Timely and provocative essays on bioethical questions brought to the forefront by the bioterrorist threat.

This article presents historical cases in which Britishscientists, principally scientific advisors, have attempted to defendresearch on biological weapons. Although the historical record is scant,there is a degree of continuity in their justifications, and a number ofthemes can be identified. It was argued, that biological weaponsresearch is morally justified because it produces humane weapons; thatit is no different from medical or other research; and that it is beingperformed for defensive purposes. It is argued that this defence isdirected primarily towards other scientists (...) working on germ warfare, andwas formed part of the `moral economy' of that secretcommunity. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of ethics in research with potentialapplicability to chemical and biological warfare. It focuses uponbiological warfare research, and examines the ethical dilemmas faced bythose working with dual-use potential technologies. It discusses thenormative, legal and ethical prohibitions against participation inchemical and biological warfare programmes from a Western perspective.It examines the motivations of individuals participating in CBW researchand concludes with recommendations for increasing awareness aboutethical and normative prohibitions. An appendix lists the results of asurvey of ethical codes in (...) relevant scientific disciplines conducted viathe Internet. (shrink)

In February 1975, a group of leading scientists, physicians, and policymakers convened at Asilomar, California, to consider the safety of proceeding with recombinant DNA research. The excitement generated by the promise of this new technology was counterbalanced by concerns regarding dangers that might arise from it, including the potential for accidental release of genetically modified organisms into the environment. Guidelines developed at the conference to direct future research endeavors had several consequences. They permitted research to resume, bringing to an end (...) the voluntary moratorium that the National Academy of Sciences had instituted several months earlier. They also served to illustrate that the scientific community was capable of self-governance, thereby securing public trust and persuading Congress not to institute legislative restrictions. Finally, they underscored the importance of weighing unforeseen risks inherent in some research against potential benefits that may arise from these same endeavors. (shrink)

This article reviews the history of smallpox and ethical issues that arise with its threat as a biological weapon. Smallpox killed more people than any infectious disease in history-and perhaps three times more people in the 20th Century than were killed by all the wars of that period. Following a WHO-sponsored global vaccination campaign, smallpox was officially declared eradicated in 1980. It has since been revealed that the Soviet Union, until its fall in the early 1990s, manufactured tens of tons (...) of smallpox for military purposes. A worry is that some of this may have fallen into the hands of "rogue" nations or terrorists. Current U.S. debate questions whether smallpox vaccine should therefore be made available to the American public, which-like the rest of the world-now lacks immunity. Because the vaccine is considerably dangerous, public dialogue cannot resolve this matter if evidence material to the likelihood of attack is classified (i.e. secret). I conclude by recommending numerous future areas for ethics research related to the weaponization of smallpox. (shrink)

: Some scientific research should not be published. The risks to national security and public health override the social benefits of disseminating scientific results openly. Unfortunately, scientists themselves are not in a position to know which studies to withhold from public view, as the National Research Council has proposed. Yet neither can government alone be trusted to balance the competing interests at stake.

: Some industry relationships are a good idea, and that makes banning the dangerous ones difficult.

Editor's Note: On February 2, 2005, the National Institutes of Health changed course on conflicts of interest and prohibited its scientists from owning stock in or working as consultants with pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies. The following essay, sent to press before the new policy was announced, recommends a very different approach. The author stands by the recommendations.

Editor's Note: On February 2, 2005, the National Institutes of Health changed course on conflicts of interest and prohibited its scientists from owning stock in or working as consultants with pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies. The following essay, sent to press before the new policy was announced, recommends a very different approach. The author stands by the recommendations.

The paper provides a briefintroduction to the biotechnology revolutionand its impact upon biological researchrelevant to military uses. It describes thestatus of biological weapons today, and currentefforts to strengthen the Biological WeaponsConvention with a legally binding complianceprotocol. Specific modifications ofmicro-organisms that may be of military use arediscussed. Three examples of dual-use researchactivities are then used to highlight issuesand dilemmas in ethical decision making.

