Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Kant and Hutcheson on the Psychology of Moral Motivation.Michael Walschots - 2024 - In Antonino Falduto (ed.), Problems of Reason: Kant in Context. De Gruyter. pp. 101–126.
    In this paper I argue that Kant’s psychology of moral motivation has less in common with Hutcheson’s view than interpreters have traditionally thought. I first offer an interpretation of the role that feeling, desire, and cognition play in Kant’s account of moral action. I then outline the essential features of Hutcheson’s understanding of desire before arguing that although Kant and Hutcheson share the trivial similarity that even moral action springs from a desire, Kant conceives of the desire at the root (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Incentives of the Mind: Kant and Baumgarten on the Impelling Causes of Desire.Michael Walschots - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    In this paper I propose to shed new light on the role of feeling in Kant’s psychology of moral motivation by focusing on the concept of an incentive (Triebfeder), a term he borrowed from one of his most important rationalist predecessors, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. I argue that, similar to Baumgarten, Kant understands an incentive to refer to the ground of desire and that feelings function as a specific kind of ground within Kant’s psychology of moral action, namely as the ‘impelling (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Kant on wonder as the motive to learn.Melissa Zinkin - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):921-934.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):75-92.
    Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis, he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only p...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Achtung in Kant and Smith.Michael Walschots - 2022 - Kant Studien 113 (2):238-268.
    This paper argues that Kant’s concept of ‘respect’ for the moral law has roots in Adam Smith’s concept of ‘regard’ for the general rules of conduct, which was translated as Achtung in the first German translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. After illustrating that Kant’s technical understanding of respect appeared relatively late in his intellectual development, I argue that Kant’s concept of respect and Smith’s concept of regard share a basic similarity: they are both a single complex phenomenon with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Kantian Forgiveness: Fallibility, Guilt and the need to become a Better Person: Reply to Blöser.Paula Satne - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1997-2019.
    In ‘Human Fallibility and the Need for Forgiveness’, Claudia Blöser has proposed a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. Blöser argues that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral failure, a need that we all have in virtue of our moral fallible nature, regardless of whether or not we have repented. Blöser claims that Kant’s proposal yields a plausible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis.Tamar Schapiro - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):147-167.
    In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Moral Motivation in Kant.Konstantinos Sargentis - 2012 - Kant Studies Online (1):93-121.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Kant on Moral Feelings, Moral Desires and the Cultivation of Virtue.Alix Cohen - 2018 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. De Gruyter. pp. 3-18.
    This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Sublime.Melissa Merritt - 2018 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. Since Kant says with evident endorsement that 'we call sublime that which is absolutely great' and nothing in nature can in fact be absolutely great, Kant concludes that strictly speaking what is sublime can only be the human calling to perfect our rational capacity according to the standard of virtue that is thought through the moral law. The Element (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of Emotions.Krista K. Thomason - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):441-462.
    One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility.Irene McMullin - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):49-72.
    The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes.Katie McShane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.
    Neosentimentalist accounts of value need an explanation of which of the sentiments they discuss are pro-attitudes, which attitudes are con-attitudes, and why. I argue that this project has long been neglected in the philosophical literature, even by those who make extensive use of the distinction between pro- and con-attitudes. Using the attitudes of awe and respect as exemplars, I argue that it is not at all clear what if anything makes these attitudes pro-attitudes. I conclude that neither our intuitive sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The lutheran influence on Kant’s depraved will.Dennis Vanden Auweele - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):117-134.
    Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kant’s understanding of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in their famous debate on the freedom of the will (1520–1527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant such a claim, I will argue that Kant’s understanding of the radical evil will draws closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements. These elements are (1) the intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil, (3) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. -/- I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Henry Allison on Kant's Theory of Freedom.Marcia Baron - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (4):775-.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Concrete Kantian Respect.Nancy Sherman - 1998 - Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (1):119.
    When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Kant's account of respect: A bridge between rationality and anthropology.Jane Singleton - 2007 - Kantian Review 12 (1):40-60.
    Kant starts the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by emphasizing the importance of separating the a priori or rational part of moral philosophy from the a posteriori or empirical aspects. Indeed, he reserves the term moral philosophy for the rational part. He writes ‘ethics … the empirical part might be given the special title practical anthropology, the term moral philosophy being properly used to refer just to the rational part’. Throughout his writings in both theoretical and practical philosophy the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Three accounts of respect for persons in Kant's ethics.Dennis Klimchuk - 2004 - Kantian Review 8:38-61.
    The idea that respect for persons comprises the core of morality has long been associated with Kant and the ethics of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, the second formulation of the categorical imperative , the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-itself – ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ – is often glossed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Moral regret and moral feeling(s).Katherine Gasdaglis - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):424-452.
    1. Kantian moral theories have been criticized for their inability to make sense of the phenomenology and propriety of regret in the face of difficult moral choices. As Bernard Williams puts it, re...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Respect for the Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason.Janelle DeWitt - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis.Sven Bernecker - 2006 - Kant Studien 97 (2):163-183.
