What is analytical philosophy of education (APE)? And what has been its place in the history of the subject over the last fifty years? In a recent essay in Ethics and Education (Vol 2, No 2 October 2007) on ‘Rival conceptions of the philosophy of education’, Paul Standish described a number of features of APE. Relying on both historical and philosophical argument, the present paper critically assesses these eight points, as well as another five points delineating APE in the Introduction (...) to The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education. (shrink)

Although it has been given qualified approval by a number of philosophers of education, the so-called ‘therapeutic turn’ in education has been the subject of criticism by several commentators on post-compulsory and adult learning over the last few years. A key feature of this alleged development in recent educational policy is said to be the replacement of the traditional goals of knowledge and understanding with personal and social objectives concerned with enhancing and developing confidence and self-esteem in learners. After offering (...) some critical observations on these developments, I suggest that there are some educationally justifiable goals underpinning what has been described as a therapeutic turn. Whilst accepting that ‘self-esteem’ and cognate concepts cannot provide a general end or universal aim of education, the therapeutic function is more valuable and significant than is generally acknowledged. This claim is justified by an examination of the concept of ‘mindfulness’ that, it is argued, can be an immensely powerful and valuable notion, which is integrally connected with the centrally transformative and developmental nature of learning and educational activity at all levels. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between action research and policy and the kind of confidence teachers, policy makers and other potential users may have in such research. Many published teacher action research accounts are criticised on the grounds that they do not fully meet the conventional standards for reporting social scientific research, and by implication are held to be less trustworthy. Action research is nevertheless often seen by some academics and policy makers as a potential method for developing theory, disseminating (...) good practice, or raising standards. Through a discussion of three major approaches to action research—seen variously as professional learning, practical philosophy and critical social science—it is argued that judgements about confidence depend upon understanding the various kinds of knowledge claim that can be made by action researchers, and appropriate judgements concerning the strength of evidence or reasons. (shrink)

Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application.The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy-inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for (...) this component.A solution to the latter problem is sought in the debate between Carr and Hirst on the relationship between philosophy and education. This shows Carr making claims that rely on a conception of philosophy that he rejects, while Hirst insists on this conception, uses it to justify practical claims, but denies that this is possible.To achieve a practically relevant analysis of educational research, both need to include second-order, normative, conceptual enquiry into the philosophies that drive educational policy-making and partly regulate teaching methodology. Deweyan, first-order, ‘reflective practice’ needs, then, to be supplemented with second-order reflection.Educational research is philosophy- not science-driven, and is value-led. Consequently, it has the status not of scientific discovery but of practical recommendation. (shrink)

Elmer John Thiessen; Two Concepts or Two Phases of Liberal Education?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 223–234, https.

James D Marshall; Wittgenstein on Rules: implications for authority and discipline in education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May.

R S Downie; Professions and Professionalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 147–159, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Ronald Barnett; Does Higher Education have Aims?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 239–250, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

Higher education has often been accused of its anti-social character, represented by the metaphor of the ‘ivory tower’. However, the idea of the pursuit of knowledge per se, which is associated with the ivory tower, has not been widely recognized as a public ideal of higher education. In this study, by drawing on the 20th-century British educational philosopher Paul H. Hirst’s theory of liberal education, I revisit and re-evaluate the Newmanian idea of pursuit of knowledge as an end itself as (...) a public ideal for higher education. I argue that the public criteria provided by discipline-rooted knowledge are among the criteria that are most able to define and legitimise higher education. These public criteria are compatible with the distinctive nature of higher education, which is essentially aimed at adult citizens and linked to research as the creation of knowledge, and can even serve to legitimise the cognitive structure of the society. (shrink)

R. S. Peters and a small group of contemporaries set the foundations for analytic philosophy of education in the 1960s, a field which continues to this day. This article asks about the value of analytic philosophy of education today, and proposes alterations to its initial aims and methods to make its value clearer. I outline some critiques of analytic philosophy of education, and respond by clarifying its aims. The key insight is that if analytic philosophy of education is explicitly aligned (...) with recent trends in social philosophy to focus on ameliorative analysis, then its value and relevance as a method in educational studies becomes clearer. Ameliorative analysis starts with the social role that a concept plays, and analyses it with this purpose in mind. I illustrate how R. S. Peters analysis of education would be approached differently with ameliorative analysis in mind, and conclude by pointing to some interesting points of discussion that arise from this approach. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Although a large number of theories justify the presence of games in school, all of them converge in two of the educational functions described by Biesta, socialization and qualification. In contra...

