Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...) that it is based on a false dichotomy between internal and external causes. However, I will also suggest that this problem could be overcome, as there are no obvious obstacles to an operationalization of free will that is in accord with the philosophical conception of free will. (shrink)

The theorization of culture in psychology continues to gain momentum in spite of little agreement concerning the most suitable theoretical frameworks for examining cultural phenomena. We explore two contemporary approaches to culture--social constructionism and cultural studies--and examine their relevance for psychology. In juxtapositioning them we map their continuities and discontinuities in terms of ontological and epistemological stances on language, representation, knowledge, identity, history, ideology, social action and emancipation. We propose a bridge between the two, and discuss ways in which the (...) dialogue between social constructionism and cultural studies can deepen psychology's understanding of culture in the postmodern world. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time.

The existence or non‐existence of free will is an age‐old question in philosophy that has more recently made its way into neuroscience research. The most active area of research relevant to this question is on the subject of “conscious volition” – do our conscious decisions and thoughts exert a direct causal influence on our actions? This chapter discusses the recent history of research on conscious volition as well as the key brain structures thought to be involved. By the end of (...) the chapter the reader should have a basic working knowledge of modern research on conscious volition, the key discoveries, controversies, and open questions. (shrink)

Gathering evidence across disciplines is a strength of interdisciplinary fields like neuroethics. However, conclusions can only be made if the evidence applies to the issue at hand. Libet and colleagues' Citation1983 experiment is an interesting case study in this problem. Despite ongoing critiques about the methods used and the replicability of its findings, many people consider Libet and colleagues' methodology a valid strategy to investigate free will and related topics. We reviewed studies using methods similar to those of Libet and (...) colleagues (N = 48) to identify its use and the evidence produced. Overall, we found substantial variation between studies. While the Libet paradigm may be useful for examining how stimuli affect temporal judgments, the link between this and free will or moral responsibility is not clear. Being aware and critical of the methods used to gather results is important when applying scientific experiments to complex, abstract phenomena. (shrink)

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...) argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Test your understanding of Chapter 12 -- 13 Why are cultures that practice science better at controlling the material world than non-scientific cultures? -- (a) Structure of scientific theories -- (b) The development of the written word -- (c) The systematic testing of ideas -- (d) Different a priori assumptions about the world -- (e) Acceptance of fundamental change -- Conclusion -- Test your understanding of Chapter 13 -- Summary of Part 3: psychological constraints on scientific explanations -- References -- (...) Index. (shrink)