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  1. Providence and the Problem of Evil.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Swinburne offers an answer to one of the most difficult problems of religious belief: why does a loving God allow humans to suffer so much? It is the final instalment of Swinburne's acclaimed four-volume philosophical examination of Christian doctrine.
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  • Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa.Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2005 - Ars Disputandi 5:5-11.
    Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy . According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism. We disagree. In this paper, we explain why we think that the argument of Nagasawa and Trakakis (...)
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  • The evidential argument from evil: A second look.William Rowe - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 262--85.
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  • Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil.Stephen J. Wykstra - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 126--50.
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  • (1 other version)19 The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William Rowe - 1999 - In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 6--157.
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  • The Evidential Argument from Evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - Indiana University Press. Edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder.
    Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this issue by eminent philosophers and theologians and places them in dialogue with eleven original essays reflecting new thinking by these and other scholars. The volume focuses on two versions of the argument. The first affirms that there is no reason for God to permit (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Problem of Evil.Eleonore Stump - 1985 - Faith and Philosophy 2 (4):392-423.
    This paper considers briefly the approach to the problem of evil by Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and John Hick and argues that none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. The paper then develops a different strategy for dealing with the problem of evil by expounding and taking seriously three Christian claims relevant to the problem: Adam fell; natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall; and after death human beings go either to heaven or hell. Properly interpreted, (...)
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  • The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil.William Hasker - 1992 - Faith and Philosophy 9 (1):23-44.
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  • (1 other version)Skeptical theism and moral skepticism : a reply to Almeida and Oppy.Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa - 2004 - Ars Disputandi 4:1-1.
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need not (...)
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  • Skeptical theism and the problem of moral aporia.Mark Piper - 2007 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (2):65 - 79.
    Skeptical theism seeks to defend theism against the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning human epistemic limitations in order to establish that we have no epistemological basis from which to judge that apparently gratuitous evils are not in fact justified by morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken. This paper contributes to the set of distinctively practical criticisms of skeptical theism by arguing that religious believers who accept skeptical theism and take its practical implications seriously will be forced (...)
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  • Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil.Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.
    Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
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  • (1 other version)The Problem of Evil.Eleonore Stump - 2010 - In Robert Pasnau & Christina van Dyke (eds.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 773-784.
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  • In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241-251.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...)
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  • Necessary Gratuitous Evil.Keith Chrzan - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):134-137.
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  • Consequentialism and Cluelessness.James Lenman - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342-370.
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  • Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil.William Hasker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (3):423-425.
    Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil.” I point out that Chrzan misstates my views on several key points, and argue that his comments fail to create any difficulty for my argument.
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  • The problem of evil.Derk Pereboom - 2004 - In William Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 148–170.
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  • Naturalism defeated?: essays on Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism.James K. Beilby (ed.) - 2002 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...
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  • Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William L. Rowe - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.
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  • Sceptical theism and moral scepticism.Ira M. Schnall - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (1):49-69.
    Several theists have adopted a position known as ‘sceptical theism ’, according to which God is justified in allowing suffering, but the justification is often beyond human comprehension. A problem for sceptical theism is that if there are unknown justifications for suffering, then we cannot know whether it is right for a human being to relieve suffering. After examining several proposed solutions to this problem, I conclude that one who is committed to a revealed religion has a simpler and more (...)
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  • The argument from inscrutable evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - In The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 286--310.
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  • Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands.Stephen Maitzen - 2007 - Sophia 46 (3):237-243.
    According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
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  • Hasker on Gratuitous Natural Evil.David O'Connor - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (3):380-392.
    In a recent contribution to this journal William Hasker rejects the idea, long a staple in philosophical debates over God and evil, that the existence of gratuitous evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. Among his arguments are three to show that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutually inconsistent. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. Then, very briefly, and as a byproduct of showing this, I will sketch out how a potentially vexing form of (...)
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  • James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. [REVIEW]Paul Draper - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (1):65-68.
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  • Free will, evil, and divine providence.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Festschrift for Nicholas Wolterstorff). New York: Cambridge University Press.
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