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Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

Christopher Mole & Jiaying Zhao

Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):365-373 (2016)

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Representation-hunger reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.details According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 25 citations
Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance.Anthony Chemero - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):625-647.details Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti- representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti- representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representationalism must be divided into two distinct theses, one ontological, one (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 54 citations
Neural representations not needed - no more pleas, please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.details Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
Seeing absence.Anna Farennikova - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.details Intuitively, we often see absences. For example, if someone steals your laptop at a café, you may see its absence from your table. However, absence perception presents a paradox. On prevailing models of perception, we see only present objects and scenes (Marr, Gibson, Dretske). So, we cannot literally see something that is not present. This suggests that we never literally perceive absences; instead, we come to believe that something is absent cognitively on the basis of what we perceive. But this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 61 citations
A Systems-Neuroscience View of Attention.Christian C. Ruff - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.details Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations

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