Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August 1900—-after he (...) became acquainted with the works of Peano and later of Frege—-Russell gradually developed another theory of sense-data. With the collaboration of G. E. Moore, Russell reintroduced the term “sense-data” in 1911. Concomitantly with this move, Russell introduced the epistemological term “knowledge by acquaintance”, which came to designate the grasping of sense-data and universals. (shrink)

In der Erfahrung sind zwei Stufen zu unterscheiden: Die primäre Welt besteht aus den noch nicht dinglich gedeuteten Sinnesempfindungen in ihrer einfachsten Ordnung nach Zeit-, Raum-und Qualitätsunterschieden. Alle Ordnung und Verarbeitung der Erfahrung von solcher Art, daß sie auch weggelassen werden kann, rechnet zur zweiten Stufe. Ihr Inhalt ist die sekundäre Welt; Beispiele: die gewöhnliche Welt des täglichen Lebens und die physikalische Welt.Der Begriff der Dimensionszahl (DZ) wird festgelegt. Während die sekundäre (die gewöhnliche und die physikalische) Welt die DZ (3+1) (...) hat (d. h. 3 Raum- und 1 Zeitdimension), ergibt die Untersuchung für die primäre Welt (den Bereich der ungedeuteten Sinnesempfindungen) nur die DZ (2+1). Die Konstruktion der sekundären Welt schließt also eine Erhöhung der DZ um 1 ein.Nach einer Bestimmung des Begriffs der determinierenden und der beschränkenden Gesetze zeigt sich: In der sekundären (physikalischen) Welt gelten determinierende Gesetze bestimmter Art (ersten Grades). In der primären Welt bestehen weder determinierende noch auch bloß beschränkende Gesetze. Der Aufbau der sekundären Welt führt also die Determiniertheit neu ein.Die beiden in die sekundäre Welt eingebauten Fiktionen: Dreidimensionalität des Raumes (gleichbedeutend mit Vierdimensionalität des Weltgeschehens) und Determiniertheit oder physikalische Kausalität stehen in logischem Abhängigkeits-verhältnis zueinander. Die erste ist durch die zweite bedingt. (shrink)

The question I shall attempt to address in what follows is an essentially historical one, namely: Why did analytic philosophy emerge first in Cambridge, in the hands of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and as a direct consequence of their revolutionary rejection of the philosophical tenets that form the basis of British Idealism? And the answer that I shall try to defend is: it didn't. That is to say, the ‘analytic’ doctrines and methods which Moore and Russell embraced in (...) the very last years of the nineteenth century were not revolutionary, did not emerge first in Cambridge, were the creation of neither Russell nor Moore and cannot be explained by appeal to facts concerning British Idealism. The adoption of the doctrines and methods which characterised the earliest manifestations of British analytic philosophy are to be explained neither by reference to anything specifically British, nor by appeal to anything unproblematically philosophical. Or so I shall argue. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt. It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy (...) of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science. (shrink)

A collection of material on Husserl's Logical Investigations, and specifically on Husserl's formal theory of parts, wholes and dependence and its influence in ontology, logic and psychology. Includes translations of classic works by Adolf Reinach and Eugenie Ginsberg, as well as original contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Kevin Mulligan, Gilbert Null, Barry Smith, Peter M. Simons, Roger A. Simons and Dallas Willard. Documents work on Husserl's ontology arising out of early meetings of the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy.

Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach (...) to practically all philosophical problems; (ii) his treating of the concepts relation, structure (constructions) and order; (iii) the discussion of the concepts of states of affairs, multiple theory of judgment, general logical form; (iv) some common themes like panpsychism and contemplating the world sub specie aeternitatis. (shrink)

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

G.H. von Wright, G.E. Moore's and Wittgenstein's successor, and John Wisdom's predecessor as a Professor of Philosophy in Cambridge, wrote in 1993: «The history of the "analytical" movement has not yet been written in full. With its increased diversification, it becomes pertinent to try to identify its most essential features and distinguish them from later additions which are alien to its origins.» In the same year A.J. Ayer's successor as a Wykeham Professor of Logic in Oxford, M. Dummett noted: «I (...) hope that such a history will be written: it would be fascinating.» The task of this book is to fulfill these hopes. (shrink)