This book examines the philosophy of al-Ghazali, analysing his conception of God within Islamic theology. Seeking to contribute to the greater understanding of Muslim thought, it analyses his 'orthodox' theory, based on the notion that the spiritual struggle and philosophical enquiry are informed by the possession of firm science. Exploring a wide range of Arab texts and Arab primary literature, this book therefore examines a crucial period of Medieval Islamic history, whilst emphasizing the multifarious and by no means monolithic components (...) of the Muslim outlook. In seeking to understand Islamic religion as a creative and progressive heritage, it also demonstrates the moderate and equilibrate character of mainstream Islam, and ultimately argues that al-Ghazali's thought is the best expression of Islamic intellectuality and spirituality. Taking a theoretical approach, this book will be useful to students and scholars of Islamic philosophy, theology and history. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate that an indeterminate state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's having a determinable (...) property, but not having any unique determinate of that determinable. I motivate the needed extension of the traditional understanding of determinables, then argue that a determinable-based account of MI accommodates, in illuminating fashion, both ‘glutty’ and ‘gappy’ cases of MI, while satisfactorily treating concerns about MI stemming from Evans’ argument and the problem of the many. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 539-560 [Access article in PDF] Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason: A Medieval Arabic Debate on the Metaphysics of Nature Taneli Kukkonen In a recent article Simo Knuuttila has examined the argumentative patterns of modern cosmology, especially the search in fundamental physics for an "ultimate explanation," a unified "Theory of Everything" that would subsume all more local theories under its (...) aegis. Knuuttila goes on to compare contemporary modes of explanation with previous ways of conceiving of the metaphysics of understanding. As it turns out, on the cosmological borderline where physics shades into metaphysics desires similar at heart have fueled the efforts of thinkers throughout the history of western thought. When what is at stake is the final intelligibility of the world, shared ideals of necessity, transparency, and simplicity come to the fore. More often than not, theological concerns and preconceptions accompany these notions. 1One can react to this finding in one of two ways, either by retorting that the moderns have not gotten very far or by pointing out that earlier discussions on the topic were often quite philosophically sophisticated. In this article I propose to investigate how some of the issues raised by Knuuttila figure in a specific historical context. This is the debate on the pre-eternity of the world initiated by the celebrated Muslim theologian Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111) in his polemic arguing for The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahâfut al-falâsifa, 1095) and later picked up by the Andalusian philosopher Averroës (1126-98) in [End Page 539] his reply, The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahâfut al-tahâfut, 1180). 2 The exceptionally rich cosmological materials could be taken in any number of directions, but I will focus on three main issues: the discussants' construction of the domain of possibilities (i.e. the relation of the possible to the actual), their understanding of the reasonability of creation, and the question of its finitude and infinity. The study is undertaken partly to illustrate the sophistication with which the topics were handled in medieval Islamic philosophy, but in each case I will also draw parallels with certain modern conceptions, and I submit that in each case al-Ghazâlî's and Averroës's debate throws light on the contemporary discussion. In the final section I will develop this contention further by pointing to a connection between finitude and possibilities which I believe has both heuristic and existential value. Plenitude and Possibility Among historians of philosophy it is now acknowledged that in late medieval discussions certain modal theoretical innovations were instrumental in bringing about profound change in the western worldview. A conceptual shift occurred where, roughly speaking, a single intelligible universe was exchanged for several possible worlds. In Knuuttila's estimation this change in worldviews was in some ways more fundamental than anything modern science has produced since. 3 This claim deserves consideration but I would like first to outline what the change was about, for in al-Ghazâlî's and Averroës's debate this shift in modal paradigms is clearly discernible.Representative of the philosophers' point of view, Averroës holds onto the received Arabic Aristotelian interpretation of setting possibilities in a statistical temporal-frequency framework. According to this account, what is truly possible must at some time be realized--this is a technical interpretation of what has after Lovejoy commonly become known as the principle of plenitude. 4 As a [End Page 540] corollary, what always is is necessarily. The cosmological consequences of these assumptions can be outlined as follows. First, lest God's creative possibilities be limited, it must be admitted that the world could have been created however long ago in the past. By extension God must have been able to create the world an infinite time ago. But if it is a genuine possibility that the world is eternally old, then according to the principle of plenitude, this possibility is an actual fact. Once it is... (shrink)

