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  1. Self-Deception.David W. Hamlyn - 1971 - Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (4):210-211.
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  • Knowing What I Am Doing.Keith S. Donnellan - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (14):401-409.
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  • Depth Psychology and Self-Deception.Robert Lockie - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, (...)
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  • Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
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  • A Further Explanation and Defense of the New Model of Self-Deception: A Reply to Martin.William Whisner - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):195-206.
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  • Recent Work on Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):1-17.
    I start, in Section I, with the case for skepticism about the possibility of self-deception. In Sections II and III, I review attempts to explain how self-deception, conceived on a strict interpersonal model, is possible. Section IV addresses a variety of analyses of self-deception that involve modest departures from these strict models and canvasses associated attacks on the standard paradoxes. The emphasis there is on the static paradoxes, discussion of their dynamic coun terparts being reserved largely for Section V. Section (...)
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  • Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.
    Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs subject to (...)
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  • An Analysis of Self-Deception.Kent Bach - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.
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  • Self-Deception: A Reflexive Dilemma.T. S. Champlin - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (201):281 - 299.
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  • Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
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  • Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications.
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  • Self-Deception.Frederick A. Siegler - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):29-43.
    The author discusses the activity of deceiving" as deceiving another and as self-deception. he attempts a logical equivalence between the two. the discussion encompasses 'belief'. the author concludes that the statement 'jones is deceiving himself' translates into "'"how could" jones believe such nonsense'?" with the answer built-in: "'he really "can't"'." (staff).
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  • The Range of Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1975 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):83 – 95.
    Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...)
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  • Wanting, Intending, and Knowing What One is Doing.Arthur R. Miller - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3):334-343.
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  • 'Strong' Self‐Deception.David Pugmire - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):339-346.
    Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self?deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self?deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that P and believed not?P, and that one couldn't be described as knowing P and believing not?P unless one (...)
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  • Self-Deception: Resolving the Epistemological Paradox.Richard Reilly - 1976 - Personalist 57 (4):391-394.
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  • Self-Deception And The Common Life.Lloyd H. Steffen - 1986 - Lang.
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