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Self-Deception and Delusions

Alfred Mele

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124 (2006)

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Twisted Self Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.details In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 32 citations
(1 other version)Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-179.details According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something, p , and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something, p , and there is a time at which they believe that p (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
Primary error detection and minimization (PEDMIN) strategies in social cognition: A reinterpretation of confirmation bias phenomena.James Friedrich - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (2):298-319.details Download Export citation Bookmark 48 citations
Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.details This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief.Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-364.details Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 64 citations
Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.details Although a common clinical phenomenon, delusions are difficult to explain and have a problematic conceptual status. Advances in understanding delusions have come from studies which involve detailed investigation of particular types of delusion. Some of this work is summarised, with the Capgras and Cotard delusions as specific examples. These are used to high-highlight questions for which there is the potential for fruitful dialogue with philosophers. Such questions include the criteria for deciding that a statement represents a belief, the extent to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 21 citations

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