On the strength of a clarification of the nature of philosophy of education, a critical overview is offered of Wittgenstein's impact on the field. The focus then narrows to give attention to Wittgenstein's claim that “Nothing is hidden”, pitched here in a questionable relation to contemporary concerns with transparency. Familiar readings of this passage are challenged in connection with Wittgenstein's late writings on psychology, especially with regard to imagination and pretence. These are argued to be essential to the development of (...) mind and world, from the child's first entry into language, and hence crucial to education. (shrink)

This article examines the work of R. S. Peters on moral development and moral education, as represented in his papers collected under that name, pointing out that these writings have been relatively neglected. It approaches these writings through the lens of the ‘familiar story’ that philosophical work on this topic switched during, roughly, the 1980s from an emphasis on rational principles to an emphasis on virtues and care. Starting from what Peters called ‘the paradox of moral education’—roughly, that a rational (...) morality must be developed in part through habit—the article discusses not only Peters' rational morality of principles and rules but also elements of his thought concerning virtues and care. Running through the discussion is the question of whether Peters, in drawing for instance on Aristotle as well as Kohlberg, is attempting to combine incompatible ideas. Against this, it is suggested that in reading Peters now we can learn from his explicit claim that we need a pluralistic, not a monolithic, approach to moral development and moral education. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight why R. S. Peters' conceptual analysis of ‘education’ was such an important contribution to the normative field of philosophy of education. In the article, I do the following: 1) explicate Peters' conception of philosophy of education as a field of philosophy and explain his approach to the philosophical analysis of concepts; 2) emphasize several (normative) features of Peters' conception of education, while pointing to a couple of oversights; and 3) suggest how Peters' analysis might be (...) used to reinvigorate a conversation on one central educational aim—that of how we might educate citizens for the 21st century. (shrink)

Richard Peters argued for a general education based largely on the study of truth-seeking subjects for its own sake. His arguments have long been acknowledged as problematic. There are also difficulties with Paul Hirst's arguments for a liberal education, which in part overlap with Peters'. Where justification fails, can historical explanation illuminate? Peters was influenced by the prevailing idea that a secondary education should be based on traditional, largely knowledge-orientated subjects, pursued for intrinsic as well as practical ends. Does history (...) reveal good reasons for this view? The view itself has roots going back to the 16th century and the educational tradition of radical Protestantism. Religious arguments to do with restoring the image of an omniscient God in man made good sense, within their own terms, of an encyclopaedic approach to education. As these faded in prominence after 1800, old curricular patterns persisted in the drive for ‘middle-class schools’, and new, less plausible justifications grew in salience. These were based first on faculty psychology and later on the psychology of individual differences. The essay relates the views of Peters and Hirst to these historical arguments, asking how far their writings show traces of the religious argument mentioned, and how their views on education and the development of mind relate to the psychological arguments. (shrink)

