In this volume, Feinberg focuses on the meanings of "interest," the relationship between interests and wants, and the distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding analyses on interest and hard cases for the applications of the concept of harm. Examples of the "hard cases" are harm to character, vicarious harm, and prenatal and posthumous harm. Feinberg also discusses the relationship between harm and rights, the concept of a victim, and the distinctions of various quantitative dimensions of harm, consent, and offense, including the (...) magnitude, probability, risk, and "importance" of harm. (shrink)

Everyone knows that something has gone wrong, in the United States, with the conventions of privacy. Along with a vastly increased tolerance for variation in sexual life we have seen a sharp increase in prurient and censorious attention to the sexual lives of public figures and famous persons, past and present. The culture seems to be growing more tolerant and more intolerant at the same time, though perhaps different parts of it are involved in the two movements.

These four volumes address the question of the kinds of conduct may the state make criminal without infringing on the moral autonomy of individual citizens.

In this paper I try to defend the notion that the dead can be harmed, in opposition to Callahan and in accord with some ideas of Feinberg. In agreement with Parlit, I argue that the existence of a person has degrees. I suggest that properlies of a subject, such as “reputations” and claims, can persist after death, aIthough the subject as such does not and that these can be harmed. A promise, e.g., can be frustrated merely by being ignored; in (...) that sense a dead person can be wronged, and if wronged, s/he can be harmed. (shrink)

In this paper I try to defend the notion that the dead can be harmed, in opposition to Callahan and in accord with some ideas of Feinberg. In agreement with Parlit, I argue that the existence of a person has degrees. I suggest that properlies of a subject, such as “reputations” and claims, can persist after death, aIthough the subject as such does not and that these can be harmed. A promise, e.g., can be frustrated merely by being ignored; in (...) that sense a dead person can be wronged, and if wronged, s/he can be harmed. (shrink)

Recent technical developments in genetictesting has led to a situation where the DNA inpreviously stored tissue samples can beextracted and used for genetic analysis. Thisraises the question of how to decide whether aspecific use of such samples should be allowed.Using the genetic testing of ancient DNA ingeneral, and the DNA of the pharaoh Tutankhamenin particular as examples this paper analysesthe question. It investigates whether ethicalframeworks based on proxy consent, culturalaffiliation, ownership, or the privacy rightsof the dead are appropriate and justifiable (...) inthis context. The conclusion is that frameworksbased on proxy consent, cultural affiliation,and ownership are not very useful. (shrink)