Teleological reasoning--reasoning that is based on the assumption of purpose, design or function--is a fundamental aspect of adult cognition. It leads us to think about the actions of others in terms of goals and to presume that people's creations are designed for a purpose. It also causes us to reason about biological entities in terms of functions and characterizes much of our metaphysical musing on life and meaning. This dissertation explores the nature and development of teleological thought in preschool children. (...) ;One hypothesis is that teleological thinking is an innate mode of construal which is limited to artifacts and biological traits and provides children with the core of a biological theory. This dissertation presents an alternative proposal . It argues that children's teleological understanding develops from knowledge of intentional goal-directed behavior and is not inherently restricted to any particular category of phenomena. In the absence of scientific knowledge, children may draw upon intention-based teleological knowledge and--as many adults have done in the past--view all kinds or phenomena as intentionally caused for a purpose. ;Several studies are presented that explore the predictions of Promiscuous Teleology and Biology-Based Teleology regarding the scope of children's and adults' attribution of function to different kinds of entities and their parts. These studies lend support to the notion that children's teleological intuitions are unconstrained. In other words, that preschoolers broadly view natural objects , artifacts and biological organisms and their parts as "made for something." Further studies then explored possible explanations for these results by examining the relationship between children's and adults' concept of function. The findings suggest that children's beliefs about function are more influenced by the degree of intention involved in an activity than adults. The implications of these findings for notions of a "teleological stance" are discussed. (shrink)

In Mindblindness, Simon Baron-Cohen presents a model of the evolution and development of "mindreading." He argues that we mindread all the time, effortlessly, automatically, and mostly unconsciously. It is the natural way in which we interpret, predict, and participate in social behavior and communication. We ascribe mental states to people: states such as thoughts, desires, knowledge, and intentions. Building on many years of research, Baron-Cohen concludes that children with autism, suffer from "mindblindness" as a result of a selective impairment in (...) mindreading. For these children, the world is essentially devoid of mental things. Baron-Cohen develops a theory that draws on data from comparative psychology, from developmental, and from neuropsychology. He argues that specific neurocognitive mechanisms have evolved that allow us to mindread, to make sense of actions, to interpret gazes as meaningful, and to decode "the language of the eyes." A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...

In Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development, Frank C. Keil provides a coherent account of how concepts and word meanings develop in children, adding to our understanding of the representational nature of concepts and word meanings at all ages. Keil argues that it is impossible to adequately understand the nature of conceptual representation without also considering the issue of learning. Weaving together issues in cognitive development, philosophy, and cognitive psychology, he reconciles numerous theories, backed by empirical evidence from nominal kinds studies, (...) natural-kinds studies, and studies of fundamental categorical distinctions. He shows that all this evidence, when put together, leads to a better understanding of semantic and conceptual development. The book opens with an analysis of the problems of modeling qualitative changes in conceptual development, investigating how concepts of natural kinds, nominal kinds, and artifacts evolve. The studies on nominal kinds document a powerful and unambiguous developmental pattern indicating a shift from a reliance on global tabulations of characteristic features to what appears to be a small set of defining ones. The studies on natural kinds document an analogous shift toward a core theory instead of simple definition. Both sets of studies are strongly supported by cross cultural data. While these patterns seem to suggest that the young child organizes concepts according to characteristic features, Keil argues that there is a framework of conceptual categories and causal beliefs that enables even very young children to understand kinds at a deeper, theoretically guided, level. This account suggests a new way of understanding qualitative change and carries strong implications for how concepts are represented at any point in development. A Bradford Book. (shrink)