Although it is primarily concerned with the value of liberty and the justification of compulsory education, what lies behind much of this paper is the question ‘;Why treat children like children?’ The fact is that we do not regard children as having the same rights, privileges and liberties as adults, and children may not be thought of as deserving the same degree of respect or consideration as their seniors. In the past this has led to some horrific states of affairs, (...) and while matters have undoubtedly improved, it is still the case that most people accept what Graham Haydon describes as ‘;the assumption that one thing can go for children and quite another for adults’. One likely consequence of this, and an important example of the different treatment reserved for children is compulsory education. Illiterate and innumerate adults are not compelled to practise their letters or play with counters or watch prescribed television programmes. Even when, to quote Mill, we have an adult ‘;who shows rashness, obstinacy and self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgencies—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect’, we do not subject him to character-building games or uplifting scripture readings, or initiate him into the mysteries of home economics, or read Shakespeare at him. But we compulsorily do all of this and more to children. Moreover, compulsory education, as we have it, is not something from which the young can gain remission. The law that requires ‘;every child of compulsory school age…to receive an efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude’ effectively defines an approach where what counts is the arbitrariness of chronology, not standards or excellence. (shrink)

This article is an investigation into G. E. M. Anscombe's suggestion that there can be cases where belief takes a personal object, through an examination of the role that the activity of teaching plays in Anscombe's discussion. By contrasting various kinds of ‘teachers’ that feature in her discussion, it is argued that the best way of understanding the idea of believing someone personally is to situate the relevant encounter within the social, conversational framework of ‘engaged reasoning’. Key features of this (...) framework are highlighted, and are used to characterise the distinctive kind of teaching and learning germane to Anscombe's suggestion. (shrink)

Peters' account of the moral life and the conception of practical reason that informed it reflects a sophisticated moral universalism. However, attempts to extend a similarly sophisticated universalism into our understanding of education are not as well received. Yet, such a project is of clear contemporary relevance given the pressure put on educational institutions to achieve certain ends. If we can show that education entails standards that are not entirely contingent upon current interests, we would have a framework that all (...) institutions seriously claiming to be involved in the enterprise would have to acknowledge. In this paper I argue that a reconstruction of the relationship between Peters' work in philosophical ethics and his conceptual analysis may go some way in showing how one can speak of education in universalistic terms. Accordingly, although many of the criticisms laid at Peters' feet are of merit, they overshadow more potentially useful interpretive moves. Finally, I show how a change in the focus of Peters' account of education and practical reason more generally can provide important resources for engaging in a more plausible exploration of universalistic themes in education. (shrink)

An influential view of education is that it prepares young people for adult life, usually in the areas of civic engagement, leisure and contemplation. Employment may be a locus for learning some worthwhile skills and knowledge, but it is not itself the possible locus or one of the possible loci of a worthwhile life. This article disputes that view by drawing attention to those aspects of employment that make it potentially an aspect of a worthwhile life. The exercise and development (...) of one's abilities, co-operation with others, self-discovery and the pursuit of excellence are all identified as potential components of a worthwhile life. If such an aspect of life is worth striving for then education should prepare one for it. Objections to this argument are reviewed and ultimately rejected. (shrink)

Carolyn M Stone; Autonomy, Emotions and Desires: some problems concerning R. F. Dearden's account of autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Is.

John Wilson, Barbara Cowell; The Democratic Myth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–117, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

Jan W Steutel; Forms of Reflection on Central Educational Concepts, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–171, https://.

ABSTRACT Recent educational theorising about the nature of teaching, learning and assessment has made much of a distinction between processes and products and of so-called process models of education und curriculum. Following on from reflections on the historical provenance and subsequent evolution of process talk in psychology and the philosophy of mind it is argued in this article that such talk can only import serious conceptual confusion and ambiguity into our attempts to understand clearly and adequately the business of human (...) learning. In the light of this it would be altogether better for us to expunge the language of process from the discourse of education. (shrink)

University and school preparation of new teachers should include work on the ethical and policy quandries of professional work. As it is, teacher education institutions too rarely tackle questions of protocol, ethics, policy, principles, and procedures. Professors may discuss matters of protocol, especially ethical conflicts arising from school and university practices and routines. But they rarely give in-depth treatment to ethics and policy in the teaching life. Moreover, treatment of these matters is often sparse in ethical theory or in reasoned (...) analyses of protocol and policies. This leaves the new teacher without initiation into centrally important elements of teaching. The appropriate treatment of protocol, ethical, and policy matters in education programs warrants a separate course of instruction. Here, students would be encouraged to improve their ethical reasoning and to learn ethical theory. They would learn various ways to assess protocol and policy problems likely to arise in classrooms and schools. Minimally, teacher education professors should draw attention to important protocol, ethical, and policy aspects of course content and do so in vigorous, educationally sound ways. In this article, I show how my treatment of protocol, ethics, and policies would apply more widely in general postsecondary education. (shrink)

John Tillson’s book Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence addresses several themes: the ground and nature of ethical responsibility; the means and goals of ethical formative influence; the nature and ground of religious belief. In this article, I focus on the issue of justification for educational influence in general. Attention to this issue could avoid some intractable problems of specifically religious influence, most particularly the challenge of providing satisfactory criteria for what belongs to the category of religion. Whilst there (...) may be important reasons for examining specifically religious influence, I argue that religious influence is not fundamentally different from other forms of influence, and that the logic of the ethics of influence in general would encompass the logic of religious influence. If the educator is to justify certain forms of influence, then they should employ a kind of restraint: the educator should influence whilst simultaneously protect the influencee from that very influence. (shrink)

1. Educational concepts play an important role in educational studies. Educational concepts roughly correspond to terms or words pertaining to education. They include terms such as ‘schooling’, ‘te...

This paper, while not presenting a general discussion of authority in education, attempts to uncover some of the anomalies, paradoxes and tensions in the concept. It will argue for a revaluation of authority as an educational virtue, as a form of participatory guidance that is an aid to growth. The paper intends to help provoke continued debate over our perceived educational virtues and vices. I argue that virtuous authority is authority exercised from the point of view of a larger experience (...) and a wider horizon. If teachers’ ‘pedagogical imperative’ is to bridge the gap between forms of knowledge and their pupils, then their practice will involve authority. I suggest here that such authority should be repositioned as participatory, immanent and democratic. As Dewey says, ‘The need for authority is…constant…[I]t is the need for principles that are both stable enough and flexible enough to give direction to the processes of living in its vicissitudes and uncertainties.’ In answer to this, I suggest that teachers practice their authority in order to create stable yet flexible, open and indeterminate, but not chaotic situations that combine with pupils’ experiences in such a way as to enable educational growth. Authority practised as a form of participatory guidance, to pursue this Deweyan line of argument, can be ‘an aid to freedom’ and not freedom's enemy. This paper will argue that authority, so revalued, ought to be cultivated in our educational thought and practice. Eds: This paper forms part of a Special Issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 305-317, April 2022.

This paper takes as its starting point Kant's analysis of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. From this analysis, two different types of freedom are discerned, formative and instrumental freedom. The paper suggests that much of what passes for the pedagogy of learning in UK universities takes the form of an instrumental freedom. This, however, involves the neglect of formative freedom—the power to put learning to question. An emancipatory concept of education requires that formative freedom lies at the heart (...) of the educative endeavour, to which learning must be seen as secondary. The proposal of the two types of freedom is based on a relatively detailed consideration of Kant's Critique—this is necessary in order to ensure that the concepts of instrumental and formative freedom have a credible philosophical basis. (shrink)

Debates about indoctrination raise fundamental questions about the ethics of teaching. This paper presents a philosophical analysis of indoctrination, including 1) an account of what indoctrination is and why it is harmful, and 2) a framework for understanding the responsibilities of teachers and other educational actors to avoid its negative outcomes. I respond to prominent outcomes-based accounts of indoctrination, which I argue share two limiting features—a narrow focus on the threat indoctrination poses to knowledge and on the dyadic relationship between (...) indoctrinator and indoctrinated person. I propose a system-based account of indoctrination in which actors with authority contribute to the production or reinforcement of closed-mindedness, which threatens both knowledge and understanding. By taking a system-based approach, my account is better equipped to identify the implications of indoctrination for educational policy and practice. (shrink)

Michael Naish; Education and Essential Contestability Revisited, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 141–153, https://doi.