    Kants Position zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis liegt zwischen den beiden Polen des Cartesianismus und des Behaviorismus. Hinsichtlich des Wissens um die eigenen Maximeninhalte vertritt Kant die cartesische Direktheitsthese und m.E. auch die Unfehlbarkeitsthese. Die beiden anderen Aspekte der moralischen Selbsterkenntnis – das Wissen um die Pflichtgemäßheit der Maximen und das Wissen um die Handlungsmotive – sind Kant zufolge allerdings weder infallibel, noch unbezweifelbar, noch direkt. Und obgleich Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der eigenen Handlungsmotive in Zweifel gezogen werden und sich als falsch erweisen können, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Respect and loving attention.Carla Bagnoli - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):483-516.
    On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Kant on moral self‐opacity.Anastasia N. A. Berg - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):567-585.
    It has been widely accepted that Kant holds the “Opacity Thesis,” the claim that we cannot know the ultimate grounds of our actions. Understood in this way, I shall argue, the Opacity Thesis is at odds with Kant's account of practical self-consciousness, according to which I act from the (always potentially conscious) representation of principles of action and that, in particular, in acting from duty I act in consciousness of the moral law's determination of my will. The Opacity Thesis thus (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Humanity and personality – what, for Kant, is the source of moral normativity?Ido Geiger - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):565-588.
    According to Korsgaard’s very influential interpretation, moral normativity follows from a commonly accepted conception of rational agency, namely, the capacity to set ends and pursue them or humanity. The paper argues that humanity is not the source of moral normativity. Taking the exercise of your freedom in pursuit of your ends to be justified commits you to acknowledging the equal claim of others to see themselves as justified in the pursuit of their ends. This entails the equal restriction of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • “Having Respect for” and “Being Respectful”: A Comparison between the Kantian Conception and the Confucian Conception of Respect.Qiannan Li - 2023 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 22 (1):1-21.
    The notion of respect is central to many moral requirements in daily life. In the Western philosophical tradition, there is a tendency to explore the nature of respect based on the nature of the object of respect. The Kantian account of respect for the moral law is one representative of this approach. In contrast, the classical Confucian notion of jing 敬 not only has a meaning similar to the Western notion of respect but also emphasizes the value of having a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral motivation in early 18th century moral rationalism.Daniel Eggers - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):552-574.
    In the modern debate in metaethics and moral psychology, moral rationalism is often presented as a view that cannot account for the intimate relation between moral behaviour on one hand and feelings, emotions, or desires on the other. Although there is no lack of references to the classic rationalists of the 18th century in the relevant discussions, the works of these writers are rarely ever examined detail. Yet, as the debate in Kant scholarship between “intellectualists” and “affectivists” impressively shows, a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Sympathy, discernment, and reasons.Garrett Cullity - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):37–62.
    According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant's Ethics.Erica A. Holberg - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):226-246.
    I argue for a new reading of Kant's claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of each. I show that within Kant's ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How Kantian must Kantian constructivists be?Evan Tiffany - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):524 – 546.
    Kantian constructivists locate the source of normativity in the rational nature of valuing agents. Some further argue that accepting this premise thereby commits one to accepting the intrinsic or unconditioned value of rational nature itself. Whereas much of the critical literature on this “regress on conditions” argument has focused either on the cogency of the inference from the value-conferring capacity of the will to the unconditional value of that capacity itself or on the plausibility of the initial constructivist premise, my (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (2 other versions)8 Moralisches Handeln.Nico Scarano - 2002 - In Otfried Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 121-140.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Immanuel Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.Otfried Höffe (ed.) - 2002 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
    Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788) steht zu Unrecht oft im Schatten der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Tatsächlich sind die Grundelemente der Kantischen Moralphilosophie im Gegensatz zu vielen Thesen der ersten Kritik bis heute weitgehend anerkannt, und erst der Nachweis der zweiten Kritik, dass Freiheit wirklich ist, macht "den Schlussstein von dem ganzen Gebäude eines Systems der reinen, selbst der spekulativen Vernunft aus". Entlang der Stichworte reiner Wille, gesetzgebende Form der Maxime, transzendentale Freiheit, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)A teoria kantiana do respeito pela lei moral e da determinação da vontade.Julio Esteves - 2009 - Trans/Form/Ação 32 (2):75-89.
    Este artigo tem por objetivo examinar uma tensão existente no interior da teoria kantiana do respeito pela lei moral. Originalmente, na Fundamentação, o respeito é concebido por Kant como um mero efeito ou subproduto da imediata determinação da vontade pela lei moral. Na segunda Crítica, contudo, Kant parece conceder um papel mais positivo ao respeito, dando a ele a tarefa de enfraquecer a influência exercida pelas inclinações, o que contaria como uma promoção da influência da lei moral sobre a vontade. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark