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  1. (1 other version)Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian (...)
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  • (1 other version)Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian (...)
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  • The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
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  • Rational choice and the structure of the environment.Herbert A. Simon - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):129-138.
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  • The Theory of Statistical Decision.Leonard J. Savage - 1951 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 46:55--67.
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  • Actualist rationality.Charles F. Manski - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.
    This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he (...)
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  • The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
    Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought.
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  • Difficulties in the theory of personal probability.Leonard J. Savage - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):305-310.
    We statisticians, with our specific concern for uncertainty, are even more liable than other practical men to encounter philosophy, whether we like it or not. For my part, I like it comparatively well. That is why the honor of opening this session of discussion has come to me, though my background makes my knowledge and idiom somewhat different from your own.
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  • Statistical Decision Functions.Abraham Wald - 1950 - Wiley: New York.
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  • The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
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  • Statistical Decision Functions which Minimize the Maximum Risk.Abraham Wald - 1945 - Annals of Mathematics 46:265--280.
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  • Minimax, information and ultrapessimism.Giovanni Parmigiani - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (3):241-252.
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  • Internal consistency of choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.
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  • What Kind of Uncertainty is That? Using Personal Probability for Expressing One's Thinking About Logical and Mathematical Propositions. [REVIEW]Teddy Seidenfel, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9):516-533.
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