Howard Gardner’s theory of Multiple Intelligences has had a huge influence on school education. But its credentials lack justification, as the first section of this paper shows via a detailed philosophical analysis of how the intelligences are identified. If we want to make sense of the theory, we need to turn from a philosophical to a historical perspective. This is provided in the second section, which explores how the theory came to take shape in the course of Gardner’s intellectual development. (...) The third section looks at changes in the theory since its inception in 1983 and at problems with its applications to education. The paper concludes with a response to Gardner’s critical comments on the argument to this point. (shrink)

The role of critique in the Anglophone analytical tradition of philosophy of education is outlined and some of its shortcomings are noted, particularly its apparent claim to methodological objectivity in arriving at what are clearly contestable positions about the normative basis of education. Many of these issues can be seen to have a long history within European, and especially German, philosophy of education. In the light of this the discussion moves on to a consideration of similarities and contrasts between the (...) Anglophone and German-inspired deployment of the concept of critical rationality in philosophy of education. The claims to objectivity of the Anglophone tradition are contrasted with a more self-conscious concern for social justice and improvement in other European traditions, which has been followed more recently by a greater scepticism concerning the potential of critique for delivering social justice and improvement in education. This has parallels with the growing Anglophone disillusion with ‘classical’ analytic philosophy of education. This in turn has resulted in a greater awareness of the limitations of critique: its ideological character, its rootedness in specific contexts, its own potential dogmatism and its ambiguities. The various contributions to this volume are briefly described and related to each other. (shrink)

Although it is primarily concerned with the value of liberty and the justification of compulsory education, what lies behind much of this paper is the question ‘;Why treat children like children?’ The fact is that we do not regard children as having the same rights, privileges and liberties as adults, and children may not be thought of as deserving the same degree of respect or consideration as their seniors. In the past this has led to some horrific states of affairs, (...) and while matters have undoubtedly improved, it is still the case that most people accept what Graham Haydon describes as ‘;the assumption that one thing can go for children and quite another for adults’. One likely consequence of this, and an important example of the different treatment reserved for children is compulsory education. Illiterate and innumerate adults are not compelled to practise their letters or play with counters or watch prescribed television programmes. Even when, to quote Mill, we have an adult ‘;who shows rashness, obstinacy and self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgencies—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect’, we do not subject him to character-building games or uplifting scripture readings, or initiate him into the mysteries of home economics, or read Shakespeare at him. But we compulsorily do all of this and more to children. Moreover, compulsory education, as we have it, is not something from which the young can gain remission. The law that requires ‘;every child of compulsory school age…to receive an efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude’ effectively defines an approach where what counts is the arbitrariness of chronology, not standards or excellence. (shrink)

This article is the second of a two-part investigation, the first part of which was published in Ethics and Education, vol. 5, issue 2, 2010, under the title ?Preface to an ethics of education as a practice in its own right?. Although it builds on the arguments of that ?preface?, this second part of the investigation can be read as a stand-alone essay. It begins with a brief review of a new subordination of educational practice achieved by a neo-liberal tenor (...) in international educational reforms in recent decades in Western societies. The practical context for the essay however is that failure of many of these reforms, like the failure of neo-liberal dominance in socio-economic policy, has given rise to emergent opportunities where inspirations for educational debate and policy-making are concerned. Arguing for the uptake of such opportunity, the ethical tenor of education as a practice in its own right is explored under four headings: (1) review and clarification of the inherent purposes of education as a practice; (2) investigation of educationally productive pathways that are characteristic of education as a practice in its own right; (3) elucidation of a recognisable family of virtues that arise from that practice itself; (4) exploration of the kinds of relationships through which these virtues, and their educational fruits, are nourished. (shrink)

Carolyn M Stone; Autonomy, Emotions and Desires: some problems concerning R. F. Dearden's account of autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Is.

Michael Naish; Education and Essential Contestability Revisited, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 141–153, https://doi.

