ). There was no such difference in the ‘value-neutral’ group. Conclusion This study shows that compared to value-neutral physicians, value-influenced physicians are more likely to base decisions of medical indication on medically irrelevant factors. Moreover, medical indication is used in an ambiguous manner. Hence, we recommend that the usage of ‘medical indication’ be disciplined. (shrink)

Contrary to the widespread concern about over-treatment at the end of life, today, patient preferences for palliative care at the end of life are frequently respected. However, ethically challenging situations in the current healthcare climate are, instead, situations in which a competent patient requests active treatment with the goal of life-prolongation while the physician suggests best supportive care only. The argument of futility has often been used to justify unilateral decisions made by physicians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, (...) we argue that neither the concept of futility nor that of patient autonomy alone is apt for resolving situations in which physicians are confronted with patients' requests for active treatment. Instead, we integrate the relevant arguments that have been put forward in the academic discussion about ‘futile’ treatment into an ethical algorithm with five guiding questions: (1) Is there a chance that medical intervention will be effective in achieving the patient's treatment goal? (2) How does the physician evaluate the expected benefit and the potential harm of the treatment? (3) Does the patient understand his or her medical situation? (4) Does the patient prefer receiving treatment after evaluating the benefit-harm ratio and the costs? (5) Does the treatment require many resources? This algorithm shall facilitate approaching patients' requests for treatments deemed futile by the physician in a systematic way, and responding to these requests in an ethically appropriate manner. It thereby adds substantive considerations to the current procedural approaches of conflict resolution in order to improve decision making among physicians, patients and families. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that physicians’ restrictive attitudes in offering abortions during 1946–1965 in Sweden were due to their private values. The values, however, were rarely presented openly. Instead physicians’ values influenced their assessment of the facts presented—that is, the women's’ trustworthiness. In this manner the physicians were able to conceal their private values and impede the women from getting what they wanted and needed. The practice was concealed from both patients and physicians and never publicly discussed. It (...) is also argued that a similar tacit practice could currently be applied by palliative care physicians. Such practice might allow palliative care physicians to be restrictive when offering sedation therapy without appearing paternalistic or declaring conscientious objections. However, the practice runs counter to patients’ right to participate in making decisions. The women seeking abortion began to oppose the situation and eventually a new abortion law was introduced 1975. Patients at the end of life will never be able to protest against palliative care physicians’ restrictive attitudes. This is a vulnerable and weak group, unable to lodge complaints after the treatment. In order to respect patients’ autonomy, even suffering patients at the end of their lives, it is suggested that physicians should openly declare their values when it comes to providing treatments that might shorten life. Such transparency might facilitate more genuine shared decision-making and accordingly less suboptimal end-of-life care. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...) distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

This article investigates what notions of “just health care” are found at three Swedish hospitals among health care personnel and whether these notions are relevant to what priorities are actually made. Fieldwork at all three hospitals and 114 in-depth interviews were conducted. Data have been subject to conceptual and ethical analysis and categorisation. According to our findings, justice is an important idea to health care personnel at the studied hospitals. Two main notions of just health care were found. The main (...) idea was the notion of “equal treatment according to need”, the basic idea being that differences in treatment should be justified by differences in needs. The competing idea that merit should affect the treatment received is occasionally encountered, the idea here being that patients, by acting irresponsibly, may no longer deserve to be treated strictly according to needs. In practice, priorities are made on grounds that only partly comply with the basic idea of justice in health care, as it is understood by staff at the studied hospitals. Exceptions are made due to regional differences, considerations of cost-effectiveness, economic incentives, tradition, the daily patient flow, research, private alternatives, patient influence and favouritism of health care personnel. (shrink)