The precautionary principle (PP) is thought by many to be a useful strategy for action and by many others useless at best and dangerous at worst. We argue that it is a coherent and useful principle. We first clarify the principle and then defend it against a number of common criticisms. Three examples from nanotechnology are used; nanoparticles and possible health and environmental problems, grey goo and the potential for catastrophe, and privacy risks generated by nanoelectronics.

Although smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980, there are fears that stocks of the virus manufactured for military purposes by the Soviet Union may have fallen into the hands of “rogue nations” or terrorists. Worries about bioterrorism have thus sparked debate about whether or not the smallpox vaccine, which can be dangerous, should be offered to the general public. Meaningful public debate on this issue requires expert information about the likelihood that the virus will in fact be used as a (...) weapon. Informed voluntary individual decision making, about whether to get vaccinated if vaccine is made available to the public, would similarly require appreciation of the likelihood of attack. Public deliberation and private deliberation thus both require briefing by the intelligence community. (shrink)

The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs' new “Guidelines to Prevent the Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research” are both timely and appropriate. These guidelines are a product of the increasing realization of the “dual use” potential of life science discoveries. Although biomedical research usually aims at the development of new medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, and so on, the very same discoveries that could benefit humankind in these ways also often have implications for the development of biological weapons. The (...) CEJA Guidelines draw attention to this fact and hold that physician–researchers have responsibilities regarding the uses to which their discoveries are put. Medical researchers should assess the likely social benefits and harms of their work and avoid projects where the latter outweigh the former. Knowledge and the advancement of science should not be the only aims of scientists; “commitment to public welfare and safety” are also essential. Toward the aim of preventing the malevolent use of research discoveries, the CEJA states that “regulatory oversight” of research, increased ethics education of physician researchers, and sometimes perhaps even censorship of research findings, are warranted. (shrink)

Given that, globally, health professionals' involvement in crises—especially complex crises where human action plays a contributing role—has risen to new proportions, emergency preparedness is an increasingly integral capacity of health systems. As the United States has come to see itself as vulnerable to violence, its leaders have begun to reorganize the country's health system around protection from terrorism and other health emergencies, upholding this as an essential element or “indispensable pillar” in their strategy for securing the homeland. Biodefense and emergency (...) preparedness have thus come to capture the energies and expertise of nearly all health professionals and, increasingly, to define the specific ends that organize their work. a. (shrink)

Striving to boldly redirect the philosophy of science, this book by renowned philosopher Philip Kitcher examines the heated debate surrounding the role of science in shaping our lives. Kitcher explores the sharp divide between those who believe that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary--the purists--and those who believe that it invariably serves the interests of people in positions of power. In a daring turn, he rejects both perspectives, working out a more realistic image of the sciences--one (...) that allows for the possibility of scientific truth, but nonetheless permits social consensus to determine which avenues to investigate. He then proposes a democratic and deliberative framework for responsible scientists to follow. Controversial, powerful, yet engaging, this volume will appeal to a wide range of readers. Kitcher's nuanced analysis and authorititative conclusion will interest countless scientists as well as all readers of science--scholars and laypersons alike. (shrink)

In computer ethics, as in other branches of applied ethics, the problem of the justification of moral judgment is still unresolved. I argue that the method which is referred to as “The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (WRE) offers the best solution to it. It does not fall victim to the false dilemma of having to choose either case‐based particularist or principle‐based universalist approaches to the problem of moral justification. I claim that WRE also provides the best model of practical (...) moral reasoning available for computer ethics. It does not pretend to provide quasi‐algorithmic procedures for moral decision‐making, but neither does it abandon the regulative ideal of communicative transparency in discursive public justification. (shrink)

Given that, globally, health professionals' involvement in crises—especially complex crises where human action plays a contributing role—has risen to new proportions, emergency preparedness is an increasingly integral capacity of health systems. As the United States has come to see itself as vulnerable to violence, its leaders have begun to reorganize the country's health system around protection from terrorism and other health emergencies, upholding this as an essential element or “indispensable pillar” in their strategy for securing the homeland. Biodefense and emergency (...) preparedness have thus come to capture the energies and expertise of nearly all health professionals and, increasingly, to define the specific ends that organize their work. a. (shrink)