In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore the similarities and differences between our theories. In the first part of the paper, I outline what Hirst calls the ‘sophisticated view of education’, which I wholeheartedly endorse, and highlight his attention to the noncognitive as well as the cognitive (...) aspects of morality. In the second part, I explain how Hirst’s transcendental justification of morality differs from my contractarian justification and trace the implications of this difference for our respective accounts of moral education. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In this ninth chapter of Interpreting Kant in Education, I respond to familiar criticisms in education theory of a dualism that is seen to be at the heart of Kant's philosophy. This, and related charges of a detached conception of mind, are addressed through a discussion of concepts—conceptual unity, conceptual distinctions, how these are learnt and developed, and the idea of a dynamic system of concepts. Sebastian Rödl's work on the general and particular is used to re-emphasise the unity of (...) the capacities in perception and experience, and to help show how thought and reality can be understood together. Alternative interpretations of Kant's terms, introduced through the chapters, are expanded on, to bring out more of the fine-tuned richness of Kant's view that is obscured in characterisations that make up the familiar ‘Kantian’ picture in education. The aim is to further delineate the Kant who is not a ‘Kantian’. (shrink)

John Wilson, Barbara Cowell; The Democratic Myth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–117, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

The concept of respect plays a central role in several recent attempts to re-actualise the programme of a critical social theory. In Axel Honneth's most prominent version of that concept, respect is closely tied to the sphere of law, and it is limited to the recognition of a Kantian-type moral autonomy of the individual. So interpreted, the concept of respect can only have a very limited application in the field of education, where concern for the particular desires, intentions and beliefs (...) of mostly immature persons is at stake.However, more than forty years ago R. S. Peters did develop an extended concept of respect as a central component in education. This concept focuses exactly on those desires, intentions and beliefs, instead of on the very demanding capability of practical reasoning orientated towards the Kantian Categorical Imperative. My task in this paper is to explore the potential of Peters' concept of respect for the identification and description of educational pathologies and ultimately for the founding of a critical theory of education. (shrink)

In the past decade well‐designed research studies have shown that the practice of collaborative philosophical inquiry in schools can have marked cognitive and social benefits. Student academic performance improves, and so too does the social dimension of schooling. These findings are timely, as many countries in Asia and the Pacific are now contemplating introducing Philosophy into their curricula. This paper gives a brief history of collaborative philosophical inquiry before surveying the evidence as to its effectiveness. The evidence is canvassed under (...) two categories: schooling and thinking skills; and schooling, socialisation and values. In both categories there is clear evidence that even short‐term teaching of collaborative philosophical inquiry has marked positive effects on students. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research and a final claim that the presently‐available research evidence is strong enough to warrant implementing collaborative philosophical inquiry as part of a long‐term policy. (shrink)

Education as a practice in its own right (or sui generis practice) invokes quite a different set of ethical considerations than does education understood as a subordinate activity ? i.e. prescribed and controlled in its essentials by the current powers-that-be in a society. But the idea of education as a vehicle for the ?values? of a particular group or party is so commonplace, from history's legacy as well as from ongoing waves of educational reforms, as to appear a quite natural (...) one. So much is this case that the idea of education as a sui generis practice may seem a bit eccentric at first sight. Some preliminary work is called for then to render intelligible the claim that education is indeed a practice in its own right, and to illustrate the original starting point this gives for an exploration of educational ethics. In undertaking this preliminary work, central themes from two major sources are explored and reviewed: Richard Peters? well-known study Ethics and education and MacIntyre's After virtue. The suggestive merits of both works for advancing a sui generis understanding of education and its conduct are identified. But crucial occlusions are also highlighted in the arguments of both authors, the recognition of which might have enabled their thinking on educational matters to venture onto a different plane. The kind of thinking that emerges from these investigations as most promising for educational ethics is seen to differ in its key features from what the various branches of academic philosophy have to offer by way of ethical theory. (shrink)