Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation examines the uniquely moral motive of respect in light of Kant’s general metaphysics of agency. Kant refers to respect as a “sui generis” feeling that is both intrinsically cognitive and conative, but also denies that respect is any kind of feeling at all. Guevara convincingly argues that the feelings characteristic of respect are not psychological effects caused by our recognition of the authority of the moral law: rather, such feelings are just the affective aspect of (...) this recognition itself, as it is realized in agents with both an intelligible and a sensible character. Guevara also argues that the affective side of respect is fundamentally “positive” in character, despite Kant’s claims that our immediate experience of the law is one of “humiliation,” in which our pretensions to self-worth independent of morality are struck down. (shrink)

IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF KANT that he interprets pure practical reason as will. He thereby revolutionizes the notions of both reason and the will. Reason is conceived as interest, a motivating power, even a self-sufficient telos. Moreover, the will is understood as a rational power, that is, as initially structured by the form of law, and striving for universality in both its inner operation and the way it ought to shape the outside world. For such a will, being rational also (...) means being self-constituting, or autonomous, and self-willing, that is, seeking rationality as end-in-itself. (shrink)

When in 1792 Kant published his essay “On the Radical Evil in Human Nature” in the Berlinische Monatsschrift it had the effect of an exploding bomb. Many of those who previously embraced his ethics were shocked and bewildered. Goethe’s well-known metaphorical statement sums up the reaction: “Kant required a long lifetime to purify his philosophical mantle of many impurities and prejudices. And now he has wantonly tainted it with the shameful stain of radical evil, in order that Christians too might (...) be attracted to kiss its hem.” The deep emotional disappointment of Kant’s followers aside, there is very little reason to believe that Kant’s alleged sharp turn in regard to the problem of evil was dictated by any political considerations. Rather, it was Kant’s decision to face philosophically his inner conviction of “the insuperable evil of our hearts,” which before the essay on radical evil only appears—rather implicitly—in his personal correspondence. (shrink)

Near the end of each section he reviewed what he had done, and both times he concluded that he had achieved his first two goals. At the end of the first section he wrote.