This paper begins by rehearsing some commonly heard conservative and radical objections to the idea of citizenship education. I then explore another potentially radical objection, implicit in the tenets of ‘character education’ and ‘socio-emotional learning’ but rarely stated explicitly. According to this objection, citizenship education, with its overarching ideal of democratic justice, politicises values education beyond good reason by assuming that political literacy and specific (democratic) social skills, rather than transcultural moral and emotional ‘basics’, are the primary values to be (...) transmitted. I show how this objection is based on three major disagreements about (a) the good and the right, (b) pluralism and (c) the connection between morality and politics. (shrink)

I first put the notion of non–expansive character education in context by locating its place within recent trends in values education and, in particular, by distinguishing it from more expansive accounts such as civic education and critical postmodernism. I argue that the essential characteristics of non–expansive character education are, on the one hand, moral cosmopolitanism and, on the other, methodological substantivism. In the second part of the essay, I defend this sort of character education against various common criticisms, with special (...) reference to two canonical works of the movement, by Lickona and Kilpatrick. Non–expansive character education stands out, in the end, as a reasonable middle–ground proposal with neither too little nor too much meat on its bones. (shrink)

There needs to be a tighter connection than is often the case between contested theories of democracy and debates about the viability and desirability of the common school. Because radical traditions of state education take that connection much more seriously, in both theory and practice, than most dominant accounts, it is to those alternative traditions that we might usefully look for guidance in the furtherance of explicitly democratic aspirations. In arguing for the importance of prefigurative practice, this paper proposes seven (...) key analytic strands of radical democratic praxis. A common good animated by the affirmation of a reconfigured, inclusive ‘fraternity’ is preferred to the fearful, atomistic interdependence of neo-liberalism. (shrink)

There needs to be a tighter connection than is often the case between contested theories of democracy and debates about the viability and desirability of the common school. Because radical traditions of state education take that connection much more seriously, in both theory and practice, than most dominant accounts, it is to those alternative traditions that we might usefully look for guidance in the furtherance of explicitly democratic aspirations. In arguing for the importance of prefigurative practice, this paper proposes seven (...) key analytic strands of radical democratic praxis. A common good animated by the affirmation of a reconfigured, inclusive ‘fraternity’ is preferred to the fearful, atomistic interdependence of neo-liberalism. (shrink)

This paper begins by rehearsing some commonly heard conservative and radical objections to the idea of citizenship education. I then explore another potentially radical objection, implicit in the tenets of ‘character education’ and ‘socio-emotional learning’ but rarely stated explicitly. According to this objection, citizenship education, with its overarching ideal of democratic justice, politicises values education beyond good reason by assuming that political literacy and specific (democratic) social skills, rather than transcultural moral and emotional ‘basics’, are the primary values to be (...) transmitted. I show how this objection is based on three major disagreements about (a) the good and the right, (b) pluralism and (c) the connection between morality and politics. (shrink)

I first put the notion of non–expansive character education in context by locating its place within recent trends in values education and, in particular, by distinguishing it from more expansive accounts such as civic education and critical postmodernism. I argue that the essential characteristics of non–expansive character education are, on the one hand, moral cosmopolitanism and, on the other, methodological substantivism. In the second part of the essay, I defend this sort of character education against various common criticisms, with special (...) reference to two canonical works of the movement, by Lickona and Kilpatrick. Non–expansive character education stands out, in the end, as a reasonable middle–ground proposal with neither too little nor too much meat on its bones. (shrink)