This paper aims to present concisely the Islamic kalām atomism as an alternative philosophy to Hellenizing falsafa. Kalām is a theological-philosophical discourse which, first ventured to rival the falsafa represented early by al-Kindī, then by al-Fārābī and Avicenna in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, and which eventually appeared to be inclined to propose a mingling of the kalām discourse with falsafa in a series of varied "syntheses".—Focusing on the simple ontology of the basic kalām atomism, and noting the hybrid character (...) of kalām, the aim of this paper is to help to clarify the inevitable problematic consequences of those late ventures of Islamic intellectualism. (shrink)

At the basis of Ghazali's criticisms of Ash'arite kalam is the thesis that its primary function is the defence of traditional Islamic belief, the 'aqida, against the distortions of heretical innovations (al-bida'). Kalam is not an end in itself and it is error to think that the mere engagement in it constitutes the experientially religious. In the I[hdotu]ya' he maintains in effect that when it is pursued as an end in itself, its dogmas can constitute a veil preventive of the (...) attainment of gnosis (ma'rifa). On the other hand, Ash'arite kalam when not pursued as an end in itself can be an aid in the quest after gnosis. This is implicit in his reference (in Kitab al-Arba'in) to his own major work of Ash'arite kalam, the Iqti[sdotu]ad fi al-i'tiqad, where he states that “it goes deeper in ascertaining [the truth] and is closer to knocking at the doors of gnosis than the official discourse encountered in the books of the mutakallimin.” The I[hdotu]ya' abounds with homilies, guides for the pious, particularly for those seeking mystical knowledge. Ash'arism pervades such homilies. Thus in Kitab al-Tawba, Ghazali formulates, analyzes and defends the concept of human choice in Ash'arite terms. He thus argues that each of the ingredients of this concept - knowledge, power, the decisive will, as well as the ensuing choice - is individually the direct creation of God. Not that the argument for this concept yields experiential knowledge of its meaning within the cosmic scheme of things. For Ghazali such knowledge is only attained through mystical vision. But the Ash'arite argument, when not pursued as an end in itself, can be an aid to the seekers of gnosis. It can bring them closer to knocking at its doors. (shrink)

At the basis of Ghazali's criticisms of Ash'arite kalām is the thesis that its primary function is the defence of traditional Islamic belief, the 'aqida, against the distortions of heretical innovations. Kalām is not an end in itself and it is error to think that the mere engagement in it constitutes the experientially religious. In the I[hdotu]yā' he maintains in effect that when it is pursued as an end in itself, its dogmas can constitute a veil preventive of the attainment (...) of gnosis. On the other hand, Ash'arite kalām when not pursued as an end in itself can be an aid in the quest after gnosis. This is implicit in his reference to his own major work of Ash'arite kalām, the Iqti[sdotu]ād fī al-i'tiqād, where he states that “it goes deeper in ascertaining [the truth] and is closer to knocking at the doors of gnosis than the official discourse encountered in the books of the mutakallimīn.” The I[hdotu]yā' abounds with homilies, guides for the pious, particularly for those seeking mystical knowledge. Ash'arism pervades such homilies. Thus in Kitāb al-Tawba, Ghazali formulates, analyzes and defends the concept of human choice in Ash'arite terms. He thus argues that each of the ingredients of this concept - knowledge, power, the decisive will, as well as the ensuing choice - is individually the direct creation of God. Not that the argument for this concept yields experiential knowledge of its meaning within the cosmic scheme of things. For Ghazali such knowledge is only attained through mystical vision. But the Ash'arite argument, when not pursued as an end in itself, can be an aid to the seekers of gnosis. It can bring them closer to knocking at its doors. (shrink)

RésuméL'atomisme dukalāms'est constitué en opposition à la philosophie naturelle aristotélicienne desfalāsifa. Dans laPhysiqueduShifā', Avicenne s'en est livré à une réfutation détaillée et fondée sur de nombreux arguments. Ces derniers ont donné lieu à une réponse fort discrète chez al-Ghazālī, dont l'obédience aukalāmétait au mieux évanescente. Une réponse plus développée semble avoir été le fait d'al-Shahrastānī, encore qu'on n'en puisse retracer que les grandes lignes en raison du manque de sources transmises. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, qui est passé dans son développement intellectuel (...) par une phase avicennienne, donc par une adoption vigoureuse des arguments anti-atomistes d'Avicenne, suivie d'une phrase critique à l'égard de la philosophie du maître, ne se borne pas à fournir une réponse détaillée aux arguments d'Ibn Sīnā, mais construit de nouveaux arguments en faveur de l'atomisme dukalām. (shrink)