Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. As a matter of fact : Empirical perspectives on ethics.John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, here presents a full exposition and defense of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   642 citations  
  • My pedagogic Creed.John Dewey - 2004 - In David J. Flinders & Stephen J. Thornton (eds.), The Curriculum Studies Reader. Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance.James Woodward & John Allman - 2007 - Journal of Physiology-Paris 101 (4-6):179-202.
    We use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates for moral intuition include fronto-insular, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.Timothy Wilson - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    This is not your psychoanalyst's unconscious.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   267 citations  
  • Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a provocative contribution to contemporary ethical theory challenging foundational conceptions of character that date back to Aristotle. John Doris draws on behavioral science, especially social psychology, to argue that we misattribute the causes of behavior to personality traits and other fixed aspects of character rather than to the situational context. More often than not it is the situation not the nature of the personality that really counts. The author elaborates the philosophical consequences of this research for a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   447 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
    Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
    In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  • Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error.Gilbert Harman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-331.
    Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error '. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   336 citations  
  • If You Like It, Does It Matter if It’s Real?Felipe De Brigard - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
    Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable experiences, people care about “living in contact with reality.” Such claim, however, assumes that people's reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due to the fact that they value reality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's moral and psychological monism.Luc Faucher & Edouard Machery - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):41-62.
    In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Racial cognition and the ethics of implicit bias.Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):522–540.
    We first describe recent empirical research on racial cognition, particularly work on implicit racial biases that suggests they are widespread, that they can coexist with explicitly avowed anti-racist and tolerant attitudes, and that they influence behavior in a variety of subtle but troubling ways. We then consider a cluster of questions that the existence and character of implicit racial biases raise for moral theory. First, is it morally condemnable to harbor an implicit racial bias? Second, ought each of us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Cognitive scientific challenges to morality.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.
    Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Persons, situations, and virtue ethics.John M. Doris - 1998 - Noûs 32 (4):504-530.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   227 citations  
  • The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene - 2004 - Neuron 44 (2):389–400.
    In philosophy, a debate can live forever. Nowhere is this more evident than in ethics, a field that is fueled by apparently intractable dilemmas. To promote the wellbeing of many, may we sacrifice the rights of a few? If our actions are predetermined, can we be held responsible for them? Should people be judged on their intentions alone, or also by the consequences of their behavior? Is failing to prevent someone’s death as blameworthy as actively causing it? For generations, questions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   139 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  • Lack of character? Situationism critiqued.John Sabini & Maury Silver - 2005 - Ethics 115 (3):535-562.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations